*1Plaintiff appeals from the order of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mark Friedlander, J.),entered March 17, 2015, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied itsmotion for summary judgment and an order of reference, and from the orders of the same court andJustice, entered September 18, 2014 and December 24, 2014, which denied its motions for summaryjudgment and related relief.*2On January 18, 2007, defendant Sarah Brannon obtained a $360,000 loan from GE Money Bank(GE), secured by a mortgage on her home in the Bronx. GE indorsed the mortgage note in blank,making it a bearer instrument.On September 17, 2007, plaintiff’s agent, Litton Loan Servicing, LP, sent defendant a “Notice ofDefault and Intent to Accelerate” stating that defendant was in default for failing to pay amounts dueand that the total amount needed to bring the loan current was $5,482.40 as of that date. OnNovember 14, 2007, plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action alleging that defendantdefaulted by failing to make the payment due on August 1, 2007. The mortgage was assigned toplaintiff by assignment dated November 29, 2007. In her answer, defendant, pro se, admitted that asof the date of the complaint she owed plaintiff $359,809.63 with interest from July 1, 2007 and didnot raise any affirmative defenses.In March 2008, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, supported, inter alia, by an affidavit ofDenise Bailey, Assistant Secretary of Litton, and an Affidavit of Merit and Amount due of DianeDixon, Assistant Vice President of Litton. In opposition, defendant asserted that she had been incontact with Litton regarding a loan modification and was awaiting a complete review. She did notdispute her default.By order dated April 24, 2008, plaintiff was granted summary judgment and a referee wasappointed to compute the amount due. On November 2, 2009, plaintiff assigned the mortgage to IFSProperties, LLC. On February 16, 2011, a settlement conference was held and the matter wasreleased to the Foreclosure Part.In April 2014, plaintiff, by new counsel, moved to vacate the April 24, 2008 order because theBailey and Dixon affidavits may not have been correctly notarized under New York law, and counselcould not comply with the requirements of Administrative Orders 548/10 and 431/11 of the ChiefAdministrative Judge of the Courts. Plaintiff also moved for summary judgment anew, based upon anaffidavit, sworn to April 18, 2014, of Matthew Mattera, a managing member of IFS, and an*3affirmation of counsel certifying the accuracy of Mattera’s affidavit. In opposition, defendant assertedthat Mattera could not affirm the relevant facts because he was an employee of IFS, not plaintiff, andhis affidavit did not describe the records upon which he relied. Defendant also asserted that she hadno notice of the assignment to IFS.By order dated September 15, 2014, the court granted plaintiff’s motion to vacate the April 29,2008 order. However, the court denied summary judgment on the ground that the defects in theaffidavits in support of the original summary judgment motion were not mistakes, omissions or mereirregularities that could be cured by a new affidavit.In November 2014, plaintiff again moved for summary judgment based on an affidavit ofMattera dated November 3, 2014. In opposition, defendant questioned the validity of the assignmentof the loan by plaintiff to IFS and complained that IFS had not given her the opportunity to get a loanmodification. Defendant no longer alleged that Mattera failed to establish that he could affirm thefacts necessary to establish her default. By order dated December 22, 2014, the court deniedplaintiff’s motion for the reasons stated in its September 15, 2014 order.In February 2015, plaintiff moved for summary judgment for a third time. In support, plaintiffsubmitted the indorsed in blank note, the mortgage, and the default notice. Plaintiff also submitted anaffidavit of Mattera dated January 31, 2015 and an affirmation of counsel asserting that plaintiff haddemonstrated a prima facie case for foreclosure and that defendant had failed to plead any affirmativedefenses.In opposition, defendant alleged that she was not properly notified that the note had beentransferred to IFS and that she was improperly served with the motion. Defendant did not challengethe sufficiency of Mattera’s affidavit or refute his allegations concerning her default. Plaintiff’scounsel replied that the mortgage did not require notice of a sale or transfer be given to defendant;that defendant had waived the defense of standing when she failed to raise it in her answer; that, inany case, plaintiff had standing because it was the holder of the indorsed-in-blank note when theaction was commenced; and that defendant was properly served.By order dated March 10, 2015, the court denied the motion, stating that it did not believe thatplaintiff understood that an action initiated on the basis of a false affidavit suffers from a fatal defect,which cannot be overcome with a subsequent affidavit. The court also stated that even if the errorcould be corrected in a new affidavit, the January 31, 2015 affidavit of Mattera was defectivebecause it failed to indicate the state or county where the notarization took place.