The full case caption appears at the
end of this opinion. The issue in this appeal is whether two groups of individuals should be allowed to intervenein a suit filed by the State of Tennessee against several tobacco product manufacturers. The State’ssuit against the tobacco defendants sought money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive reliefin connection with the marketing and sale of tobacco products in Tennessee. The trial court(Chancellor Irvin Kilcrease, Jr.) approved a settlement between the State and the tobacco defendantsand dismissed the State’s complaint. The trial court also rejected attempts to intervene in the State’ssuit by two groups of individuals, the first seeking damages from tobacco companies for increasedmedical insurance premiums, and the second consisting of tobacco users seeking damages fromtobacco companies and their lawyers seeking attorney’s fees. The trial court (Chancellor Carol L.McCoy) dismissed a declaratory judgment action filed by one of the groups of proposed intervenors.Both groups of the proposed intervenors appealed, and this Court granted an expedited appeal underTenn. Code Ann. � 16-3-201(d). For the reasons explained hereafter, the trial courts are affirmed. OPINION In this case the State of Tennessee filed suit against several tobacco product manufacturersseeking monetary, declaratory, injunctive, and other relief in connection with the marketing and saleof tobacco products in Tennessee. Upon approval by the trial court of a settlement between the Stateand the tobacco defendants, the State’s complaint was dismissed. A group of individuals seekingdamages from tobacco companies for increased medical insurance premiums (collectively referredto as the “Perry intervenors”) filed a declaratory judgment action and a motion to intervene in theState’s suit. The declaratory judgment action was dismissed and the motion to intervene was denied.A separate group of individuals consisting of tobacco users seeking damages from tobaccocompanies and their lawyers seeking attorney’s fees (collectively referred to as the “Beckomintervenors”) also filed a motion to intervene in the State’s suit. Their motion to intervene waslikewise denied. Both groups of proposed intervenors appealed to the Court of Appeals, whichconsolidated the cases. The State subsequently moved this Court to assume jurisdiction of thismatter pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. � 16-3-201(d) on the grounds that the case is of compellingpublic importance in that it involves a substantial amount of State revenue.
[FOOTNOTE 1]We agreed and assumedjurisdiction over the case. After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, weconclude that the trial court correctly dismissed the declaratory judgment action filed by the Perryintervenors, as well as their motion to intervene in the settlement action. Moreover, we concludethat the trial court correctly denied the motion to intervene filed by the Beckom intervenors.Accordingly, for the reasons explained hereafter, the trial courts are affirmed. BACKGROUND On December 21, 1998, the State of Tennessee filed suit in the Chancery Court of DavidsonCounty against Brown & Williams Tobacco Corporation, along with several other tobaccomanufacturers and trade associations.
[FOOTNOTE 2]The State’s complaint included claims for relief under theTennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. � 47-18-101, et seq., the Tennessee TradePractices Act, Tenn. Code Ann. � 47-25-101, et seq., and a claim for unjust enrichment. The State’s claims were based on the alleged misconduct of the tobacco defendants in manufacturing,distributing, and marketing of tobacco products in Tennessee. Among other things, the State allegedthat the tobacco defendants made unfair, deceptive, and misleading claims about the addictive natureof nicotine, targeted young people in their advertising, misrepresented the health consequences ofusing tobacco products, and imposed a significant financial burden on taxpayers who have supportedthe medical costs of individuals dependent on financial assistance from the State because of theiraddiction to cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. The State sought declaratory and injunctiverelief, as well as money damages resulting from the State’s payment of medical expenses for tobaccorelated diseases caused by the marketing, sale, and use of the defendants’ products. The State’scomplaint stated that the suit was brought by the State in its capacity as sovereign, not as a classaction on behalf of Tennessee residents. Thus, the State was not seeking relief on behalf of anyindividual or party other than itself. On the same day that the State filed suit, the State and the tobacco defendants submitted aMaster Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) to Chancellor Irvin Kilcrease for approval.
