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The trial court did not err by determining that no summary judgment evidence exists supporting application of the continuing violation theory to the pay discrimination claim. Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Charlene Cooper-Day appeals the summary judgment rendered against her on her gender discrimination claims for constructive discharge and unequal pay. HOLDING:Affirmed. The court addresses whether Cooper-Day timely filed her administrative complaint as mandated by Texas Labor Code �21.202. Cooper-Day contends that she timely filed her constructive discharge administrative complaint because the intolerable working conditions that forced her constructive discharge, including being assigned an additional territory and having inadequate support staff, existed for almost 18 months. Union Pacific Resources Co. counters that Cooper-Day’s own testimony that the allegedly intolerable working conditions occurred for almost 18 months before she resigned proves that the conditions occurred more than 180 days before she filed her administrative constructive discharge complaint. UPR therefore contends that Cooper-Day’s 180-day time period for purposes of her constructive discharge claim began to run, at the latest, on the last day she could have been subject to discrimination, her last day of work � May 14, 1998 � requiring her administrative complaint to be filed by Nov. 11, 1998. In response to this argument by UPR, Cooper-Day argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the date she resigned, i.e., the date of her constructive discharge, and concerning the date she was last subjected to the alleged discriminatory conduct. She contends that Chris Cirone refused to accept her resignation at the May 15, 1998, breakfast meeting and that, therefore, the resignation was not effective on that date. This argument, however, is contrary to controlling law: “Resignation from a corporate position is not required to be in writing, nor is it required to be in any special form, and it takes effect immediately from the time notice of the resignation is given, unless a subsequent date is named, by the one resigning. A resignation does not require an acceptance unless it is tendered to take effect on acceptance.” Bell v. Tex. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 43 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. � Dallas 1931, writ dism’d). Here, Cooper-Day provided no effective date of resignation, so her resignation was effective immediately, whether or not Cirone wanted to accept it. Cirone’s failure to communicate Cooper-Day’s resignation to UPR until May 18, 1998, and UPR’s internal documents listing May 18, 1998, as the date of Cooper-Day’s resignation do not raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the date on which Cooper-Day’s statutory 180-day time period began to run for purposes of her constructive discharge complaint. Cirone was acting as UPR’s representative when he received her resignation. Cooper-Day did not return to work after notifying Cirone of her resignation, did not send a resignation letter to UPR and took no steps to inform other UPR representatives of her resignation. Cirone, in his official capacity as UPR’s agent, received Cooper-Day’s resignation and notice to him served as notice to UPR. Thus, the summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Cooper-Day’s resignation was effective on May 15, 1998, when it was conveyed to UPR’s representative, Cirone. The summary judgment evidence likewise conclusively establishes that Cooper-Day decided to resign on or before May 14, 1998, based on her work experiences prior to that date. Accordingly, Cooper-Day’s administrative complaint, filed on Nov. 16, 1998, was not filed within 180 days of UPR’s date on which the alleged unlawful discrimination occurred. Therefore, Cooper-Day’s administrative complaint concerning her alleged constructive discharge was not timely filed. Concerning her discriminatory pay claim, Cooper-Day contends that when UPR gave her pay raises in 1996, 1997 and 1998, she believed UPR discriminated against her based on her gender by paying her less than her male counterparts. Comparing her salary to that of several landmen who had more experience than she, Cooper-Day asserts that she received a lower base pay than her male counterparts. The 180-day limitations period begins to run when an employee is informed of the allegedly discriminatory employment decision, not when that decision comes to fruition. Here, Cooper-Day complains of UPR’s decisions regarding her pay rate; Cooper-Day had notice of those decisions more than 180 days before she filed her administrative discrimination complaint, and her paychecks were merely the inevitable consequence of UPR’s pay-rate decisions in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Thus, Cooper-Day’s discriminatory pay claims accrued each time she was informed that she was receiving a raise, albeit a raise she did not consider equal to those given to men. Consequently, Cooper-Day’s administrative filing on Nov. 16, 1998, more than 180 days after her last pay raise, was not timely. OPINION:Walker, J.; Cayce, C.J., Holman and Walker, JJ.

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