*4We now reverse to grant plaintiff’s third motion for summary judgment. The failings in thesupporting affidavits to the original motion for summary judgment only affected the ability of thecourt to grant that motion, not the viability of the action as a whole. The substitution, nunc pro tunc,of newly-signed affidavits of merit in a mortgage foreclosure action, provided in an effort to bring aplaintiff in compliance with Administrative Order 431/11, is permitted (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Eaddy,109 AD3d 908 [2d Dept 2013]).Furthermore, under the circumstances before us, the flaws in the notarization of Mattera’saffidavit are not fatal to plaintiff’s summary judgment motion (see Matter of Cubisino v Cohen, 47NYS2d 952, 953-954 [Sup Ct, NY County 1944], affd 267 App Div 891 [1st Dept 1944]; Fisher vBloomberg, 74 App Div 368, 369 [1st Dept 1902]; see also Sirico v F.G.G. Prods., Inc., 71 AD3d429, 434 [1st Dept 2010]; Todd v Green, 122 AD3d 831, 832 [2d Dept 2014]). Pursuant to CPLR2101(f) the court can disregard a defect in the Uniform Certificate of Acknowledgment unless adefendant has demonstrated that a substantial right of hers has been prejudiced. As no prejudice hasbeen shown by defendant, the alleged defect should have been disregarded (see Bank of N.Y. Mellonv Vytalingam, 144 AD3d 1070 [2d Dept 2016]; see also Executive Law § 142-a[2][f] [officialcertificate of notary public shall not be deemed invalid due to "the fact that the action was takenoutside the jurisdiction where the notary public or commissioner of deeds was authorized to act"]).Plaintiff established standing by virtue of its possession of the indorsed-in-blank note at thecommencement of this action (see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Taylor, 25 NY3d 355, 361-362[2015]). It demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by providingevidence of the note and mortgage, and proof of defendant’s default (see Horizons Invs. Corp. vBrecevich, 104 AD3d 475 [1st Dept 2013]). This included Mattera’s affidavit of facts and defendant’sanswer in which she admitted that as of the date of the complaint she owed plaintiff $359,809.63with interest from July 1, 2007, and denied knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as toplaintiff’s allegations that she “has/have failed to comply with the conditions of the mortgage andnote by failing to pay principal and interest and/or taxes, assessments, water rates, insurancepremiums, escrow and/or other charges that came due and payable on the 1st day of August 2007 . . ..”In opposition, defendant failed to provide evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to anavailable defense. “Facts appearing in the movant’s papers which the opposing party does notcontrovert, may be deemed to be admitted” (Kuehne & Nagel v Baiden, 36 NY2d 539, 544 [1975]).Defendant did not deny receiving the notice of default or that she had defaulted in her obligations*5under the note and mortgage. Defendant also waived any standing defense, or defense based onplaintiff’s alleged failure to comply with a condition precedent, since she did not raise those defensesin her answer, and did not bring a motion to dismiss the complaint on those grounds (see SecurityPac. Natl. Bank v Evans, 31 AD3d 278, 280-281 [1st Dept 2006], appeal dismissed 8 NY3d 837[2007]; 1199 Hous. Corp. v International Fid. Ins. Co., 14 AD3d 383, 384 [1st Dept 2005]).Defendant’s mere denial of receipt of service of the motion is insufficient to rebut the presumption ofservice (Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 122 [1999]).The dissent agrees that the motion court should have granted plaintiff summary judgment on itsforeclosure claim based on defendant’s answer, in which she admitted the amount she owed plaintiffand waived any challenge to plaintiff’s standing. However, the dissent would hold, sua sponte, thatplaintiff is not entitled to an order of reference because its counsel could not affirm the factsnecessary to satisfy his obligations under Administrative Order 431/11.Administrative Order 431/11, which amends Administrative Order 548/10, requires theplaintiff’s counsel in a residential mortgage foreclosure action to file an affirmation confirmingthat he or she communicated with a representative of the plaintiff who confirmed the factual accuracyof the plaintiff’s pleadings, supporting documentation and submissions to the court (see Wells FargoBank, N.A. v. Pabon, 138 AD3d 1217, 1217—1218 [3d Dept 2016]). “The order incorporated twoforms for this purpose—an affirmation to be filed by the plaintiff’s counsel ( shall file’), and anaffidavit to be filed by the plaintiff’s representative ( may file’)” (Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Izmirligil,144 AD3d 1063, 1065 [2d Dept 2016]).To fulfill his obligations under Administrative Order 431/11, plaintiff’s counsel submitted anaffidavit that comported with the form provided in Administrative Order 431/11. Counsel stated thaton April 