[FOOTNOTE 3]Pursuant to theMSA, the State is projected to receive approximately 4.8 billion dollars through the year 2025, andannual payments in perpetuity thereafter in amounts expected to exceed 100 million dollars per year.In addition to the cash settlement, the MSA grants various forms of injunctive relief, such asenjoining the tobacco defendants from targeting youth or using cartoons in their advertising. Theagreement also bans outdoor advertisements and limits tobacco advertising in sporting events,concerts, and similar activities. In exchange for the money and injunctive relief, the MSA providesfor the release of claims against the tobacco defendants. The State cannot begin receiving anymoney under the MSA until the State achieves “state specific finality,” which means that alllitigation pertaining to the MSA in the State must be resolved. Tennessee is one of a small numberof states that has yet to achieve this status. Chancellor Kilcrease approved the settlement anddismissed the State’s complaint against the tobacco defendants on the same day it was filed,December 21, 1998. On December 18, 1998, the Perry intervenors filed a declaratory judgment action in theChancery Court of Davidson County before Chancellor Carol McCoy, seeking to have their rightsunder the MSA determined. Specifically, the Perry intervenors sought a declaration that the MSAdid not impair their ability to maintain a pending action against the tobacco defendants.
[FOOTNOTE 4]Chancellor McCoy dismissed the declaratory judgment action on the basis of sovereign immunity, res judicata,and her determination that the Perry intervenors were seeking an advisory opinion regarding theimpact of the MSA on their Coffee County litigation. In addition to filing a declaratory judgment action before Chancellor McCoy, the Perryintervenors filed with Chancellor Kilcrease a motion to intervene in the State’s lawsuit. The Perryintervenors sought to challenge the fairness of the settlement and have the order approving it setaside. They also sought declaratory relief regarding the impact of the MSA on their Coffee Countysuit. Chancellor Kilcrease denied the motion to intervene because the Perry intervenors did not havea protectable legal interest in the State’s suit. Therefore, the intervenors were seeking an advisoryopinion that would require the court to “indulge in speculation.” The other group of proposed intervenors, the Beckom group, likewise filed a motion withChancellor Kilcrease to intervene in the State’s lawsuit against the tobacco companies. Like thePerry intervenors, the Beckom intervenors sought to challenge the fairness of the MSA. However,unlike the Perry intervenors, the Beckom intervenors sought to have liens imposed on the settlementfor attorney’s fees incurred in other litigation against tobacco companies.
[FOOTNOTE 5]Chancellor Kilcreasedenied the motion to intervene based on lack of standing, sovereign immunity, and because theunderlying suit filed by the Beckom group on behalf of taxpayers was moot since the State had filedand settled its own suit against the tobacco manufacturers. The trial court also found that a lien forattorney’s fees was not proper because the lawyers seeking the fees were not counsel in the State’ssuit. After their efforts to intervene failed in the trial courts, the Perry and Beckom intervenorsappealed to the Court of Appeals, which consolidated the cases. Thereafter, this Court assumedjurisdiction of the case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. � 16-3-201(d) because the case is of compellingpublic importance which involves a substantial amount of State revenue. ANALYSIS I. We first address the trial court’s denial of intervenor status to the Perry and Beckom groups.We begin by observing that “a lawsuit often is not merely a private fight and will have implicationson those not named as parties.” Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir.1997). Believing that the State’s settlement with the tobacco industry implicated their interests, thePerry and Beckom groups contend that they are entitled to intervene in the State’s lawsuit under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24, which provides for two types of intervention — intervention as of right andpermissive intervention. The applicable rules provide as follows:
24.01. Intervention as of Right. — Upon timely application anyoneshall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confersan unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claimsan interest relating to the property or transaction which is thesubject of the action and the applicant is so situated that thedisposition of the action may as a practical matter impair orimpede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless theapplicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties; or(3) by stipulation of all the parties. (Emphasis added). 24.02. Permissive Intervention. — Upon timely application anyonemay be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confersa conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s claim ordefense and the main action have a question of law or fact incommon. In exercising discretion the court shall consider whetheror not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudicationof the rights of the original parties. (Emphasis added).
