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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:This appeal arises from the district court’s judgment dismissing the claims for non-pecuniary damages of appellants Barbara Scarborough, Rhonda Scarborough, and William Scarborough, Jr. See Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 264 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. La. 2003) (stating the reasons upon which the district court dismissed the claim for non-pecuniary damages). Appellants had sued, inter alia, Clemco Industries, Inc., Pulsoman Safety Equipment Co. and Century Indemnity Co. (collectively “appellees”), individually and for damages they sustained as a result of William Scarborough’s wrongful death. Scarborough worked aboard sandblasting vessels between 1959 and 1967. These vessels maintained the protective coatings of offshore oil platforms through the use of abrasive sandblasting. The equipment used in this procedure included sand pots located within the hull of the vessel; compressors located on the deck of the vessel; hoses that were connected to the compressor and brought aboard the platforms; and hoods worn by the decedent while sandblasting. It is alleged that the hoods worn by Scarborough while sandblasting were manufactured by Pulsoman and Clemco. The hoods were allegedly defective and caused Scarborough to inhale silica and other materials. The inhalation of these materials caused Scarborough to develop silicosis. In 1977, Scarborough brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against his employer, appellees, and certain insurers alleging that their negligence had caused him to develop silicosis and that he was permanently disabled. Scarborough v. N. Assurance Co., et al., No. 77-2523 (E.D. La. 1977) (Heebe, J.) (Scarborough I). The jury in that case returned a $650,000 verdict in Scarborough’s favor. The jury’s findings of fact included, inter alia, that Scarborough was a Jones Act seaman, a status he sought, and that the negligence of his employer and the manufacturers of vessel equipment caused his disability when they provided equipment that rendered the vessel unseaworthy. Scarborough died of respiratory failure on March 21, 2002. Approximately ten months later, appellants brought suit against a majority of the Scarborough I defendants for wrongful death, arguing that the defendants were precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from rearguing the issue of their liability for causing Scarborough to develop silicosis. Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 264 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. La. 2003) (Scarborough II). The Scarborough II court, in an order addressing various cross motions for dismissal and summary judgment, made the following pertinent findings: 1. Appellants’ cause of action against Clemco and Pulsoman for wrongful death arises under maritime law and is subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction. 2. Appellants are precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from arguing that Scarborough was not a Jones Act seaman. 3. Under the uniformity principle announced in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 29 (1990), a Jones Act seaman and his survivors may not recover non-pecuniary damages in a wrongful death suit against a non-employer third party. The motions for dismissal and summary judgment were denied in the district court’s Order and Reasons entered on May 16, 2003, because there were material issues of fact in connection with appellants’ pecuniary damages claims that were in dispute. After the pecuniary damages claims were settled, however, the motion to dismiss was granted by the district court in its Final Judgment entered on Oct. 1, 2003. Appellants now appeal two legal conclusions, contained in the district court’s Order and Reasons, based upon which it later dismissed appellants’ claims: 1. Appellants’ claims against Clemco, Pulsoman and Century are subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction. 2. A Jones Act seaman’s survivors may not recover non-pecuniary damages against a non-employer third party in a maritime wrongful death action. HOLDING:Affirmed. The facts in this case are analogous to causes of action brought pursuant to the Jones Act. It would be improper for this court to allow the surviving spouse and heirs of a Jones Act seaman to recover non-pecuniary damages in this case when Congress has disallowed the recovery of identical damages in a Jones Act suit. The genesis of appellants’ claims is maritime through and through. Miles plainly limits recovery to pecuniary damages. We will not retreat from the bright line directive of Miles. The Miles opinion is concerned with uniformity in the damages recoverable by a Jones Act seaman and his survivors, not with uniformity of the types of damages to which various defendants are subjected. OPINION:Little, J.; Jones, Wiener and Little, JJ.

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