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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:On Sept. 20, 1999, John D. Moore was driving an 18-wheel tractor-trailer rig, without a trailer, on Loop 610 North in Houston during rush-hour traffic. The speed limits were a minimum of 40 and a maximum of 55 miles per hour. Moore’s speed was approximately 45 mph. As Moore crested a hill just before the Wayside exit, he came upon a motionless line of cars in his lane, waiting to exit. The car directly in front of Moore swerved into the left lane; Moore swerved into the emergency lane to the right of the exit lane. Moore shifted down and intentionally “rode the guardrail” as he proceeded, to augment his attempt to bring the rig to a stop, but he drove over some grass on the side of the road that caused the rig to skid. Moore passed as many as 15 cars before the emergency lane merged into the exit lane and ended. On the right of the emergency lane was a dropoff over an embankment. When he realized he was running out of room as the emergency lane ended, Moore thought he could steer through an opening of 10 feet to 12 feet between Maethenia Jordan’s Ford Expedition and the car behind her. Instead, his tractor-trailer cab collided with the rear end of Jordan’s Expedition, spinning the Expedition 180 degrees. The tractor trailer traveled across the freeway and came to rest against the divider between the oncoming lanes of traffic. Moore and his front-seat passenger checked on Jordan and her passenger and called EMS. Medical personnel took Jordan to a local hospital by ambulance. She had injured her back, resulting in a number of physical and practical impairments. A police officer stopped to investigate the accident. He issued Moore a citation for “failure to control speed,” but did not cite him for speeding. Jordan sued Moore for negligence and sued Sava Inc., the company that owned the tractor-trailer, for various causes of action including negligent entrustment under the doctrine of respondeat superior. After a jury trial in which the jury determined that Moore was not liable, the trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment for Jordan. HOLDING:Reversed and remanded. In her first issue, Jordan contended that the trial court erred by denying her challenges for cause to two jurors who she alleged were biased in favor of Moore, thereby forcing her to use peremptory strikes on the two jurors instead of on two other jurors whom she found objectionable. But the court overruled this objection. Venire member 17′s replies to the trial court’s inquiries, the court stated, did not demonstrate that she would not have been able to set aside her personal beliefs to act impartially. Similarly, the court found a lack of evidence that venire member 20 had a bias. In her second issue, Jordan argued that the trial court erred in submitting a sudden-emergency instruction to the jury over her objection. A sudden-emergency instruction, the court noted, advises the jurors that if the evidence shows that conditions beyond the party’s control caused the accident in question or that the conduct of some person not a party to the litigation caused it, the jury does not have to place blame on a party. The court held that there was “evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the emergency condition arose suddenly and unexpectedly” and that the evidence satisfied the three-prong test for submission of a sudden emergency instruction. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was evidence of probative value to support submission of the sudden-emergency instruction to the jury. Therefore, the court held that the trial court did not err in submitting the instruction. In her third issue, Jordan contended that Moore’s counsel improperly embellished the court’s charge, resulting in an unjust verdict. But the court found that Moore’s counsel did not do so, and, even if he did, Jordan waived her error by not making a timely objection. Finally, the court considered the evidence in the record to find that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the verdict. OPINION:Keyes, J.; Keyes and Alcala, J.J. CONCURRENCE:Radack, C.J. “I would conclude that the trial court erred in giving the sudden emergency instruction, but that the error was harmless. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.”

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