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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS: Crystal Goodnough gave birth to twins, J.P.H. and S.P.H., in July 2002. Shortly after their birth, Child Protective Services started an investigation based upon allegations of neglect. CPS took the children to the hospital at 14 days of age for testing and investigation of possible dehydration. Goodnough and her common-law husband, Mark Alan Hennington, agreed to voluntarily place the children with his aunt, Kim Gopffarth. When the children were released from the hospital, they were placed in her care. The trial court named Gopffarth sole managing conservator of the children and Goodnough possessory conservator. Goodnough and Hennington faced criminal charges for organized criminal activity at the time of the twins’ placement with Gopffarth in 2002. They were ultimately convicted and placed on community supervision. They failed to comply with their community supervision requirements and were arrested in January 2004. Goodnough admitted that she had failed to perform community service as ordered and had consumed amphetamines and methamphetamine. The trial court revoked Goodnough’s and Hennington’s community supervision and sentenced each to a term of ten years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Gopffarth then filed suit seeking to terminate Goodnough’s and Hennington’s parental rights. Gopffarth and her husband also sought to adopt the twins. The trial court conducted a bench trial and found that Goodnough and Hennington knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in their convictions, their incarcerations, and their inability to care for the children for not less than two years from the date the petition to terminate was filed. The trial court also found that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the children’s best interest. The trial court terminated the parent-child relationship and granted the Gopffarths’ request to adopt the children. Both Goodnough and Hennington filed notices of appeal. Only Goodnough filed a brief. Counsel advised the court that Hennington has decided not to pursue an appeal. HOLDING: Affirmed. Imprisonment alone is insufficient to justify termination of the parent-child relationship. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1987). Texas Family Code �161.001(1)(Q) recognizes this by requiring both a two-year incarceration and proof of the parent’s inability to care for the child while incarcerated. At the same time, the statute provides for the child’s best interest by allowing proactive action. A lengthy sentence is a serious matter and requires that measures be taken to ensure the child’s care. Goodnough’s 10-year sentence creates at least a rebuttable presumption sufficient to satisfy subsection Q’s incarceration requirement. Although a 10-year sentence is not synonymous with a 10-year period of incarceration, A 10-year sentence satisfies subsection Q because it raises the need to take proactive measures to ensure the child’s welfare. If a parent wishes to challenge the statute’s applicability, then the parent must produce evidence that he or she will be out of prison less than two years after the filing of the petition of termination. The court finds that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Goodnough would be incarcerated at least two years from the date of the petition. Subsection Q requires not only a period of incarceration of two years but also that the parent be unable to provide care for the child while incarcerated. Goodnough does not challenge the trial court’s finding that she would be unable to provide care for the children while in prison. Subsection Q was satisfied. Goodnough contends in her second issue that the Gopffarths failed to comply with �160.422. This statute requires a search of the registry of paternity before a proceeding for the termination of parental rights is concluded. Goodnough lacks standing to raise a challenge under this statute. Moreover, the statute does not apply to this case. Hennington admitted that he was the father and acknowledged that his name is on the twins’ birth certificates. Finally, even if Goodnough has standing, she waived this issue by not raising it before the trial court. Goodnough waived any complaint that her due process rights were violated because the same judge presided over both her termination case and her criminal case. Goodnough knew the judge who would preside over the termination case was the same judge who had presided over her criminal case. If she was concerned about the judge’s ability to fairly and impartially consider her case, she had the opportunity to file a motion for recusal. Not only did she not object to the judge’s presence, she did not ask for a jury trial. Goodnough does not allege the judge was constitutionally disqualified to serve. OPINION: Strange, J.; Wright, C.J., McCall and Strange, J.J.

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