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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:After being hit by a car in the 1980s, Mark Johnson entered into a settlement that paid him $702,000 in a lump sum, and then provided for incremental monthly payments totaling $1.8 million to last from December 1986 to November 2026. The Home Insurance Company was to make the future payments, and so purchased an annuity from Integrity Life Insurance Co. to do so. With Johnson’s approval, Home Insurance then assigned the annuity and the obligation to make the payments to Equitable Life Assurance Society. Integrity began making payments in December 1986. The settlement agreement stated that the payments could not be accelerated, deferred, increased or decreased by Johnson, and he could not sell, mortgage or encumber future assets, “nor anticipate the same, or any part hereof, by assignment or otherwise.” In February 1998, Johnson contacted Stone Street Capital and entered into an agreement with that company whereby Stone Street agreed to pay $132,844 in a lump sum to Johnson in exchange for some of Johnson’s assignment of 13 years’ worth of his future monthly payments under the 1986 settlement. The assigned monthly payments were $500 per month less than the standard total due to Johnson each month under the settlement, and the assigned payments ran from March 1998 to February 2011 only. Stone Street made the payment to Johnson, who used the money for a house and to pay off a truck loan, in March 1998, then assigned its agreement with Johnson to Settlement Trust. Stone Street remained the services and agent for Settlement Trust. The next month, Equitable received a letter Johnson wrote to Integrity, who had been making the monthly payments, from an address in Spring that matched that of Stone Street’s lock box. Johnson did not advise Equitable or Integrity that he had assigned the settlement proceeds to Stone Street, though. Equitable advised Integrity to make the address change, therefore Stone Street received the monthly payout from Integrity from April 1998 to February 1999. Stone Street forwarded the extra $500 to Johnson. Unilaterally, in February 1999, Johnson faxed a letter to Integrity directing that future payments be sent to his residence, which Integrity did until June 1999. Stone Street sued Johnson in a Maryland lawsuit and Johnson was enjoined from having the payments directed to himself. Johnson, however, did not comply with the order, so the Maryland court entered a default judgment against him. Stone Street was thus granted injunctive relief as well as entitlement to the monthly payments. When Integrity tried to send the payments to Stone Street in compliance with the court order, Johnson demanded that Integrity send the payments to him in Leesburg or else face a lawsuit. Structured Asset took over as agent and servicer from Stone Street. When Structured Asset and Johnson were simultaneously demanding that payments be sent to them, Integrity filed an interpleader action and deposited the disputed sum ($27,000) into the court’s trial court’s registry. In October 2002, the trial court eventually entered a final judgment in favor of Structured Asset, awarding it all of Integrity’s deposited funds plus interest. Structured Asset was also awarded the right to receive monthly payments from August 2002 to February 2011 in the same incremental amounts that Stone Street had agreed with Johnson on in March 1998. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Johnson appeals. HOLDING:Affirmed. Johnson argues that the trial court should not have concluded that Johnson had waived the anti-assignment provision of the original settlement agreement. Also, he argues that the trial court erred in finding that Johnson was estopped from raising the anti-assignment provision as a defense. The court confirms that Johnson did not waive raising these issues on appeal. The court then finds that Texas law was the correct law to apply when assessing whether Johnson waived the anti-assignment clause or was estopped from raising it. Johnson’s agreement with Stone Street chose Pennsylvania as the state whose law would govern, though at trial, neither party urged that law to actually be applied. The one reference during the proceeding to Stone Street’s office being in Pennsylvania does not amount to a specific argument to apply that state’s law. The court thus assumes that the trial court properly applied Texas law. Thus applying Texas law on waiver and estoppel, the court finds � through the trial court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law � that Johnson entered into a contract with Stone Street assigning his rights to the monthly payments, preventing him from taking a position inconsistent that assignment. Johnson expressly waived any contractual right he had to assert the anti-assignment provision of the original agreement when he entered into the agreement with Stone Street. That agreement included acknowledgements in that agreement that he was waiving and releasing prior rights under the original settlement. In addition, Johnson’s intention to yield or waive his rights under the anti-assignment provision is demonstrated by his silence or failure to object to Stone Street’s receipt of the monthly payments for approximately 11 months and the concurrent forwarding to Johnson of the extra $500 per month. Johnson then claims that the trial court erred in awarding all of the interpleaded funds to Integrity. He says that since the agreement with Stone Street applied to only a portion of each monthly payment he was originally entitled to receive, there is no evidence to support an award of all the periodic monthly payments. The court finds that Johnson has failed to adequately brief this argument. He did not present a clear and concise argument with appropriate citations to authority or case law. Even if he had not waived this issue through inadequate briefing, however, the court says his argument would still fail. The amount the trial court ordered to be paid to Integrity was only what Integrity was entitled to. The schedule outlined by the trial court indicated that is was based on the monthly payments � less the $500 overage � for the same period of time, plus interest. Finally, the court addresses Johnson’s argument that the agreement between him and Stone Street (and, subsequently Structured Asset) was against public policy. The court acknowledges that both the Internal Revenue Code and the Texas Settlement Protection Act address the acquisition of structured settlements by so-called factoring companies like Stone Street. The court notes that the TSPA is a paternalistic statute designed to protect consumers from unscrupulous factoring companies, and though it bars some types of these arrangements, there is not a blanket prohibition. After reviewing case law from other state and federal courts, the court joins those courts that have found that the assignment of structured settlement payments, like what Johnson had with Stone Street, is not against public policy. OPINION:Lang-Miers, J.; Whittington, Lang and Lang-Miers, JJ.

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