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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:This appeal arises from a larger suit filed by plaintiffs, Willowbrook Foods Inc., Promised Land Foods Inc. and Sunday House Foods Inc., against several defendants, including Emerson Electric Co. Plaintiffs sued Emerson, alleging it was liable for the malfunction of a component part of a control panel on a commercial turkey fryer. Panatrol Corp. manufactured the control panel and consequently Emerson joined Panatrol as a third-party contribution defendant based on its independent fault for plaintiffs’ injuries. Panatrol counterclaimed against Emerson for indemnification. HOLDING:Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Panatrol contends the trial court’s severance order of April 28th created a new action that included several parties (Emerson, FCL, and itself) and several claims. Therefore, according to Panatrol, all orders remained interlocutory until Aug. 18 when the court finally disposed of the last remaining claims of these parties. Panatrol’s argument is premised, not on the substance of the April 28 order, but on the style of the severed cause, which includes the plaintiffs and FCL, along with Emerson and Panatrol. Panatrol concedes the April 28 severance does not expressly sever the causes of action between plaintiffs and FCL; instead, Panatrol contends the order does so by implication by naming those entities as parties in the style. Therefore, Panatrol argues that when the trial court finally disposed of all claims in favor of FCL on Aug. 18, all other orders in cause No. 9472-A became final as well. Panatrol provides no authority for its argument that the style of a case dictates the substance of an order or judgment in the case. Although the April 28 order named plaintiffs, Panatrol, Emerson and FCL as parties in the style of cause number 9472-A, it is the substance of an order that controls the legal effect of a suit, not its form or style. Therefore, while the style of a case may be a factor to consider in determining the trial court’s intent, it is not a controlling factor. The court looks beyond the mere style of the case to discern the trial court’s intent. The April 28 judgment contains only two decretal paragraphs: 1. the first rendering a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of Emerson on Panatrol’s claims; and 2. the second stating as follows: “the cause of action asserted by Third-Party Defendant Panatrol Corporation against Defendant Emerson Electric is severed from this action . . . .” Despite the parties named in the style, the substance of the April 28 judgment does not indicate further proceedings are to be had in the severed cause. The April 28 judgment disposed of Panatrol’s claims against Emerson, and it severed only that cause of action. The order does not contemplate “a later final order,” nor does it contain language indicating that the trial court was precluding judgment until a later judgment was signed. To the contrary, the April 28 judgment disposed of Panatrol’s claims against Emerson in their entirety and severed the claims into a separate cause without reserving the right to enter final judgment at a later time. Therefore, nothing in the substance of the April 28 judgment supports Panatrol’s argument that this judgment remained interlocutory until plaintiffs’ pending claims against FCL were resolved on August 18. Accordingly, the court holds the April 28 summary judgment in favor of Emerson became final when the trial court severed Panatrol’s cause of action against Emerson on that same date. Panatrol next asserts that even if the April 28 judgment became final when it was severed from the main action, the appellate timetable was restarted on May 14 and again on June 5. Panatrol argues that the trial court’s addition of parties and claims to severed cause No. 9472-A on these dates acted as clarifications or modifications of the April 28 judgment, and, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(h), the appellate timetable began anew. Because the May 14 and June 5 orders left the April 28 summary judgment and severance order undisturbed, Rule 329b(h) did not operate to extend the appellate deadlines. The May 14 order did not affect the finality of the April 28 judgment. The purpose of a motion for new trial, or as here a motion for reconsideration, is to allow the trial court to modify, correct, or reform the judgment assailed. Here, the plaintiffs did not ask for reconsideration of the April 28 summary judgment, a judgment to which they were not parties and which did not affect them. Therefore, neither Rule 26.1(a) nor Rule 329b operated to extend the appellate deadlines. OPINION:Marion, J.; Lopez, C.J., Marion and Speedlin, JJ.

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