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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Horris Bernard Green was arrested on Sept. 10 or 11, 2005, after refusing to leave a Hurricane Katrina shelter, for state charges of public intoxication, false pretenses and violation of probation. After booking, he was placed in the custody of the Hinds County Detention Center in Mississippi. The Hinds County sheriff’s office contacted the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Mississippi regarding Green’s case. On June 21, 2006, Green was indicted on federal charges, and an arrest warrant was issued. On July 28, 2006, Green was arrested and made his initial appearance before the magistrate judge. July 28 marked Green’s first time in federal custody for these offenses. Prior to that date, he had remained continuously in state custody. At a detention hearing on Aug. 1, 2006, the United States learned for the first time that the state of Mississippi had not yet resolved any pending charges against Green. Green confessed detention and waived the hearing. Trial was set for Sept. 5, 2006. On Aug. 4, 2006, Green filed a motion to dismiss his indictment for pre-indictment delay. The district court denied Green’s motion, but the trial was not calendared for Sept. 5, 2006, and no new trial date was set. On Oct. 30, 2006, the United States filed a motion for a special trial setting due to the impending expiration of the speedy trial clock. On Nov. 8, 2006, Green filed another motion to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. On Nov. 27, 2006, the district court denied Green’s motion to dismiss and set a trial date of Dec. 5, 2006. The day before trial, Green notified the court that he intended to plead guilty to the indictment. On Dec. 5, 2006, Green pleaded guilty, and on Feb. 23, 2007, he was sentenced. HOLDING:Affirmed Under 18 U.S.C. �3161(h)(1)(F), any pretrial motion, including a motion to set a trial date, tolls the speedy trial clock automatically, and the government is not required to prove that the motion actually delayed trial. The government’s Oct. 30, 2006, motion for a special trial setting automatically tolled the 70-day speedy trial clock during the pendency of the motion. Because the government’s motion tolled the clock, no speedy trial violation occurred. Green next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for pre-indictment delay under 18 U.S.C. �3161(b), which provides that “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.” Relying on a 2005 decision from the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Woolfolk, Green argued that the 30-day clock prescribed by �3161(b) began ticking on the date when the federal government either knew or should have known that Green was being held by state authorities for the purpose of answering federal charges, which Green argues is any of three specific dates in September or October 2005, around the time he first arrived in state custody. In Woolfolk, the 4th Circuit addressed whether an individual held by state authorities can ever be under “federal arrest” or in “federal custody” and stated that, “in limited circumstances,” one can be. Green relies primarily on two facts in support of his argument that the government knew or should have known that he was being held solely to answer federal charges: the AUSA’s request to state authorities to defer interviewing Green until the AUSA had reviewed the case and the initiation of the Social Security Administration investigation into Green’s case. Neither these nor the other facts alleged by Green are sufficient to bring this case within the parameters of the standard which Green proposes; these facts fail to establish either that Green was being held solely to answer federal charges or that, even if he was, the government knew or should have known about it. Green’s arrest by state authorities on state charges did not trigger the Speedy Trial Act or the 30-day clock prescribed by �3161(b). The relevant period for the Sixth Amendment analysis begins on June 21, 2006, the date that Green was indicted by the United States and thus the date he was officially accused. Green failed to show that the six-month delay between his indictment and guilty plea was presumptively prejudicial. Having failed to satisfy this threshold requirement for stating a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, Green’s claim fails. OPINION:Garza, J.; Reavley, Smith and Garza. JJ.

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