21, 2014 he had communicated with Mattera,“who informed me that he/she/they (a) personally reviewed Plaintiff’s documents and records relatingto this case for factual accuracy; and (b) confirmed the factual accuracy of the allegations set forth inthe Complaint and any supporting affidavits or affirmations filed with the Court, as well as theaccuracy of the notarization contained in the supporting documents filed therewith.”Counsel further stated:“Based upon my communication with Matthew Mattera as well as upon my own inspection and otherreasonable inquiry under the circumstances, I affirm that, to the best of my knowledge, information,and belief, the Summons, Complaint, and other papers filed or submitted to this Court in this mattercontain no false statements of fact or law. I understand my continuing obligation to amend this*6[a]ffirmation in light of newly discovered material facts following its filing.”The dissent finds this affidavit deficient, stating that “because Mattera’s affidavits do notestablish a complete review of, or the indicia of reliability necessary to lay a business recordsfoundation for, the records pre-dating IFS’s acquisition of defendant’s mortgage, counsel may not relyupon alleged communications with Mattera to comply with the requirements of the AdministrativeOrder.” However, defendant, who has continued to reside on the premises for the last 10 yearswithout paying her mortgage, did not dispute her default or challenge the accuracy or sufficiency ofMattera’s affidavit on the third summary judgment motion.Furthermore, CLPR 4518(a) does not require a person to have personal knowledge of each ofthe facts asserted in the affidavit of merit put before the court as evidence of a defendant’s default inpayment (see Citigroup v Kopelowitz, 147 AD3d 1014, 1015 [2d Dept 2017] ["There is norequirement that a plaintiff in a foreclosure action rely on any particular set of business records toestablish a prima facie case, so long as the plaintiff satisfies the admissibility requirements of CPLR4518(a), and the records themselves actually evince the facts for which they are relied upon"];Citibank, NA v Abrams, 144 AD3d 1212 [3d Dept 2016]). Thus, in seeking to enforce a loan, anassignee of an original lender or intermediary predecessor may use an original loan file prepared byits assignor, when it relies upon those records in the regular course of its business (see LandmarkCapital Invs., Inc. v Li-Shan Wang, 94 AD3d 418 [1st Dept 2012]; see also State of New York v158th St. & Riverside Dr. Hous. Co., Inc., 100 AD3d 1293, 1296 [3d Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d858 [2013] [records admissible "if the recipient can establish personal knowledge of the maker'sbusiness practices and procedures, or that the records provided by the maker were incorporated intothe recipient's own records or routinely relied upon by the recipient in its business"]).Here, Mattera, a representative of IFS, which has held the note and mortgage since November2009, satisfied these standards, stating that“I make this affidavit with personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances herein which arederived from personal knowledge and/or an independent examination of the financial books andbusiness records made in the ordinary course of business maintained by or on behalf of Plaintiff to bean accurate and fair representation of the occurrences with which the record purports to represent aswell as business records relative to the within litigation. I am familiar with the record keepingsystems that Plaintiff and/or its loan servicer uses to record and create information related to theresidential mortgage loans that it services, including the processes by which Plaintiff and/or its loanservicer obtains the loan information in those systems. While many of those processes are automated,*7where the employees of the Plaintiff and/or its servicer manually enter data relating to loans on thosesystems, they have personal knowledge of that information and enter it into the system at or near thetime they acquired that knowledge. The records relied upon are made in the regular course ofbusiness made at or about the time the event is being recorded, systematically made for the conductof business and are relied upon as the accurate routine reflections of the day-to-day regularlyconducted business activity and so they may be relied upon as being truthful and accurate. Inconnection with making this affidavit, I have personally examined these business records reflectingdata and information as of January 31, 2015. . . .* * *“I have also reviewed Plaintiffs books and records, and the payments of principal and interestmade by Defendant(s) to Plaintiff. Any allegation of either full or timely payment after default issimply not substantiated by these records. All notices of default as required in the Note have beensent as prescribed in the Mortgage . . . . All time frames set forth in the notice and /or notices, asrequired by the Mortgage have elapsed and the Defendant(s) have not taken the necessary action tocorrect the default and or defaults as specified herein and in the Complaint. . . .