The New Jersey Supreme Court has just taken certification in State v. Nazier Goldsmith, in which it will revisit the often examined issue of whether police officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop and frisk defendant when there was no probable cause to arrest. These cases invariably involve assertion by the police of some combination of “nervous” appearance, “furtive” gestures or body language, “bulges” in pants, or being found in a “high-crime area.” In Goldsmith, each of these except protrusions in clothing was alleged, and the courts are reluctant to challenge all but the most implausible assertions of reasonable suspicion when based on these fairly malleable factors.

While we doubt the court intends a wholesale reconsideration of the jurisprudence of Terry stops in New Jersey, we do suggest that it at least take a hard look at one of these factors—“high-crime area.” The U.S. Supreme Court held in Illinois v. Winslow (2000) that presence in a high-crime area, while insufficient standing alone to provide reasonable suspicion, was nevertheless relevant and could, in combination with other factors, justify a stop and frisk. Assertion of “high-crime area” has thus become an important component of law enforcement’s ability to engage in investigatory stops. But Winslow does not provide a definition of “high-crime area,” and New Jersey cases seem to accept that a location is in a high-crime area simply on the word of the police officer.