A party seeking to intervene as of right under Rule 24.01 must establish that (1) theapplication for intervention was timely; (2) the proposed intervenor has a substantial legal interestin the subject matter of the pending litigation; (3) the proposed intervenor’s ability to protect thatinterest is impaired; and (4) the parties to the underlying suit cannot adequately represent theintervenor’s interests. Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989). The intervenor has theburden of establishing all four of these elements or else the motion to intervene will be denied. Id.In the case of permissive intervention, the party seeking to intervene must show that there is acommon question of law or fact between the intervenor’s claim and the main action. Tenn. R. Civ.P. 24.02. Permissive intervention is generally not proper when the intervenor seeks to raise newclaims or issues against the existing parties. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 (1983). The standard of review on appeal for the denial of intervention as of right is de novo, exceptfor the timeliness of the application which is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.Michigan State AFL-CIO, 103 F.3d at 1245. The standard of review for the denial of permissiveintervention is abuse of discretion. Chaille v. Warren, 635 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tenn. App. 1982). Anabuse of discretion exists when the reviewing court is firmly convinced that the lower court hasmade a mistake in that it affirmatively appears that the lower court’s decision has no basis in law orin fact and is therefore arbitrary, illogical, or unconscionable. See Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d652, 661 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Carter, 890 S.W.2d 449, 454 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). In this case, both groups of would-be intervenors contend that the trial court erred in denyingthem the right to intervene under Rule 24.01. In support of their position, the proposed intervenors focus on the possibility that the release provisions of the MSA might be used as a defense in theirrespective suits against tobacco companies.[FOOTNOTE 6]They argue that they have a substantial legal interestin the State’s suit which will be impaired or impeded because the MSA might be raised as a defensein their pending suits if the tobacco defendants interpret the MSA’s release provision to encompassthe intervenors’ claims. The State takes the position that the MSA does not encompass theintervenors’ private litigation and, therefore, the MSA has no impact on their ability to pursue theirclaims against the tobacco companies. Not surprisingly, the tobacco defendants have chosen to takea noncommital position on the issue, which “deeply concerns” the proposed intervenors that theMSA might be used to “stifle or destroy” their pending claims by leaving those claims vulnerableto dismissal. The intervenors are particularly concerned about the language in the MSA purportingto prohibit actions brought by private persons “seeking relief on behalf of or generally applicableto the general public.” The MSA, however, does not prohibit suits seeking “private or individualrelief for separate and distinct injuries.” The contention of the intervenors that they have a substantial legal interest in the State’s suitentitling them to intervene as of right is unconvincing. While the precise nature of the interestrequired to intervene as of right has eluded exact definition, it is clear that the right does not includea mere contingent, remote, or conjectural possibility of being affected as a result of the suit, but mustinvolve a direct claim on the subject matter of the suit such that the intervenor will either gain or loseby direct operation of the judgment. See 3B Moore’s Federal Practice, p. 24-54 (2d ed. 1995); 67AC.J.S. Parties � 75 (1978). Hence, intervention as of right is not appropriate to adjudicate legalinterests of an indefinite character, or hypothetical or speculative scenarios that may never come topass. See Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 601 (3rd Cir. 1987). In this case, the question ofwhether the intervenors’ claims asserted in their private lawsuits are released by the MSA is an issuethat will not arise unless and until the tobacco defendants in those cases raise the MSA as a defense,which they have yet to do. As stated by one court, “[t]he mere possibility that the MSA may someday be offered as a defense is not grounds for intervention. The language of the MSA, inanticipation of separate litigation, contemplates that it may be offered as a complete defense, not thatit will be a complete defense. At this juncture it cannot be determined if such anticipated defenses may be employed or will be valid.” Missouri v. American Tobacco Co., No.76054, 2000 WL 29421(Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2000). Attempting at this point to decide whether the proposed intervenorswill be bound by the MSA, and if so in what respect, would require addressing these questions inthe abstract and theoretical. Doing so would run afoul of the established rule that courts are not torender advisory opinions, see Super Flea Mkt. v. Olsen, 677 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tenn. 1984), ordecide abstract legal questions, see Lewis v. State, 347 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tenn. 1961). The proposedintervenors would have us render an advisory opinion, which we decline to do. We conclude thatthe intervenors do not have a substantial legal interest in the State’s suit entitling them to interveneas of right under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.01. