In a prior article I contended that McKinsey & Co. (McKinsey), the strategic consultant to the Financial Management and Oversight Board (the FOMB) in the Puerto Rico bankruptcy case, was not disinterested under Bankruptcy Code. Carlos J. Cuevas, PROMESA and McKinsey’s Lack of Disinterestedness, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 7, 2019). Subsequently, McKinsey, through its ethics counsel, published a rebuttal to my article. Ronald Barliant, Upholding a Rational Standard for Disinterestedness in Puerto Rico, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 17, 2019). It is important to state that I have no pecuniary stake in the Puerto Rico bankruptcy case, and do not represent any of the creditors. I have written about the Puerto Rico bankruptcy case as a person who has studied, taught, practiced and written about bankruptcy law for over 30 years. My sole interest is to see an equitable resolution of the Puerto Rico debt crisis in which all parties are treated fairly.

The jurisprudence concerning Bankruptcy Code §327(a) is robust and clear. Each day court appointed fiduciaries in bankruptcy cases must comply with the requirements of Bankruptcy Code §327(a). It is my contention that if Bankruptcy Code §327(a) were applicable to the Puerto Rico bankruptcy case, McKinsey could not have been retained because it is not disinterested. Given McKinsey’s central role in the Puerto Rico bankruptcy case, it is vital that McKinsey render dispassionate advice to the FOMB that is not tainted by a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest so as to not compromise the legitimacy of the Puerto Rico bankruptcy case.