Moreover, there was clear and unequivocal language that arbitration was plaintiff’s sole remedy in the event of a dispute. Additionally, plaintiff contends that Smith Barney did not commence either the first or second phase of the two-part process for resolving employment-related disputes. The principles of employment provide as follows:

Our procedures are divided into two parts. First, an internal dispute procedure, the “Dispute Resolution Procedure,” which allows you to seek review of any decision regarding your employment or termination of your employment which you think is unfair. Second, in the unusual situation when this procedure does not fully resolve an employment related dispute, you and we agree to waive any applicable statute of limitations and to submit the dispute, within one year of the date it arose, to binding arbitration, before the arbitration facilities of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. in accordance with the arbitration rules of that body then in effect and as supplemented by Travelers Group arbitration policy.

This provision cannot reasonably be said to be confusing. The provision is clear on its face. If the Smith Barney internal-dispute procedure is unsuccessful, the parties can submit the dispute to the NYSE arbitration facilities. Indeed, it appears that the employee is responsible to commence the first phase. There is no indication, however, that plaintiff sought review of any employment decision under the first phase of the Smith Barney procedures.

Since the first question under Leodori is answered in the affirmative, the next step is to determine if the record indicates that plaintiff clearly agreed to the waiver-of-rights provisions. A waiver-of-rights provision should at least provide that the employee agrees to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination.” Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 773 A.2d 665, 672 (N.J. 2001). Therefore, in order to enforce a waiver-of-rights provision in this setting, the court “requires some concrete manifestation of the employee’s intent as reflected in the text of the agreement itself.” Id.

Here, plaintiff signed three distinct documents, each containing arbitration provisions. Her actions constitute a concrete manifestation of her assent. Plaintiff mistakenly relies on Grasser v. United Healthcare Corp., 778 A.2d 521, 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), asserting that she could not have knowingly agreed to waive her right to sue because the arbitration clauses lacked conspicuous language. Grasser is easily distinguishable from the case at bar because there, the Appellate Division found that the claimed waiver lacked the necessary specificity. By contrast, the waiver here included a much more specific and detailed arbitration provision.

Plaintiff also improperly relies on Gras v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 786 A.2d 886, 894 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), where the court held that “[a]lthough plaintiff contended that defendant never alerted him to the arbitration provision, no such obligation exists where the provision is not hidden.” Here, plaintiff’s argument concerning the visibility of the clauses fails because these clauses are not hidden, but rather prominently located. Moreover, plaintiff signed a one-page, three-paragraph employee acknowledgment form that accompanied the employee handbook, which contained arbitration clauses in the first and third paragraphs slightly above plaintiff’s signature. Accordingly, the waiver-of-rights provision before the court properly reflects that plaintiff clearly and unambiguously agreed to arbitrate the disputed claim.

Additionally, absent a showing of fraud or mental incompetence, a person who signs a contract cannot avoid his obligations under it by showing that he did not read what he signed. Here, plaintiff possessed an academic background in mathematics and computer programming and is certainly more than capable of understanding the content of the arbitration provisions.

Held: In view of the foregoing, there was a knowing and voluntary waiver by plaintiff of her statutory rights, as she agreed clearly and unambiguously to arbitrate the disputed claims.

B. Plaintiff maintains that, assuming arguendo this court finds there was an agreement to arbitrate, defendants have nonetheless waived their right to arbitration through their statements and conduct toward plaintiff. A party may waive or revoke their agreement to arbitrate either expressly or through their conduct. As plaintiff observes, the principles of employment provide that the arbitration process must be set forth within one year of the date the dispute arose. Plaintiff argues that defendants waived any right to arbitration because, even though they knew of plaintiff’s discrimination claim no later than August 2001, the date of her exit interview, they sought to compel arbitration by motion filed Feb. 17, 2004.

Plaintiff’s argument for waiver, however, is untenable. A party waives its right to compel arbitration only in the following circumstances: when the parties have engaged in a lengthy course of litigation, when extensive discovery has occurred, and when prejudice to the party resisting arbitration can be shown. The last of these factors is the key to the analysis. Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 915 (1997).

Two factors inform this court’s decision on the issue. First, litigation in this case is limited to plaintiff’s amended complaint, defendants’ answer, and the parties’ submissions with respect to this motion. The parties have not exchanged Rule 26 disclosures, nor have they drafted a discovery plan, or participated in a scheduling conference with the court. Moreover, plaintiff’s right-to-sue letter, obtained through the EEOC’s investigation of her charge, does not constitute litigation on the merits for waiver purpose.

Second, and more important, plaintiff has failed to put forth any evidence to demonstrate prejudice from the delay. Considering plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate waiver, this court is satisfied that defendants preserved their right to refer plaintiff’s claim to arbitration.

Plaintiff further contends that during the exit interview she expressed her complaints of discrimination to human resources representative Casey Curcio. According to plaintiff, Curcio responded that plaintiff could “take legal action.” This basis for waiver also fails, as it is clear that plaintiff did take a form of legal action in filing charges with the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights and the EEOC. Moreover, it is conceivable that in the context of that discussion, Curio contemplated arbitration as legal action. Therefore, it does not appear that Curcio’s alleged statement was incorrect. Nonetheless, for all of the reasons mentioned above, defendants have not waived their right to arbitration.

C. Since plaintiff’s claims are arbitrable, the proceeding is stayed pending arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. � 3.

� Digested by Steven P. Bann

[The slip opinion is 18 pages long.]

For plaintiff � Randall J. Peach (Alpert, Butler, Sanders, Norton & Bearg). For defendants � John Michael Riordan (Bressler, Amery & Ross).