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the intervenors did have a substantial legalinterest in the State’s suit, intervention as of right under Rule 24.01 would still not be appropriate.As stated above, one of the requirements to intervene as of right is that the would-be intervenor be”so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede theapplicant’s ability to protect that interest.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.01(2). While it may be that at somepoint the MSA’s release provisions will be found to apply to the intervenors’ claims if raised as adefense in their cases, the validity of those release provisions and their applicability to theintervenors’ claims can be litigated in their other lawsuits. Those lawsuits provide the intervenorswith a forum in which to determine whether the MSA creates a defense to their claims. Thus, itcannot be said that the State’s settlement of its suit against the tobacco companies will preclude theintervenors from protecting their interests in their private litigation. Accordingly, we find that theproposed intervenors are not entitled to intervention as of right because they do not have asubstantial legal interest in the State’s suit, and even if they had such an interest, the MSA does notimpair or impede their ability to protect that interest. On the question of permissive intervention under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.02, we find no abuse ofdiscretion in the trial court’s denial of intervention. As noted above, if an intervenor’s claim ordefense contains a question of law or fact that is also raised by the main action, the requirement ofRule 24.02 is satisfied and the trial court is afforded discretion to permit intervention. Ballard, 924S.W.2d at 657. In exercising that discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention willunduly delay or otherwise prejudice the rights of the original parties. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.02. Here,it cannot be said that the trial court’s denial of permissive intervention had no basis in law or factor was otherwise arbitrary, illogical, or unconscionable, given that the proposed intervenors have aforum to determine the impact of the MSA on their cases. Furthermore, asking the trial court in theState’s suit to determine the impact of the MSA on the intervenors’ cases would be speculative sincethe MSA has not been raised as a defense to the intervenors’ claims. Finally, the extent to which theMSA’s release provisions bind private litigants is not an issue in the State’s case. Nor is it presentlyan issue in the intervenors’ cases. Thus, the trial court acted properly in rejecting the intervenors’motions for permissive intervention under Rule 24.02. II. In addition to filing a motion to intervene, the Perry intervenors filed a declaratory judgmentaction in which they sought to have their rights under the MSA determined. Specifically, the Perryintervenors sought a declaration that the MSA did not impair their ability to pursue their action against the tobacco defendants. Chancellor McCoy dismissed the declaratory judgment action onthe basis of sovereign immunity, res judicata, and her determination that the intervenors wereseeking an advisory opinion regarding the impact of the MSA on their private lawsuit. A decision on whether to entertain a declaratory judgment falls squarely within a trial court’sdiscretion, which has been described by this Court as “very wide.” Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v.Cooper, 292 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tenn. 1956); Hinchman v. City Water Co., 167 S.W.2d 986, 992(Tenn. 1943); Newsum v. Interstate Realty Co., 278 S.W. 56, 57 (Tenn. 1925). Thus, the issue hereis whether the trial court acted arbitrarily in refusing to declare the rights of the Perry intervenorsunder the MSA. See Southern Fire & Cas. Co., 292 S.W.2d at 178 ( “the action of the trial court inrefusing a declaration should not be disturbed by this, an appellate court, unless such refusal bearbitrary”). The primary purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is “to settle and to afford relief fromuncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations . . . .” Tenn. CodeAnn. � 29-14-113. Although the Act is “to be liberally construed and administered,” id., we haveacknowledged that “certain limitations must be placed upon the operation of the statute.” JohnsonCity v. Caplan, 253 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Tenn. 1952). For example, a declaratory judgment actioncannot be used by a court to decide a theoretical question, Miller v. Miller, 261 S.W. 965, 972 (Tenn.1924), render an advisory opinion which may help a party in another transaction, Hodges v.Hamblen County, 277 S.W. 901, 902 (Tenn. 1925), or “allay fears as to what may occur in thefuture,” Super Flea Mkt., 677 S.W.2d at 451. Thus, in order to maintain an action for a declaratoryjudgment a justiciable controversy must exist. Jared v. Fitzgerald, 195 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. 