The Barton doctrine is a legal principle that limits a court’s jurisdiction over a cause of action brought against a court-appointed receiver. Specifically, the doctrine requires that before a plaintiff can sue a receiver in a forum other than the court which appointed the receiver, the plaintiff must obtain leave from the appointing court to do so. Though the Barton doctrine was initially applicable to state court receiverships, federal courts have applied the doctrine in the bankruptcy context to shield a bankruptcy trustee from suits arising in connection with the trustee’s administration of a bankruptcy estate. As a result, before a plaintiff can sue a bankruptcy trustee in a nonbankruptcy forum, the plaintiff must obtain leave from the bankruptcy court. However, as the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently explained in In re World Marketing Chicago, 2018 WL 1989435 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2018), this rule does not apply if the plaintiff brings suit in the very bankruptcy court that appointed the trustee.

The Barton doctrine is grounded in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. 203 (1872) wherein the Supreme Court recognized that because a court-appointed receiver is “virtually a representative of the court … appointed for the benefit … of all concerned,” the receiver should not be subject to suit in connection with the performance of his or her duties, unless the appointing court permits the prosecution of such a suit. Relying on Davis, the Supreme Court in Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881) established that before bringing suit against a receiver in a foreign court, the plaintiff must first obtain leave from the appointing court.