X

Thank you for sharing!

Your article was successfully shared with the contacts you provided.
Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Margaret Bass filed a workers’ compensation claim after slipping and injuring her back while employed with Flour Bluff Independent School District. The Texas Association of School Boards denied Bass’s claim for compensation. Bass appealed the denial, and the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeals Panel denied the benefits in a decision filed Oct. 6, 1997. On Nov. 14, 1997, with one day remaining on the statute of limitations, Bass filed a judicial petition for review of the panel’s decision and named TASB as the only defendant. TASB moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was not a proper party to the suit. Flour Bluff moved for summary judgment on two alternative grounds: 1. that the statute of limitations had expired because Bass failed to timely file suit against Flour Bluff; or 2. that Bass failed to use due diligence in serving Flour Bluff with process. The trial court granted both TASB’s and Flour Bluff’s summary judgment motions. The court found it did not have jurisdiction over TASB and that the statute of limitations had run on the claims against Flour Bluff. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment in TASB’s favor, but reversed the summary judgment as to Flour Bluff, holding that a fact issue existed as to whether the statute of limitations tolled the claims against Flour Bluff when Bass mistakenly named TASB as defendant. HOLDING:Reversed and rendered that Bass take nothing. According to the court of appeals, misidentification tolls the statute of limitations in a workers’ compensation appeal under Texas Labor Code �410.252 if the appealing party establishes that the proper defendant was cognizant of the facts of the suit and was not misled or placed at a disadvantage by the appealing party’s pleading error. The court disagrees. The statute of limitations will be tolled in misidentification cases if there are two separate, but related, entities that use a similar trade name and the correct entity had notice of the suit and was not misled or disadvantaged by the mistake. Chilkewitz v. Hyson, 22 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. 1999). Here, TASB and Flour Bluff were two distinct parties that did not operate under a similar trade name. Bass therefore was required to sue Flour Bluff within the limitations period and serve Flour Bluff with process within a reasonable time thereafter. OPINION:Per curiam.

Want to continue reading?
Become a Free ALM Digital Reader.

Benefits of a Digital Membership:

  • Free access to 3 articles* every 30 days
  • Access to the entire ALM network of websites
  • Unlimited access to the ALM suite of newsletters
  • Build custom alerts on any search topic of your choosing
  • Search by a wide range of topics

*May exclude premium content
Already have an account?

 
 

ALM Legal Publication Newsletters

Sign Up Today and Never Miss Another Story.

As part of your digital membership, you can sign up for an unlimited number of a wide range of complimentary newsletters. Visit your My Account page to make your selections. Get the timely legal news and critical analysis you cannot afford to miss. Tailored just for you. In your inbox. Every day.

Copyright © 2020 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All Rights Reserved.