1946).For a controversy to be justiciable, a real question rather than a theoretical one must be presentedand a legally protectable interest must be at stake. Cummings v. Beeler, 223 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tenn.1949). If the controversy depends upon a future or contingent event, or involves a theoretical orhypothetical state of facts, the controversy is not justiciable. Story v. Walker, 404 S.W.2d 803, 804(Tenn. 1966). If the rule were otherwise, the “courts might well be projected into the limitless fieldof advisory opinions.” Id. In this case, the Perry intervenors seek a declaration as to whether the MSA’s releaseprovisions affect their private suit pending in Coffee County. As previously pointed out, the MSAhas not yet been raised as an issue in that case. The issue will arise and be justiciable, if at all, whenthe tobacco companies assert the affirmative defense of release in the Coffee County case.Therefore, the trial court did not act arbitrarily in declining to render a declaratory opinion to assistthe intervenors in their other litigation or otherwise allay their fears as to what might occur in thefuture. The dismissal of the declaratory judgment action was entirely proper. III. The final issue in this case involves the claim of the Beckom intervenors to attorney’s fees.The Beckom intervenors are composed in part of lawyers who claim to have spent millions of dollarsfighting the tobacco industry in other cases in Tennessee and elsewhere. These lawyers seek to haveliens imposed on the MSA for attorney’s fees incurred as a result of their work against the tobaccocompanies, claiming that the State benefitted from their past efforts. They argue that since the tobacco companies agreed to pay the State’s attorney’s fees in its suit against them under the MSA,this entitles the intervenors to receive from the tobacco companies the attorney’s fees generated bytheir prior litigation. They further contend that they are owed attorney’s fees based on a theory ofimplied contract and other equitable theories. The trial court found that a lien for attorney’s fees wasnot proper because the lawyers seeking the fees were not counsel in the State’s suit. We agree. Pursuant to the terms of the MSA, the tobacco companies agreed to pay attorney’s fees to”private outside counsel, if any, retained by” the State, and who were identified in the MSA “ashaving been retained by and having represented” the State. Thus, only attorneys hired by the Stateand identified by the State in the MSA can make a claim for attorney’s fees under the MSA. Theattorneys seeking to intervene here were not hired by the State to represent it, did not in factrepresent the State in its suit, and are not designated in the MSA as having done so. Thus, theyclearly have no claim to attorney’s fees under the MSA. Similarly unpersuasive is the intervenors’claim to attorney’s fees on equitable grounds, such as quantum meruit, implied contract, and othertheories. If the attorney intervenors in this case were allowed to claim fees under the theories beingasserted, then any lawyer who has been involved in litigation against a tobacco company could dothe same by merely claiming that their efforts have benefitted the State. Obviously, such a situationcannot be sanctioned. Accordingly, we find that the intervenors’ claim to attorney’s fees iscontrolled by the American Rule, which is firmly established in this state. See John Kohl & Co. v.Dearborn & Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 528, 534 (Tenn. 1998). Under that rule, litigants pay their ownattorney’s fees absent a statute or an agreement providing otherwise. Id. It follows that the trialcourt properly refused to permit those individuals seeking attorney’s fees to intervene in this case. CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing discussion, we conclude that the trial court properly denied themotions to intervene and that the Perry intervenors’ declaratory judgment action was properlydismissed. We have carefully considered the other claims of error made by the would-be intervenorsand find them to be without any merit.[FOOTNOTE 7]Accordingly, the judgments of the trial courts are affirmed.Finally, we deny the intervenors’ motions to consider post-judgment facts.[FOOTNOTE 8]Costs of this appeal shall be taxed evenly between the Perry and Beckom intervenors. :::FOOTNOTES::: FN1 This Court is authorized to assume jurisdiction over an undecided case pending in theintermediate appellate courts when a “compelling public interest” is at stake, or when the case is “ofunusual public importance” and involves state taxes, the right to hold or retain public office, orconstitutional issues. Tenn. Code Ann. � 16-3-201(d). FN2 The tobacco defendants named in the State’s complaint included Brown & WilliamsonTobacco Corporation; Liggett Group, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Company; Philip Morris Incorporated;R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; United States Tobacco Company; United States TobaccoManufacturing Company, Inc.; and United States Tobacco Sales and Marketing Company, Inc. FN3 The MSA, which is 147 pages long excluding numerous exhibits, was reached between thetobacco industry and 46 states, along with the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United StatesVirgin Islands, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam. The