DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff Suzanne L. Cirencione filed this action against Defendants County of Ontario and Mary Krause claiming retaliation for exercising her First Amendment free speech rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, and three other causes of action under New York state law. Am. Compl., Nov. 8, 2021, ECF No. 7. The matter is presently before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Mot. to Dismiss, July 6, 2021, ECF No. 11. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion [ECF No. 11] is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s §1983 claim. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims, and remands the matter to New York Supreme Court, Ontario County. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. LEGAL STANDARD At the outset, the Court notes that the purpose of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “is to test…the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s statement of a claim for relief without resolving a contest regarding its substantive merits.” Global Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted). An action must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief….” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), on the other hand, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Where a plaintiff’s factual allegations are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, those allegations “stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Moreover, “[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). BACKGROUND For the purpose of ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Defendant Ontario County is a municipal corporation under New York law, and at all times relevant to the present complaint, Defendant Mary Krause was the Ontario County Supervisor. Am. Compl. at 2-4. From May 2014 to January 2020, Plaintiff was employed as the Program Administrator for Defendant Ontario County’s “Special Traffic Options Program for Driving While Intoxicated” (STOP DWI). Am. Compl. at 16, 78. A New York state appellate court has summarized the STOP DWI program as follows: In 1981, the [New York State] Legislature enacted Vehicle and Traffic Law article 43-A, later reenacted as present [N.Y.V.T.L.] §1197…to encourage localities to establish a county-wide…[STOP DWI program] aimed at reducing alcohol-related traffic injuries and deaths through coordinated efforts within the counties for better enforcement, prosecution and prevention of drunken driving…. The STOP-DWI legislation offered an incentive to counties to participate by providing that all fines, penalties and forfeitures imposed by the various courts of the county in intoxicant-related offense prosecutions would be diverted from State revenues to the county where the offense was committed and deposited in a special account to fund the local program…. Cnty. of Rensselaer v. Regan, 173 A.D.2d 37, 38-39 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1991), aff’d, 607 N.E.2d 793 (1992). N.Y.V.T.L. §1197 requires each county that administers a STOP DWI program to assign a “coordinator” for that program, and lists several duties the coordinator must perform, including: …Render annually or at the request of the county legislature or other governing body of the county, a verified account of all moneys received and expended by the coordinator or under the coordinator’s direction and an account of other pertinent matters. …Submit annually or upon request of the chief fiscal officer of each county participating in the program, in such manner as may be required by law, an estimate of the funds required to carry out the purposes of this section. * * * …Receive proposals from county, town, city or village agencies or non-governmental groups for activities related to alcohol traffic safety and to submit them to the county board of legislators or other such governing body, together with a recommendation for funding of the activity if deemed appropriate. …Cooperate with and assist local officials within the county in the formulation and execution of alcohol traffic safety programs including enforcement, adjudication, rehabilitation and education. N.Y.V.T.L. §1197(4)-(5) (listing the functions of the program coordinator). In January 2016, as part of her role as STOP DWI Program Administrator, Plaintiff proposed using County “Contingency Funds” to purchase a patrol car for use by the Ontario County Sheriff’s Department exclusively for DWI patrol. Am. Compl. at
