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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:In a single trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of two burglaries that arose from the same criminal episode. One was a felony of the first degree, the other of the second degree. In each case the jury assessed a punishment of 10 years in prison and a $10,000 fine, and it recommended suspending the sentences and placing the defendant on community supervision. The trial court entered judgments of guilt and concurrent sentences. As the jury’s recommendations required, the judge suspended the imposition of the sentences. He placed the defendant on community supervision for a period of 10 years in each case. The judge imposed conditions of probation in each case. They included confinement in the county jail for a period of 180 days, which is the longest period permitted by the statute. The judge ordered that the confinement in one case begin on a certain day, and that on the 180th day of that confinement, the 180-day confinement in the other case begin. The result would be a total confinement in the county jail of 359 days. The defendant appealed. He argued that the trial judge’s imposition of consecutive periods of confinement totaling more than 180 days as conditions of his probations violated �3.03(a) of the Penal Code, which says, “When the accused is found guilty of more than one offense arising out of the same criminal episode prosecuted in a single criminal action . . . the sentences shall run concurrently.” The court of appeals overruled the appellant’s complaint. It held that community supervision is not part of a sentence but rather a suspension of a sentence, and thus it is not governed by �3.03(a). Alternatively, the court held that, by not objecting at the time the conditions were imposed by the trial judge, the appellant waived any possible objection, and failed to preserve any error for review. HOLDING:Affirmed. It is simply not clear from the record that the appellant or his attorney reasonably should have understood from the judge’s statement that the 180-day confinements as conditions of probation were to run consecutively. There is no reporter’s record of this proceeding. It is not noted on the court’s docket sheets. The record does not show whether either the state or the appellant was represented by counsel; no counsel signed the conditions. The trial judge did not participate (the conditions were signed by another judge “for” the trial judge). The appellant and a “court liaison officer” also signed the conditions. The court presumes that the document was signed in the appellant’s meeting with a community supervision officer, rather than during a hearing before the trial judge. The appellant had no meaningful opportunity to object to these specific conditions of his probations. The court agrees with the appellant that he did not waive, or fail to preserve, his complaint for appellate review. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure �12(a) of Article 42.12 authorizes a judge with jurisdiction of a felony case to require a defendant who has been convicted to submit to a period of confinement in a county jail not to exceed 180 days, even when a jury has recommended probation. There is a statutory limit on that authority; �12(b) says that, when the judge also requires a defendant to serve a term in a community corrections facility, the total time served in such a facility and in a jail may not exceed 24 months. Nothing else in the article limits the judge’s authority to require confinement in jail for each offense of which a defendant is convicted. If �12(a) authorizes a condition of confinement of jail for up to 180 days for a probationer who has been convicted in a felony case, the authority of the statute is not exceeded by another such condition of probation for a probationer who has been convicted in another felony case. That the 10-year periods of probation could not made consecutive does not mean that the combined conditions of probation in two cases could not have a more onerous effect than the conditions in one case. OPINION:Paul Womack, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which, Keller, P.J., and Meyers, Price, Keasler, Hervey, and Cochran, JJ., joined. Holcomb, J., concurred in the judgment. Johnson, J., dissented.

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