In order to assert a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must prove he/she suffered actual damages as a result of the offensive statements at issue to recover, meaning the plaintiff must demonstrate a financial or economic loss. But, in the case of defamation per se, the standards are not as stringent and such damages are presumed. There are four categories of statements considered to be defamatory per se:

  • Statements charging a plaintiff with a serious crime,
  • Statements that tend to injure another in his or her trade, business, or profession,
  • Statements imputing a loathsome disease on a plaintiff, and
  • Statements imputing unchastity on a woman.

Despite the clear recognition under New York law of the seriousness of baseless accusations and the damage they cause, such statements are absolutely privileged when made in the context of judicial proceedings. This absolute privilege applies to statements made in connection with litigation (or in good-faith anticipation of litigation) when the comments and descriptions are considered to be relevant to the issues involved in the case. The underlying purpose of the privilege is to ensure that attorneys are able to speak freely in the course of litigation without a fear of harassment or potential financial punishment.