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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:On Oct. 24, 2005, Cedyco Corp. filed an application for a turnover order to enforce a judgment that Cedyco had purchased from Claron Corp. and that Claron had purchased from the original judgment creditor, Sakowitz Inc. The judgment was in the principal amount of $7,250.50 against William Gregory Holt and his former wife. County Civil Court-at-Law No. 1 in Harris County rendered the underlying judgment on March 17, 1988. On Sept. 16, 2005 and Sept. 19, 2005, Cedyco filed in the trial court two records of assignment, which evidenced that Claron and Cedyco were assignees of the Sakowitz final judgment. On Nov. 28, 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing and signed an order granting Cedyco’s application for turnover. Holt’s attorney was not present at the hearing, because he was in trial in another county. The Nov. 28 turnover order appointed Ray Cain as the receiver and gave him the power and authority to take possession of and sell the nonexempt real and personal property of Holt. The court ordered that the receiver have the fullest and broadest powers, including: 1. ordering the production of evidence pertaining to Holt’s compliance with the Nov. 28 turnover order, the assets, the location of assets, the value of assets and all other financial matters pertaining to Holt; 2. scheduling hearings and directing all parties and witnesses to give testimony at such hearings and to rule upon the admissibility of evidence at such hearings; and 3. placing witnesses under oath and examining them himself. The trial court ordered Holt to turn over to the receiver all checks, cash securities, promissory notes, documents of title, and contracts that he owned; however, the order did not list any specific assets that Holt was required to turn over. In response, Holt filed a petition for writ of mandamus before the 1st Court of Appeals. On June 8, 2006, the 1st Court conditionally granted Holt’s petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing a master-in-chancery. The 1st Court directed the trial court to vacate its Jan. 19, 2006, order appointing a master-in-chancery and any other ancillary orders. On Dec. 22, 2005, Holt filed a notice of appeal from the Nov. 28, 2005, turnover order. HOLDING:Reversed and remanded in part. The court reviewed the turnover order and the appointment of the receiver under an abuse-of-discretion standard. In his first point of error, Holt contended that that the trial court erred, because Cedyco had no standing to file an application for turnover. He claims that Cedyco provided no support for its allegation that it was the current owner and holder of the judgment that it sought to execute as assignee of Sakowitz. At the Dec. 14, 2005, hearing, Holt demanded that Cedyco put on evidence that it was the current owner and holder of the judgment. Instead, Cedyco requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the pleadings and the judgment on file which Cedyco claimed included the records of assignment at issue. The trial court, however, did not take judicial notice of those documents. Thus, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in entering the turnover order, because Cedyco did not carry its evidentiary burden that it was a successor in interest. The court instructed the trial court on remand to vacate the turnover order. Nonetheless, it considered Holt’s remaining arguments because they were likely to recur. Holt, the court stated, argued that Cedyco did not carry its evidentiary burden to prove that the judgment signed March 17, 1988, was not dormant. Cedyco, the court stated, filed its application for turnover on Oct. 24, 2005 17 years after the underlying judgment was signed. At the Dec. 14, 2005, hearing, Holt called Cedyco to put on evidence that the judgment was not dormant. Cedyco did not put on evidence that a writ of execution was issued within 10 years after the rendition of the underlying judgment or that the judgment had been revived. Thus, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion by entering the turnover order, because Cedyco did not carry its evidentiary burden of showing that the judgment was not dormant. In addition, the court found that the turnover order did not comply with Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code �31.002. The court noted that the trial court’s Nov. 28, 2005, turnover order did not identify specific, nonexempt property subject to the order; rather, it improperly included a laundry list of possible assets stated in broad categories. OPINION:Taft, J.; Taft and Hanks, J.J. DISSENT:Keyes, J. “I would hold that Cedyco failed to bear its burden of proof either as to its capacity to execute the judgment or as to the preservation of the judgment in the evidentiary hearings on its turnover application and that any further attempts to execute the 17-year-old Sakowitz judgment against Holt are, therefore, forever barred. “I would reverse the order and render an order dismissing Cedyco’s turnover application with prejudice to any further attempt to execute the judgment.”

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