I wish I could agree with Richard Robbins, but I cannot. Contrary to Mr. Robbins’ representations in his recent letter to the editor, Barrow v. Raffensperger, was not a complicated case. As the dissent noted, the question was straightforward: can a constitutionally mandated “scheduled election [be canceled] to allow the governor to make an appointment that cannot be made until after the scheduled election. Why?” The most logical reading of this ruling is that the majority put personal partisan priorities and favoritism for a colleague ahead of the law. That kind of ruling, to borrow a phrase, opens the door to the attendant response.

The impropriety of canceling an election under these circumstances is a fairly straightforward matter. Turning logic and language on its head as the majority must do to reach its conclusion makes it difficult to view their ruling as anything other than one in which their partisan slip shows. Worst of all, the impact of this seeming partisan bent calls into question the motivation of each vote in favor of it. A partisan judiciary is one that rewards those who hew the party line—and punishes those who don’t. That fact makes it impossible to untangle the motivations of the three replacement judges who lined up behind the three justices who wrongly refused to recuse. The replacements’ support of Justice David Nahmias’ opinion may be sincere, but the partisan shadow this ruling casts over our judiciary means we cannot take their reasoning at face value.