MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The plaintiff, Niurka Corona, brings this action against her former employer, Clarins U.S.A., Inc. (“Clarins”), and a former Clarins manager, Felipe Vaca (collectively, the “defendants”). The plaintiff alleges that she was disabled by parotid gland cancer, and that the defendants terminated her employment as a sales associate because of her disability. The plaintiff alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq., the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §290 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code §8-101 et seq. Under each statute, the plaintiff alleges (1) failure to accommodate her disability, (2) employment discrimination, and (3) retaliation. The defendants move for summary judgment dismissing each of the plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff opposes the motion, except as it pertains to her failure to accommodate claims and ADA claims against the defendant Vaca. I. The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. “The [C]ourt shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). “[T]he trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying the matter that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” summary judgment should be granted against that party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B) & 2010 Advisory Committee Note. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must produce evidence in the record and “may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993). District courts should “be especially chary in handing out summary judgment in discrimination cases, because in such cases the employer’s intent is ordinarily at issue.” Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Chambers, 43 F.3d at 40. However, “a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations to resist a motion for summary judgment, and show more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Gorzynski v. Jet Blue Airways, 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has instructed that courts are not to treat discrimination any “differently from other ultimate questions of fact.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) (quotation marks omitted). II. The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. A. The plaintiff worked as a sales associate for Clarins at its fragrance counter located at Saks Fifth Avenue in New York City. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt.
2-3.) Among other duties, the plaintiff was tasked with selling new fragrance products. (Id.
