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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Arthur Meru sued attorneys Albert Huerta, Steve Hastings, Doug Allison and Guy Allison for breach of contract and misrepresentation. He asserted that he was employed by the attorneys as an investigator and legal assistant from 1984 to 1997; that his duties included investigating current and potential cases and interviewing witnesses, family members and other key individuals; that in addition to his base salary, the lawyers agreed to pay him a bonus, contingent upon the successful outcome of the cases on which he performed legal assistance and investigative services; and that the practice of paying bonuses in addition to base salary was common for appellees. Meru claimed he was owed compensation on two cases: the “Tomlinson” and “Hastings” cases. The trial court granted the attorneys’ motion for summary judgment without specifying the grounds. Meru appeals. HOLDING:Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. The attorneys’ first ground for summary judgment was based on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), but the court finds the no-evidence motion was insufficient. It did not state the elements of the claim as to which there is no evidence; instead, it merely conclusory statements. One claim raised in the attorneys’ traditional motion for summary judgment is that limitations prevented Meru’s claim. They argue that the Tomlinson case settled in 1993, and Meru didn’t file his petition until Dec. 17, 1998. Meru claims that the case did not end until it was dismissed in November 1994. The court finds that the date the case settled is not the date when any alleged contract was breached or when any fraud was discovered. A cause of action generally accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy. The court finds that the attorneys did not present any evidence establishing when they received their share of the settlement proceeds from the Tomlinson case. Thus, they failed to establish as a matter of law when Meru’s claims accrued. Another ground asserted in the attorneys’ summary judgment motion was that Meru had attempted to get perjured testimony to support his contract claims, and that such conduct amounts to an admission that his claims were without merit. The attorneys say that a transcript of a telephone conversation between Meru and his former girlfriend includes an attempt by Meru to get his girlfriend to support his recollection of the formation of a contract. The attorneys call this spoliation of evidence. The court finds that an issue of spoliation of evidence is, by its nature, an evidentiary question. The court says it refuses “to transform a sanctionable act or presumption into a conclusively established fact for summary judgment purposes.” The court discusses whether Meru established the elements of his cause of action for breach of contract. He did not, the court finds. Meru says the attorneys made oral representations that he would receive “close to” $600,000 for the Tomlinson case, and “somewhere in the neighborhood” of $1 million for the Hastings case, or “double the amount” he is to receive from the Tomlinson case. The court agrees with the attorneys that an oral contract cannot be established where the material terms are indefinite. Meru says he cannot come up with a precise figure because much of what he is paid is in the form of luxury goods, rent-free housing and forgiven loans. He also says it was their common course of dealing for him to be paid in this way, and that payments were often made over the course of a few months, and that he had already received partial payment for the Tomlinson case in his receipt of $25,000, an automobile and a boat. The court rejects Meru’s explanation for this indefiniteness. At best, the court finds a contingent agreement to agree. An agreement to make future contracts is enforceable only if its essential terms are specific; terms to be negotiated in the future will not do. “The record here is devoid of any agreement or promise to pay a sum certain to [Meru] in the future as a bonus for services rendered to [the attorneys]. It is undisputed that the amount of any bonus was never determined by the parties. Further, [the attorneys] have shown that any alleged agreement to pay their employees a bonus was gratuitous in nature and contingent on the successful outcome of their lawsuits. Because the amount of any bonus was indefinite at the time of the alleged agreement, such amount was open for future negotiation or discretion.” Meru argues on appeal that the attorneys’ summary judgment proof does not address his claims for misrepresentation. The court agrees. With little discussion, the court finds that the attorneys failed to produce any evidence regarding the misrepresentation cause of action. The court reverses the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue. OPINION:Federico G. Hinojosa, J.; Hinojosa, Yanez and Castillo, JJ.

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