four remainingstates previously reached agreements with the tobacco industry. No state has rejected the MSA. SeeState v. Philip Morris, Inc., 686 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566 n.3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998), aff’d, 693 N.Y.S.2d36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). FN4 The Perry intervenors had pending a proposed class action suit against the tobaccodefendants in the Circuit Court of Coffee County. In their suit, the Perry intervenors sought torecover for the increase in medical insurance premiums they and thousands of others havepurportedly paid from 1953 to the present as a result of the tobacco industry’s marketing and saleof tobacco products in Tennessee. FN5 The Beckom intervenors had filed suit in Monroe County against various tobacco companiesto recover money spent by the State for smoking-related injuries. The case was removed to federaldistrict court, which dismissed it for lack of standing. The United States Court of Appeals for theSixth Circuit affirmed the district court decision. FN6 The MSA provides for the release of claims against the tobacco companies by the”Releasing Parties.” “Releasing Parties” is defined in the MSA as follows: “Releasing Parties meanseach Settling State and any of its past, present and future agents, officials acting in their officialcapacities, legal representatives, agencies, departments, commissions and divisions; and also means,to the full extent of the power of the signatories hereto to release past, present and future claims, thefollowing: (1) any Settling State’s subdivisions . . .; and (2) persons or entities acting in a parenspatriae, sovereign, quasi-sovereign, private attorney general, qui tam, taxpayer, or any other capacity,whether or not any of them participate in this settlement, (A) to the extent that any such person orentity is seeking relief on behalf of or generally applicable to the general public in such Settling Stateor the people of the State, as opposed solely to private or individual relief for separate and distinctinjuries, or (B) to the extent that any such entity (as opposed to an individual) is seeking recoveryof health care expenses (other than premium or capitation payments for the benefit of present orretired state employees) paid or reimbursed, directly or indirectly, by a Settling State.” FN7 Both groups of proposed intervenors, particularly the Beckom group, attempt to make muchof the fact that Chancellor Kilcrease stated at a hearing that he had not read the MSA beforeapproving it and was therefore unfamiliar with its provisions. The proposed intervenors fail to note,however, that the Chancellor stated at a later hearing that he wanted “to correct the record right nowabout that,” stating that he had in fact read the MSA and that his earlier comment about not readingit was made in jest and taken out of context. We assume that counsels’ omission in this regard is theresult of oversight rather than any attempt to mislead the Court. FN8 The Perry intervenors filed a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 14 asking this Court toconsider a laches argument made by the State in a case pending in federal court where an individualwas seeking to intervene in that case. The motion does not request that we consider a post-judgmentfact, but merely a legal position taken by the State in another case, which we decline to do. Lachesis not even an issue in the present case. The Beckom intervenors likewise filed a motion to consider the purported post-judgment fact that the MSA had been amended after its approval to designate anout of state lawyer as one who provided legal services to the State and could therefore recoverattorney’s fees. The motion is moot given our resolution of the case. In any event, the motion doesnot meet the criteria of Tenn. R. App. P. 14 for the consideration of post-judgment facts. TheBeckom intervenors have filed other motions to consider post-judgment facts which we haveconsidered and hereby deny.
State of Tennessee v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEEAT NASHVILLE STATE OF TENNESSEE, ET AL. v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCOCORPORATION, ET AL. v. GREGORY BENNETT PERRY and STEVELLOYD CHAMPION, ET AL. Consolidated Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 98-3776-I Hon. Carol L. McCoy, Chancellor No. 98-3771-II Hon. Irvin Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor Consolidated Appeal No. M1999-00455-SC-R11-CV – Decided April 19, 2000 Appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. � 16-3-201(d) from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court;Judgments of Trial Courts Affirmed DROWOTA, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDERSON, C.J., BIRCH, HOLDER, andBARKER, JJ., joined. J. D. Lee and David C. Lee, Knoxville, Tennessee, for intervenors-appellants, Steven LloydChampion, et al. Gordon Ball, Knoxville, Tennessee, for intervenors-appellants, Gregory Bennett Perry, et al. John A. Lucas, Knoxville, Tennessee, and Robert G. McDowell and James A. Delanis, Nashville,Tennessee, for appellees, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, et al. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Russell T.Perkins, Special Deputy for Litigation; Carolyn Underwood Smith, Assistant Attorney General,Nashville, Tennessee, for appellee, State of Tennessee
