By Renwick, J.P., Gische, Andrias, Kapnick, Singh, JJ.6887. Jorge Naupari, plf-ap, v. Jennifer Murray def-res, Shearman Cabinets, Inc. res-ap, V&Z Electrical Maintenance def — __ Monaco & Monaco, LLP, Brooklyn (Frank A. Delle Donne of counsel), for ap — Law Office of James J. Toomey, New York (Evy L. Kazansky of counsel), for Shearman Cabinets, Inc., res-res — Farber Brocks & Zane, LLP, Garden City (Charles T. Ruhl of counsel), for NY Custom Home and Remodeling, Inc., res-res — Ahmuty, Demers & McManus, Albertson (Glenn A. Kaminska of counsel), for Jennifer Murray, Jordan Murray, Rose Associates, Inc., and The Board of Managers 255 East 74th Street Condominium, res — Sugarman Law Firm LLP, Syracuse (Megan K. Thomas of counsel), for Form Architecture & Interiors, res — __—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Debra A. James, J.), entered October 5, 2016, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied that part of the motion of defendant Shearman Cabinets, Inc. (Shearman) for summary judgment dismissing all cross claims sounding in contractual indemnification asserted against it by defendants Board of Managers 225 East 74th Street Condominium (Board), Rose Associates, Inc. (Rose) Jennifer Murray and Jordan Murray (the Murrays), denied the motion of defendant NY Custom Home and Remodeling, Inc. (NY Custom) for summary judgment dismissing the contractual indemnification cross claims as against it, denied plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law §§240(1) and 241(6) claims against defendants Form Architecture & Interiors (FAI) and Rose, and granted the motions of FAI, Rose, and the Murrays for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant Shearman’s motion, and to grant NY Custom’s motion, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.Plaintiff commenced this action for injuries he sustained when he was working as a painter/plasterer for his nonparty employer, in a unit of a residential condominium. As plaintiff was descending a ladder, the ladder, as well as the rosin paper placed underneath it, shifted, causing plaintiff to fall. The condominium was owned by the Board, Rose was the Board’s property manager and the unit was owned by the Murrays. Upon closing on the unit, the Murrays hired FAI as their interior designer. Shearman installed cabinets in the unit and NY Custom installed kitchen doors.The court properly denied plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law §§240(1) and 241(6) claims as against FAI, because FAI was an architectural firm without supervisory authority, and it did not direct or control the work or activities other than providing architectural and design services. The court also properly denied that part of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking the same relief as against Rose, because while Rose was the Board’s property manager, it did not have authority to supervise and control the work that plaintiff was performing (see Guryev v. Tomchinsky, 20 NY3d 194, 198 [2012]; Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280, 293 [2003]).The court also properly dismissed plaintiff’s common-law negligence claims as to all defendants. Plaintiff’s accident arose out of the means and manner of his work, which was determined by plaintiff’s employer, and defendants did not exert any supervisory control (see Ciechorski v. City of New York, 154 AD3d 413, 414 [1st Dept 2017]).Shearman was entitled to dismissal of the cross claims against it sounding in contractual indemnification, because it was not liable for plaintiff’s accident, as it had no connection to plaintiff’s work (see Worth Constr. Co., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 10 NY3d 411, 416 [2008]). Moreover, the claims for contractual indemnification against Shearman were based on the main agreement between the Murrays and the Board, to which Shearman was not a signatory. ”Under New York law, incorporation clauses in a construction subcontract, incorporating prime contract clauses by reference into a subcontract, bind a subcontractor only as to prime contract provisions relating to the scope, quality, character and manner of the work to be performed by the subcontractor” (Bussanich v. 310 E. 55th St. Tenants, 282 AD2d 243, 243 [2001]). For these same reasons, the cross claims for contractual indemnification against NY Custom are dismissed.This constitutes the decision and order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
By Sweeny, J.P., Webber, Kern, Oing, JJ.7029-7030. PEOPLE, res, v. Jamal Armstead, def-ap — __ Rosemary Herbert, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Naomi J. Scotten of counsel), for ap — Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Karen Schlossberg of counsel), for res — __—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ronald A. Zweibel, J. at suppression hearing; A. Kirke Bartley, Jr., J. at jury trial and sentencing), rendered December 12, 2012, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of 15 years; and judgment, same court (Ronald A. Zweibel, J.), rendered March 19, 2015, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted murder in the second degree, and sentencing him to a concurrent term of 15 years, unanimously affirmed.The court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress statements and lineup identifications. There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations, including its resolution of any alleged discrepancy between police testimony and paperwork.At the time of the arrest at issue, defendant was represented on an unrelated case by an attorney from Neighborhood Defender Service, who attempted to enter the case on defendant’s behalf, at defendant’s mother’s request, by contacting the police. The attorney’s supervisor subsequently attempted to enter the case as well. However, after being apprised by the detectives of each of these attempts, in both instances defendant unequivocally declined to be represented by these attorneys. The suppression court correctly noted that the right to counsel is personal in that “[t]he decision to retain counsel rests with the client… not the lawyer” (People v. Bing, 76 NY2d 331, 349 [1990]).“[T]he evidence established that defendant unambiguously rejected [his mother's and the attorneys'] efforts to provide [him] with legal representation” (People v. Lowery, 131 AD3d 884, 885 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1090 [2015]). Accordingly, no attorney-client relationship existed, and the suppression court correctly concluded that defendant’s right to counsel had not indelibly attached when he made statements to the detectives and when he was placed in a lineup (see People v. Allenye, 66 AD3d 1039 [2d Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 797 [2010]; People v. Lennon, 243 AD2d 495, 497 [2d Dept 1997], appeal dismissed 91 NY2d 942 [1998]; see also People v. Grice, 100 NY2d 318, 323-324 [2003]).We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.This constitutes the decision and order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
