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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Applicant was convicted on a plea of guilty for the offense of theft of property of $750 or less, and was sentenced to a 15-year term in prison on July 23, 1991. He was released on parole or mandatory supervision on July 8, 1996, (“RELEASE date”), with an expiration date of May 25, 2006 (just under 10 years). A parole-violator warrant was issued on Oct. 20, 1998, but was subsequently withdrawn on Feb. 5, 1999. The applicant was returned to custody at the Texas Department of Correctional Justice on March 25, 1999, and re-released on Jan. 26, 2000. This detention was for a new conviction, however, and the applicant’s parole was not revoked. On April 19, 2000, another parole-violator warrant was issued, but the warrant was later withdrawn on June 22, 2000. The applicant was again returned to the TDCJ on Aug. 3, 2000, and re-released on Jan. 18, 2001, but the applicant’s mandatory supervision for this cause was not revoked. On Aug. 6, 2001, (“SUMMONS date”), a summons relating to this cause was issued. Then, on Sept. 4, 2001, (“WARRANT/REVOCATION date”), a parole-violator warrant was issued for this cause, and the applicant’s mandatory supervision was revoked on the same date. The applicant applied for street-time credit, but was denied such credit by the TDCJ street-time credit office on June 18, 2002, “due to not meeting the mid-point.” The applicant then filed this application on Aug. 23, 2002. HOLDING:Granted. Texas Government Code �508.283(c) says that certain parole violators will receive street-time credit if the “remaining portion” of their sentence is less than the amount of time they have spent out on parole. Although �508.283(c) is worded in a confusing manner, the court states, it can be simplified into the following 2-pronged test for the purpose of determining whether the applicant receives street-time credit: 1. If, on the SUMMONS date, the “remaining portion” of applicant’s sentence is greater than the time spent on parole, applicant receives no street-time credit for the time spent on parole. 2. If, however, on the SUMMONS date, the “remaining portion” of applicant’s sentence is less than the time spent on parole, applicant receives street-time credit for the amount of time spent on parole. But the court asks: For purposes of determining street-time credit (whether the “remaining portion” of the sentence is greater than the time spent on parole), what does “remaining portion” in �508.283(c) mean? Does “remaining portion” mean merely that part of the sentence which is remaining as of the RELEASE date (without considering the amount of time spent out on parole), or does it mean that part of the sentence remaining at the RELEASE date less the time spent on parole? The court determines that, of the two possible interpretations of “remaining portion” in �508.283(c), only one interpretation will render the statute effective and consistent with legislative intent. “Remaining portion”in �508.283(c) refers to that part of the sentence remaining at the RELEASE date, less time spent on parole. OPINION:Meyers, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Price, Womack, Johnson, Holcomb, and Cochran, J.J., joined. Keasler, J., concurred in the judgment. Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Hervey, J., joined. DISSENT:Keller, P.J.; Hervey, J., joins. “I believe that �508.283(c) conforms to legislative custom regarding the denial of calendar time credits. Standing alone, the wording concerning the third class of offenders may be confusing. But the legislative usage becomes clear upon examining the language relating to the first two classes. For those classes, the remaining portion of the sentence is computed or served “without credit for the time from the date of release to the date of revocation” (i.e., without credit for street time). The provisions say nothing about the time after revocation. Does that mean the offender gets credit for the time remaining after revocation, even though that time has not been served in any shape, form, or fashion? Of course not. The Legislature does not have to affirmatively deny credit for time that has never been served in any capacity. It is only when time has been served in some manner that the Legislature is called upon to specifically allow or disallow credit for that time. So, for the first two classes, the Legislature has disallowed credit for the time from the date of release to the date of revocation – time that is served on the street under supervision. The time after revocation, that has yet to be served, is not specifically referred to because there is no need to take any action to prevent that time from being credited. Just as the statute does not address time served under incarceration, the statute does not address time not yet served.”

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