Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Smith Per Curiam More than eighteen months after a machine used by appellee Edgar Berrios nearly severed one of his arms while he was working, appellees sued appellant Logical Systems, Inc. d/b/a Logical Systems, LLC (LSI) and others, claiming their defective design of the machine he was using at the time caused his injuries and appellees’ related losses. Ten months later, after appellees had twice amended their petition, LSI moved to dismiss appellees’claims against LSI with prejudice because, LSI argued, appellees failed to submit a certificate of merit as required by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 150.002. On June 8, 2023, the trial court granted LSI’s motion in part, dismissing appellees’ claims against LSI without prejudice and allowing appellees “to amend with the required specific notice to cure the defect, if it can cure.”[1] LSI timely filed this accelerated, interlocutory appeal. See TEX.CIV.PRAC.& REM. CODE § 150.002(f) (allowing interlocutory appeal); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(a) (appeals from interlocutory orders when allowed by statute are accelerated appeals). Appellees filed no cross-appeal challenging the dismissal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(d) (process and deadline for such). On appeal, LSI argues the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing appellees’ claims without prejudice and allowing appellees to amend “with the required specific notice to cure the defect, if it can cure.” As explained below, we conclude the trial court did not err by dismissing appellees’ claims without prejudice but did err by allowing appellees “to amend with the required specific notice to cure the defect, if it can cure.” Thus, without addressing the propriety, if any, of the dismissal of appellees’ claims against LSI,[2] we affirm the portion of the trial court’s June 8, 2023 order dismissing appellees’ claims against LSI without prejudice, reverse the portion of the order allowing appellees to amend their pleading as to their claims against LSI, and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ISSUES &ANALYSIS The trial court dismissed appellees’ claims against LSI without prejudice but also allowed appellees to amend “with the required specific notice to cure the defect, if it can cure.” LSI argues the trial court abused its discretion by taking both actions. We review an order granting a Chapter 150 motion to dismiss under an abuse of discretion standard, but if resolution of the issue requires us to interpret or construe the statutory language, we review that issue de novo. TIC N. Cent. Dall. 3, L.L.C. v. Envirobusiness, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). When reading a statute, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012). The plain meaning of the text is the best expression of legislative intent unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd or nonsensical results. Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011). We consider statutes as a whole rather than their isolated provisions. TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). We “endeavor to read the statute contextually, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence.” In re Office of Att’y Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding). Civil practice and remedies code § 150.002, entitled “Certificate of Merit,” states, in pertinent part: [I]n any action or arbitration proceeding for damages arising out of the provision of professional services by a licensed or registered professional,[3] a claimant[4] shall be required to file with the complaint[5] an affidavit of a third-party licensed architect, licensed professional engineer, registered landscape architect, or registered professional land surveyor who [meets certain criteria as specified in the statute]. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002(a). A claimant’s failure to file the affidavit in accordance with § 150.002 “shall result in dismissal of the complaint against the defendant[,]” and “ [t]his dismissal may be with prejudice.” See id. § 150.002(e). Thus, while the statute requires a trial court to dismiss a complaint if a claimant does not file a certificate of merit in compliance with the statute, because the dismissal “may” be with prejudice, the statute expressly does not require the trial court to dismiss with prejudice, and the trial court has discretion in determining whether to dismiss with or without prejudice. See TIC N. Cent. Dallas3, 463S.W.3d at 76. In exercising this discretion, the trial court cannot act “in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to guiding rules or principles” and should consider the statute’s “broader purposes” of deterring and quickly ending meritless claims. Id.; see CTL/Thompson Tex., L.L.C. v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n., Inc., 390 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (purpose of a section 150.002(e) dismissal is “to deter meritless claims and bring them quickly to an end”). In Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington Eng’g, Ltd., 536S.W.3d487, 496(Tex. 2017), the court stated: Aplaintiff’s failure to file an affidavit with an original petition, together with the filing of an amended petition with a deficient affidavit, might support a trial court’s