* * *“The simple uncontroverted fact is that Defendant, SARAH BRANNON, was loaned and didreceive $360,000.00, as is confirmed by the Mortgage and Note. Defendant did not uphold thisobligation, to the detriment of Plaintiff. Defendant breached his/her obligations under the Mortgageby failing to successfully tender funds for the August 1, 2007 payment and all successive paymentsthereafter.”These allegations sufficed to establish plaintiff’s default and the basis of Mattera’s knowledge.Mattera indicated that he was personally familiar with the recordkeeping systems of IFS andplaintiff and the loan servicer it used, that the records he relied on were made in the regular course ofbusiness and that he personally reviewed them on January 31, 2015 (see JP Morgan Chase Bank,N.A. v Shapiro, 104 AD3d 411, 412 [1st Dept 2013] ["Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of anemployee who identified herself as having personal knowledge of, inter alia, plaintiff's status assuccessor-in-interest to WAMU and defendant Saadia Shapiro's default. . . . based upon her review ofplaintiff's books and records and its account records regarding Shapiro's delinquent account"];Deutsche Bank Natl Trust Co. v Naughton, 137 AD3d 1199, 1200 [2d Dept 2016]). While the dissentfinds the affidavit deficient because Mattera did not state that he was familiar with the records of GE,*8the Default Notice was sent by Litton, plaintiff’s agent, and Mattera stated that he was familiar withthe recordkeeping systems that plaintiff and/or its loan servicer used. He also stated that hepersonally reviewed plaintiff’s books and records, and the payments made by defendant.[FN1]Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mark Friedlander, J.), enteredMarch 17, 2015, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiff’s motionfor summary judgment and an order of reference, should be reversed, on the law, without costs,plaintiff’s motion granted, and the matter remanded for appointment of a referee, to compute ansascertain the amount due plaintiff on the subject mortgage. The appeals from the orders of the samecourt and Justice, entered September 18, 2014 and December 24, 2014, which denied plaintiff’smotions for summary judgment and related relief, should be dismissed, without costs, as academic.All concur except Gesmer, J. who dissents in part in an Opinion.GESMER, J. (dissenting in part)I respectfully dissent in part.In my view, the affidavit that BOA submitted in support of its motion was deficient and failed tocomply with Administrative Order 431/11 of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Court.Nonetheless, I agree with the majority that the motion court should have granted BOA summaryjudgment on its foreclosure claim, since this is the rare case where a foreclosure plaintiff wasable to establish its prima facie case without reference to its own affidavit. Instead, BOA could relysolely on defendant’s answer, in which she admitted the amount she owed to BOA and waived anychallenge to BOA’s standing (see Bank of N. Y. Mellon v Arthur, 125 AD3d 492, 493 [1st Dept2015]; Security Pac. Nat. Bank v Evans, 31 AD3d 278, 281 [1st Dept 2006], appeal dismissed 8NY3d 837 [2007]).However, since the deficiencies in the affidavit submitted by BOA are substantial, I believe thatwe should follow the approach taken by our colleagues in the Second Department and hold that BOAwas not entitled to an order of reference because the affidavit it submitted failed to establish that theaffiant could affirm the facts necessary to satisfy BOA’s and its counsel’s obligations underAdministrative Order 431/11 (Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Izmirligil, 144 AD3d 1063, 1065 [2d Dept2016]). This result is necessary to accomplish the purposes which that Administrative Order wasintended to achieve.*9In October 2010, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman instituted a rule requiring plaintiffs inforeclosure actions to certify the accuracy of the documents they present to the court. Thisrequirement, embodied in Administrative Order 548/10, later amended by Administrative Order431/11, was intended to prevent the practice of “robo-signing”(2014 Report of the ChiefAdministrator of the Courts, available at https://www.nycourts.gov/publications/pdfs/2014-Foreclosure-Report-ofthe-CAJ.pdf, at 5-6 [accessed September 14, 2017]). “Robo-signing” refers to“the robotic affixation of signatures on key papers in the case by those with no first-hand knowledgeof the information contained in the papers they’re signing” (252 Siegel’s Practice Review 2 [Dec.2012]).Specifically, the Administrative Order requires counsel for a foreclosure plaintiff to file anaffirmation confirming that he or she communicated with a representative of the plaintiff whopersonally reviewed the plaintiff’s books and records, personally reviewed the summons, complaintand other submissions in the case, and confirmed the factual accuracy of the plaintiff’s submissionsas well as the accuracy of the notarization of those submissions (Administrative Order of the ChiefAdministrative Judge of the Courts, available at