OPINION & ORDER Plaintiff Sherard Clark (“Plaintiff”) brought this action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Bronx, against Defendants Bay Park Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation, LLC, Benjamin Landa, Ben Philipson, Mayer Fischl, Eli Grinspan, Chana Laerner, Berish Rubinstein, Naomi Tessler, Sentosacare, LLC, and several John Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging in a single cause of action various violations of §2801-d of New York’s Public Health Law. Defendants removed the action to this court. Before me is Plaintiff’s motion to remand and for attorneys’ fees and costs. Because Plaintiff’s sole cause of action alleges a violation of a state statute and Plaintiff could obtain the relief sought without prevailing on his allegations that Defendants violated any federal law, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED. However, because I cannot find that there was no objectively reasonable basis for Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is DENIED. I. Background and Procedural History1 On November 27, 2018, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Bronx. (See Compl.)2 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated §2801-d of New York’s Public Health Law by failing “to staff a sufficient number of nurses and aides, thereby depriving” Plaintiff and other residents of a nursing home owned and operated by Defendants “of the level of care required under New York and federal law.” (Id. 2.) On January 17, 2019, Defendants removed the action to this court. (Doc. 1.) On February 1, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff did not respond to that motion; instead, he filed a motion to remand the action to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. (Docs. 8-10.) In light of the motion to remand, I denied Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration without prejudice. (Doc. 11.) Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand on February 27, 2019, (Doc. 12), and Plaintiff filed his reply on March 6, 2019, (Doc. 13). Defendants assert that because Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants violated federal laws, Plaintiff’s cause of action arises under the laws of the United States, and therefore this court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint. (See Notice of Removal 6.)3 For example, the complaint alleges that Defendants’ conduct violates “federal and New York State laws, rules, and regulations,” and states that a “resident’s right to sufficient staffing is one of the most important rights protected by New York and federal statutes.” (See id. 3 (citing Compl.
26-27).) Additionally, in the portion of the complaint related to class action allegations, Plaintiff alleges eight questions of fact and law that are common to all members of the purported class, and one of those questions is “[w]hether Defendants’ conduct violated or violates the federal Nursing Home Reform Act [("FNHRA")], codified at 42 U.S.C. §§1395i-3(a)-(h) and at 42 C.F.R. §§483.15, 483.20, 483.25, 483.30, 483.40, 483.60, & 483.75.” (Compl. 45.) II. Legal Standards A. Motion to Remand “[F]ederal courts have original subject matter jurisdiction…[in] case[s] arising under federal law….” Franklin H. William Trust v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. §1331). “Most directly, a case arises under federal law when federal law creates the cause of action asserted.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013). “But even when a claim finds its origins in state law, there is a special and small category of cases in which arising under jurisdiction still lies.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1569-70 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The “mere need to apply a federal law in a state-law claim will [not] suffice to open the ‘arising under’ door.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005). Rather, federal jurisdiction is “confined…to those [claims] that ‘really and substantially involv[e] a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.’” Id. (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)) (second and third alterations in original). “[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258. “Only ‘[where] all four of these requirements are met’ will federal jurisdiction be appropriate over a state-law claim.” PCVST Mezzco 4, LLC v. Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C30, No. 14-cv-6023 (AJN), 2015 WL 153048, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2015) (quoting Gunn, 568 U.S. at 254). On a motion to remand, “the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the propriety of removal.” California Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 100 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Hodges v. Demchuk, 866 F. Supp. 730, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“On a motion to remand, the party seeking to sustain the removal, not the party seeking remand, bears the burden of demonstrating that removal was proper.” (citing R.G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir.1979))). B. Request for Attorneys’ Fees An order remanding a case may, in a court’s discretion, “require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). “Absent unusual circumstances, however, courts may award attorney’s fees under Section 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” CMGRP, Inc. v. Agency for the Performing Arts, Inc., 689 F. App’x 40, 41 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (citation omitted). III. Discussion A. Motion to Remand Plaintiff’s sole cause of action alleges violations of a state law, §2801-d of New York’s Public Health Law. (See Compl.
