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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Elmer Williams joined the Houston Fire Department in 1990, and signed up for participation in the Houston Firemen’s Relief and Retirement Fund, which was created pursuant to the firement’s fund retirement statute. Before that, Williams had worked for six-and-a-half years for two other fire departments, neither of which had statutory firefighters’ retirement funds like Houston’s. In 1995, Williams attempted to purchase prior service credit (PSC) under the retirement statute, for the time he worked at the other departments to be applied to his HFD retirement benefits. At the time, the PSC provision, referred to as �30, said PSC credit was available to “[a] firefighter who transfers from the fire department of one city to that of a city covered by this Act” and met certain requirements. While Williams’ application for PSC was pending, the HFD issued guidelines interpreting �30 to mean that someone like Williams could get PSC only if the departments he worked for had plans similar to the Houston fund. Accordingly, they denied Williams’ application. The Texas Legislature later repealed the retirement statute and replaced it with Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6243e.2(1). Section 16 of that statute says that “[a] person who becomes a firefighter in a municipality to which this article applies may receive service credit for prior employment with the fully paid fire department of another municipality in this state with a similar fund benefitting [sic] only firefighters of that municipality to which the firefighter contributed” if certain requirements were met, an explicit recitation of how the guidelines interpreted �30. Williams sued the fund on statutory and constitutional grounds. This appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the statutory claims until 2003, when Williams would be eligible for retirement. Williams filed suit again, adding the city and the fund’s four trustees. He also added three common-law claims to his four statutory and six constitutional complaints. The trial court granted the fund’s and the trustees’ summary judgment motion and granted the city’s motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. The trial court also entered a take-nothing judgment against Williams. On appeal in 2001, this court declined to revisit its first Williamsruling ( WilliamsI). This court also ruled that Williams’ claims were not ripe since he was not yet eligible for retirement. The trial court judgment was modified and affirmed. On motion for rehearing, the court now withdraws its December 2001 opinion and issues this one in its stead. HOLDING:Affirmed. “We hold that Williams has no statutory right to judicial review of his claims. However, Texas law recognizes a right to judicial review of administrative orders that violate a constitutional right. We hold that Williams has standing to raise his constitutional claims, but those claims are without merit. We further hold that the City is immune to Williams’s Trust Code and common law claims under the doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity and that the trustees are immune under the doctrine of official immunity.” The court divides the jurisdictional issues into two categories: the district court’s jurisdiction to review claims related to the Fund’s decision to deny Williams PSC, and the trial court original jurisdiction over the claims. The court affirms its holding from WilliamsI that the retirement statute did not authorize judicial review of the guidelines or of the trustees’ decision to deny the PSC request. The Fund’s board is administrative in nature, and has broad authority to carry out the retirement statute’s mandates, including determinations relating to eligibility for participation in the Fund. The Fund, therefore, has exclusive jurisdiction over Williams’ claims. Though the statute does allow for judicial review in certain circumstances, review of a PSC determination is not one of them. However, the court does agree that there is judicial review of Williams’ constitutional claims. Williams argues the Fund’s guidelines interpreting �30 was an ultra vires act: the Fund acted outside its statutory authority. Noting that even Williams does not deny that the Fund has authority to review all questions relating to eligibility for participation, service, benefits and administration of the Fund, the court finds Williams’ complaint is really one of “getting it wrong,” not of acting outside statutory authority. The court rejects Williams’ claim of an unconstitutional delegation of governmental authority for much the same reasons. Williams also argues that the Fund unconstitutionally applied �16 of the retirement statute retroactively. The court rejects that argument, though, because Williams did not have a vested right in a certain interpretation, nor did he have a vested right to receive PSC. Therefore, there was no constitutional bar to Fund’s guidelines interpreting �30 or to applying the newer �16. Williams’ fourth constitutional challenge is that the old retirement statute was a special or local law. Though the court finds the issue improperly raised on appeal, it nevertheless considers the merits and rejects it. The statute applies to localities with at least 1.6 million in population, but it is part of a series of statutes that apply to other population centers around the state and operates equally on all members of the Fund in the same position. The court also rebuffs Williams’ equal protection and substantive due process claims, the former because the PSC determination does not impinge upon a fundamental right or distinguish between people on a suspect basis. The due process claim fails because, as mentioned earlier, Williams doesn’t have a vested right in the pension benefits under the statute. The court takes several paragraphs to argue with the dissent over its suggestion that district courts have an inherent right of judicial review of legal issues before turning to the question of the trial court’s original jurisdiction over Williams’ claims against the city under Trust Code �115.001(a). That provision confers original and exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings concerning trusts, including proceedings to construe a trust instrument. The court agrees that this is a statute of general jurisdiction, and it cannot serve to waive sovereign immunity for public pension funds. Finally, the court considers the trial court’s jurisdiction over Williams’ common-law claims against the trustees. The court rules the trustees are entitled to official immunity for its PSC decision because the function of administering a public pension plan is discretionary. “requiring deliberation, decision, and judgment within the scope of the trustees’ authority under the retirement statute.” Summary judgment for the city on sovereign immunity grounds is proper, too. Sovereign immunity is granted for governmental functions, but not proprietary ones. The court disagrees with those cases that hold that pension administration is a proprietary function. “Such a construction not only contradicts the definition of governmental functions, but is absurd when (1) the result is to hold a municipality liable in tort for the exact same acts of statutory interpretation and administration for which the statutorily created board in which it participates in interpreting and administering a statutorily created pension fund under the exact same statute enjoys sovereign immunity and (2) a further result is to hold two of the members of a statutorily created board personally liable in tort for the exact same actions in their statutorily enjoined capacity as the municipality’s representatives on the board of trustees for which they and the other trustees enjoy official immunity under the exact same statute in their exact same capacity as Fund trustees.” OPINION:Keyes, J.; Hedges, Taft and Keyes, JJ. CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT:Taft, J. The author concurs in the judgment respecting the claims against the city, but not for the Fund or the trustees. The author also disagrees with the majority’s analysis of the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over Williams’ statutory challenges.

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