https://www.nycourts.gov/attorneys/pdfs/AdminOrder_2010_10_20.pdfat Exhibit A [accessed August 28, 2017][Administrative Order]; see also Izmirligil, 144 AD3d at 1065; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Jones, 139AD3d 520, 521 n 1 [1st Dept 2016]). The Administrative Order prescribes the required form of theattorney affirmation and a sample affidavit of merit that may be used by the representative of theplaintiff (Administrative Order, Forms A and B). For cases pending at the time of the order’seffective date, where no judgment of foreclosure has been entered, this affirmation must be filed “atthe time of filing either the proposed order of reference or the proposed judgment of foreclosure”(Izmirligil, 144 AD3d at 1065 [internal quotation marks omitted]).1Our colleagues in the Second Department have refused to issue an order of reference andjudgment of foreclosure and sale, when the plaintiff failed to submit the required affirmation (seeBank of N.Y. Mellon v Izmirligil, 144 AD3d 1067, 1070 [2d Dept 2016]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vHudson, 98 AD3d 576, 577-578 [2d Dept 2012]), or submitted an affirmation which was not “incompliance” with the Administrative Order (see Downey Sav. Loan Assn., F.A. v Trujillo, 142 AD3d1040, 1042 [2d Dept 2016]), even where the application was otherwise sufficient.I submit that this is an appropriate case to follow the Second Department. In this case, counselrelies on the affidavit of Matthew Mattera, a “Member” of BOA’s successor-in-interest, IFS. Matteraalleges, in each of his affidavits, as follows:*10“I make this affidavit with personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances herein which arederived from personal knowledge and/or an independent examination of the financial books andbusiness records made in the ordinary course of business maintained by or on behalf of Plaintiff to bean accurate and fair representation of the occurrences with which the record purports to represent aswell as business records relative to the within litigation. I am familiar with the record keepingsystems that Plaintiff and/or its loan servicer uses to record and create information related to theresidential mortgage loans that it services, including the processes by which Plaintiff and/or its loanservicer obtains the loan information in those systems. While many of those processes are automated,where the employees of the Plaintiff and/or its servicer manually enter data relating to loans on thosesystems, they have personal knowledge of that information and enter it into the system at or near thetime they acquired that knowledge. The records relied upon are made in the regular course ofbusiness made at or about the time the event is being recorded, systematically made for the conductof business and are relied upon as the accurate routine reflections of the day-to-day regularlyconducted business activity and so they may be relied upon as being truthful and accurate. Inconnection with making this affidavit, I have personally examined these business records . . . .”Mattera also alleges that he reviewed “[p]laintiff’s books and records” and that “[a]ny allegationof either full or timely payment after default is simply not substantiated . . . .” In addition, Matteraalleges that defendant breached “his/her obligations” to tender the August 1, 2007 payment and allsuccessive payments. These statements do not comply with the Administrative Order (see WellsFargo, N.A. v Jones, 139 AD3d at 521 n 1).2In fact, Mr. Mattera’s affidavit differs in two critical respects from the proposed principal’saffidavit in the Administrative Order. First, that affidavit is written as if the affiant were arepresentative of the plaintiff. However, Mr. Mattera does not claim to have any relationship toplaintiff, BOA; rather, he claims to be a managing member of IFS, plaintiff’s assignee.Second, the proposed affidavit in the Administrative Order assumes that the mortgage has notbeen transferred, as demonstrated by this alternative language: “Inasmuch as the underlyingmortgage loan has been transferred prior to commencement or during the pendency of this action, Iam unable to confirm or deny that the underlying documents filed with the Court have been properlyreviewed or notarized by the prior servicer” (Administrative Order 431/11 Form B). In contrast,although Mr. Mattera acknowledges that the mortgage has been transferred, he does not explain hissource of knowledge about the records maintained by plaintiff and its predecessor, GE Money Bank(GE), which was the original lender and mortgagee, and remained the mortgagee until after the date*11of defendant’s default. Mr. Mattera does not claim to have reviewed the records of GE or to befamiliar with GE’s record-keeping practices. Instead, Mr. Mattera’s affidavits only refer to his allegedreview of the records of “plaintiff,” i.e., BOA. Indeed, while the majority highlights that “in seekingto enforce a loan, an assignee of an original lender or intermediary predecessor may use an originalloan file prepared by its assignor,” there is no indication in the record that Mr. Mattera reviewed