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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Appellant, Deborah Dodge, appeals from a no-evidence summary judgment and traditional summary judgment granted in favor of appellees, Jean Durdin, Granger Durdin, Raymond Durdin, Magic Moments Inc. and Magic Moments Stables. Dodge claims that she sustained an injury when an untamed horse kicked her in the abdomen as she was administering oral deworming medication to the horse, pursuant to direction from her employer and supervisor, appellee Granger Durdin. HOLDING:Reversed and remanded. No court has addressed directly whether employees involved in equine activities are “participants” according to the Equine Act so as to remove any employer liability pursuant to the Labor Code. With respect to an equine activity, the Equine Act defines “participant” as “a person who engages in the [equine] activity, without regard to whether the person is an amateur or professional or whether the person pays for the activity or participates in the activity for free.” Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code �87.001(9) (Vernon 2005). The statute does not state that it is inapplicable to people who are employees paid to work with equine animals. However, the preliminary portion of the definition of participant, which refers to “a person who engages in the [equine] activity,” is circumscribed by the concluding portion of the sentence, which suggests the term applies to consumers of equine activities. Specifically, the concluding portion states that a person is a “participant” regardless of “whether the person pays for the activity or participates in the activity for free.” Employees, such as Dodge, who are involved in an equine activity neither pay to participate nor participate for free, as consumers do; rather, they are paid by employers for their work. Thus, although the definition of participant in the Equine Act does not expressly exclude an employee such as Dodge, the definition implies that the Equine Act does not apply to her by narrowing the class of “participants” to those who either pay to participate or who participate for free. The court examines the legislative history, the object of the equine act and consequences of alternative constructions. although the Equine Act does not specifically exclude employees acting within the course and scope of their employment from the definition of “participant” under the act, the statutory language specifically encompasses those who pay to participate in the equine activity or who choose to participate for free. Employees neither pay to participate in the equine activity nor participate for free; rather, they are paid for their labor. The purpose of the Equine Act was to limit the liability of those involved in the tourism industry, rather than to limit an employee’s right against his or her employer. Further, the Equine Act lacks express legislative intent to abrogate employer duties as delineated in the Workers’ Compensation Act. For these reasons, the court holds that Dodge, as an employee covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act, was not a participant in an equine activity under the Equine Act. The court finds that Dodge presented more than a scintilla of evidence as to each element of her cause of action to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Dodge stated that she was employed by appellees and that she was applying the deworming paste to the horse pursuant to instructions from her supervisor, Granger Durdin, at the time of the injury. Thus, Dodge presented more than a scintilla of evidence that she was acting within the course and scope of her employment at the time of her injury. Dodge produced more than a scintilla of evidence that appellees breached their duty of care to warn Dodge about the dangerous propensities of the horse and to provide a reasonably safe work place. Dodge presented more than a scintilla of evidence regarding cause-in-fact because reasonable minds could differ as to whether warning Dodge about the dangerousness of the horse or taking precautions would have prevented Dodge’s injury. Further, the court concludes that some evidence exists that the appellees, as stable owners, would have anticipated the danger of failing to warn Dodge or taking precautions to prevent her injury. The summary judgment record shows that Dodge incurred more than $4,000 in medical bills as a result of her injury, therefore, the court concludes that some evidence exists that Dodge suffered damages resulting from appellees’ negligence. OPINION:Alcala, J.; Radack, C.J., Alcala and Bland, JJ.

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