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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Jennifer Lynn Jones killed Robert Clair Dow Jr. by shooting him while they were having sex. Jones testified that killing Dow was Bobbi Jo Smith’s idea, that Smith provided her with the gun she used, and that Smith took the gun from the scene and disposed of it. Authorities arrested Smith, and a jury convicted her of murder. Smith appealed. The trial court assessed her punishment at 50 years of imprisonment and a fine of $5,000. Smith contended in three issues that the trial court erred in excluding testimony of two defense witnesses; in striking language in the proposed charge that would have required the jury to find that she knew about the intent of Jones, who had actually committed the murder, to kill the deceased; and in refusing to allow her attorney to argue to the jury that it was required to make such a finding. HOLDING:Affirmed. Smith urged in issue one that the trial court erred in excluding Pamela Cartwright’s and Carla Weatherford’s testimony. Cartwright, the court stated, would have testified that Jones, while in jail, told her that she killed Dow because of his “pervertedness” and that Jones never mentioned that Smith had anything to do with it. Weatherford, the court stated, would have testified that Jones told her while in jail that she killed Dow, because she was tired of being abused and that Jones never told her that Smith had helped her murder Dow or helped her plan to murder him. The state objected to the testimony of Weatherford and Cartwright on the basis of hearsay and relevance. Smith, however, contended that their testimony was admissible by virtue of Texas Rule of Evidence 803(3), which provides that a statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is admissible. “In this case,” the court stated, “the testimony regarded Jones’s motive in killing Dow. Consequently, the testimony would appear to be admissible assuming that Jones’s motive is relevant in this case.” The court stated: “The State appears to contend that Jones’s motive was not at issue because she had pleaded guilty to murder, that the statements of the two witnesses did not relate to Smith’s state of mind, and that the statements were made in 2006 after Jones had been convicted and sentenced and about two years after the offense was committed.” Smith, the court stated, was tried as a party to Jones’ act of murdering Dow. Under Texas Penal Code �7.01, a person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by the conduct of another for which he or she is criminally responsible. Moreover, a person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he or she solicits, encourages, directs, aids or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. The court stated that therefore, the matters at issue in the case were what actions, if any, Smith took in relation to Jones’ commission of the offense, as well as Smith’s intention when taking those actions. Accordingly, the court declared Jones’ motive irrelevant to the issue of Smith’s culpability or lack thereof with respect to the murder of Dow. Consequently, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the state’s objection to the proffered testimony of Cartwright and Weatherford. Smith urged in issue two that the trial court erred in not including language in the jury charge requiring that the jury find, as a prerequisite to conviction, that Smith knew of Jones’ intent, if any, to shoot and kill Dow. The court, however, found no legal basis for a requirement that a defendant who has taken the actions set forth in �7.02, with the intent set forth in that section, must have an advance knowledge of the other party’s intent to commit the offense or that the charge to the jury must incorporate such a requirement. Thus, the court disposed of Smith’s two remaining points of error. OPINION:Hill, J.; Wright, C.J., and Strange and Hill, JJ.

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