In most instances, a federal court assessing whether it has personal jurisdiction over a defendant applies the forum state’s personal jurisdiction statute—in New York, CPLR 301 for general jurisdiction, and CPLR 302 for long-arm or specific jurisdiction. If the exercise of jurisdiction is permissible under New York law, the court then assesses whether it also comports with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. New York’s long-arm statute does not confer jurisdiction in every case where it is constitutionally permissible.1 Accordingly, where a defendant is subject to jurisdiction under CPLR 302, the exercise of jurisdiction will likely also pass constitutional muster.
But the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Daimler v. Bauman,2 coupled with its 2011 decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown,3 call into question whether certain long-held assumptions about the reach of CPLR 301—New York’s general jurisdiction statute—are consistent with due process. Daimler’s impact is already evident in decisions from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. We discuss below several of those recent decisions, which raise important questions about the scope of general jurisdiction in New York.
