In Matter of Hearst v. Clyne, the Court of Appeals stated: “It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal.”1 This principle prohibits courts from giving advisory opinions or ruling on “academic, hypothetical, moot, or otherwise abstract questions.”2 Thus, “an appeal is moot unless adjudication on the merits will result in immediate and practical consequences to the parties.”3
Because “mootness is a doctrine related to subject matter jurisdiction,”4 it may be raised at any point in the litigation, and must be raised by the court sua sponte whenever it detects a potential mootness issue. Mootness often results from the passage of time or a change in circumstances during the pendency of an appeal. A large number of cases involve the dismissal of an appeal for mootness where an intervening change of circumstances prevented the appellate court from rendering a decision that would determine an actual controversy between the parties.