determination that the claims lack merit. But that determination is within the trial court’s discretion and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Here, we need not and do not consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding to dismiss appellees’ claims against LSI because none of the parties challenge that dismissal. Instead, we consider only whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing appellees’ claims against LSI without prejudice (LSI’s second issue) and whether the trial court should have allowed appellees to amend “with the required specific notice to cure the defect, if it can cure” (LSI’s first issue). While LSI acknowledges a Chapter 150 dismissal “may be with prejudice,” see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002(e), LSI argues, in essence, that under the circumstances here—where Edgar Berrios’s injuries occurred more than two years before the dismissal date and thus appellees’ claims could not be re-filed within the statute of limitations—the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing appellees’ claims without prejudice and allowing appellees to amend. Appellees dispute LSI’s arguments and urge us to affirm the trial court’s order. We do so, but only in part. Based on the record before us, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing appellees’ claims against LSI without prejudice. Section 150.002 plainly allows the trial court discretion in deciding whether to dismiss with or without prejudice. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002(e) (dismissal “may be with prejudice”); TIC N. Cent. Dallas 3, 463 S.W.3d at 76 (trial court has discretion in making determination on whether to dismiss with or without prejudice). And there is no indication in the record that the trial court abused that discretion here. As was the case in Pedernal Energy, 536 S.W.3d at 494–95, appellees’ failure to file an expert affidavit with their original petition was not, by itself, evidence that the allegations in appellees’ petition lacked merit or mandated the sanction of dismissal with prejudice, and nothing in the record as of the time of the dismissal otherwise leads us to conclude the trial court’s action in dismissing without prejudice violated any guiding rules or principles so that its action as to the dismissal was arbitrary and unreasonable and an abuse of its discretion. While the court may have been able to exercise its discretion and reach a different conclusion on this record as to whether appellees’ claims should be dismissed with or without prejudice, we cannot say from the record before us that the trial court abused its discretion in making the decision it did on that issue.[6] We reach a different conclusion, however, regarding the trial court’s decision to allow appellees to amend their pleading “with the required specific notice to cure the defect, if it can cure.” We conclude the trial court erred by allowing appellees “to amend with the required specific notice to cure the defect, if it can cure” because a dismissal is equivalent to a suit never having been filed,[7] and thus, as a result of the dismissal, appellees no longer had any pleading against LSI to amend. Moreover, in practical effect, the portion of the order allowing appellees to amend their claims against LSI essentially treated LSI’s Chapter 150 motion to dismiss as a special exception to appellees’ pleading. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91; Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998) (“When the trial court sustains special exceptions, it must give the pleader an opportunity to amend the pleading.”). Chapter 150 contains no indication that a trial court may dismiss a claimant’s claims while simultaneously allowing a claimant to amend its pleading to cure the defect that led to dismissal. Those two actions are simply incongruous, particularly where, as here, the trial court has not vacated its order of dismissal. We sustain LSI’s first issue and overrule its second issue.[8] CONCLUSION Without addressing the propriety of the dismissal of appellees’ claims against LSI, we affirm the portion of the trial court’s June 8, 2023 order dismissing appellees’ claims against LSI without prejudice, reverse the portion of the order granting appellees leave to amend their pleading as to their claims against LSI, and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. PER CURIAM 230662f.p05 Molberg, J., concurring, joined by Reichek, J. Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT LOGICAL SYSTEMS, INC. D/B/A LOGICAL SYSTEMS, LLC, Appellant No. 05-23-00662-CV V. EDGAR BERRIOS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND ON BEHALF OF CA.B., CESAR BERRIOS, AND ESTELA A. QUINTOS LOPEZ, Appellees On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-22-01109-B. Opinion delivered by Justice Molberg. Justices Reichek and Smith participating. In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s June 8, 2023 order is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We AFFIRM that portion of the June 8, 2023 order dismissing appellees’ claims against appellant without prejudice, REVERSE that portion of the June 8, 2023 order allowing appellees to amend their pleading as to their claims against appellant, and REMAND this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal. Judgment entered this 9th day of February, 2024.