GE’soriginal loan file (see Jones 139 AD3d at 521-522).Mattera has also failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a business records foundation underCPLR 4518(a) for the records of BOA, and its loan servicer, Litton, which he claims to havereviewed. Mattera is a member of IFS, which was assigned the mortgage on November 2, 2009.Mattera has not explained how he acquired personal knowledge of the record-keeping practices ofBOA, or its loan servicer (see Jones at 521-522). Furthermore, Mattera does not provide the courtwith any assurances that the unidentified employees to whom he refers actually followed thepractices he describes. Accordingly, Mattera’s affidavits are bereft of the ” indicia of reliability’”necessary for a representative of one entity to lay a business records foundation for the records ofanother entity (see Jones, 139 AD3d at 521, quoting One Step Up, Ltd., v Webster Bus. Credit Corp.,87 AD3d 1, 11 [1st Dept 2011]; see also People v Cratsley, 86 NY2d 81, 90 [1995])3. SinceMattera cannot lay a business records foundation for the records of BOA or Litton that he claims tohave reviewed, this Court “cannot rely on any statements in the [Mattera affidavits] concerningevents before the date of [IFS's] acquisition of the mortgage” (Jones, 139 AD3d at 522).Indeed, Mr. Mattera’s lack of knowledge of events before 2009 is underscored by thediscrepancy between his statement in the first of his three affidavits that BSI Financial was the loanservicer from the inception of the loan, and the 2007 notice of default in which Litton Loan Servicingclaims to be the loan servicer.The majority cites a number of cases in an effort to suggest that Mattera can lay a businessrecords foundation for the records pre-dating IFS’s acquisition of the mortgage. However, in themajority’s cases, the witness was able to provide the court with the necessary “indicia of reliability”that Mattera’s affidavits lack (id. at 521 [internal quotation marks omitted]).In each of Citibank, NA v Abrams (144 AD3d 1212, 1216 [3d Dept 2016]) and Deutsche BankNatl. Trust Co. v Naughton (137 AD3d 1199, 1200 [2d Dept 2016]), the foreclosure plaintiff’s agentwas found to have sufficient knowledge of the plaintiff’s record-keeping procedure to provide the“indicia of reliability” necessary to lay a proper business records foundation. Here, Mattera is amember of IFS which is merely BOA’s successor-in-interest; he has not claimed that IFS has any*12agency relationship with GE, BOA, or BOA’s agent, Litton.In State of New York v 158th St. & Riverside Dr. Hous. Co., Inc. (100 AD3d 1293, 1296 [3dDept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 858 [2013]), a representative of the Department of EnvironmentalConservation (DEC) laid a proper business records foundation for the records of an outsidecontractor when, inter alia, the records were generated at the DEC’s direction and the DEC was therecords’ primary custodian. Mattera’s affidavits lack any comparable factual details or indicia ofreliability.In Landmark Capital Invs., Inc. v Li-Shan Wang (94 AD3d 418, 419 [1st Dept 2012]), theforeclosure plaintiff relied upon an original loan file prepared by its assignor, a record that theplaintiff “[r]elied on . . . in its regular course of business.” In this case, Mattera does not allege thatIFS has incorporated BOA’s records into its own records, or that IFS relies upon the records of BOAin the regular course of its own business or that he relied on or reviewed GE’s records.4Accordingly, because Mattera’s affidavits do not establish a complete review of, or the indicia ofreliability necessary to lay a business records foundation for, the records predating IFS’s acquisitionof defendant’s mortgage, counsel may not rely upon alleged communications with Mattera to complywith the requirements of the Administrative Order.Moreover, the accuracy of BOA’s records remains relevant to the computations that a refereewill have to undertake in this case. Denying an order of reference at this juncture, in order to ensurethe accuracy of the records upon which those computations will be based, is our obligation under theAdministrative Order.For all these reasons, I would follow the procedure prescribed by our colleagues in theSecond Department and deny BOA’s application for an order of reference (Izmirligil, 144 AD3dat 1070; Trujillo, 142 AD3d at 1042; Hudson, 98 AD3d at 577-578).Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mark Friedlander, J.), entered March 17, 2015, reversed,on the law, without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and an order of reference granted,and the matter remanded for appointment of a referee, to compute and ascertain the amount dueplaintiff on the subject mortgage. Appeals from orders, same court and Justice, entered September18, 2014 and December 24, 2014, dismissed, without costs, as academic.Opinion by Andrias, J. All concur except Gesmer, J. who dissents in part in an Opinion.*13Acosta, P.J., Richter, Andrias, Kahn, Gesmer, JJ.THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDEROF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.ENTERED: OCTOBER 31, 2017
