DECISION AND ORDER INTRODUCTION Once again, this Court is asked to determine the extent to which anti-abortion protestors and groups can engage in activities at a facility in Rochester, New York, Planned Parenthood of Rochester (“PPR”), which provides reproductive health care services, including abortions. The activities plaintiffs here seek to engage in have been litigated literally for decades, before this Court on several occasions, the Second Circuit on several occasions, and the United States Supreme Court. See Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y. v. Project Rescue Western N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994), aff’d as modified, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d in part & rev’d in part sub nom. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (collectively “Schenck”); see also New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue Nat’l, 99-cv-209A, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20059 (W.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d in part & vacated in part, 273 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The Western District of New York has been the site of ongoing anti-abortion protests going back at least a decade”) (collectively “Operation Rescue National”). Familiarity with this lengthy litigation history is presumed. Almost 20 years ago, on July 26, 2000, United States District Judge Richard J. Arcara, after conducting a lengthy 23-day hearing throughout August and September 1999, issued a preliminary injunction restricting anti-abortion protests in several respects. That preliminary injunction was later modified on April 21, 2002, and converted to a permanent injunction on October 31, 2005 (the “Arcara Injunction”), after the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the terms of the original preliminary injunction in substantial part. See generally Operation Rescue Nat’l, 273 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2001). The Arcara Injunction, which has been in effect and controlled activities at PPR for the past eighteen years — and, indeed, at all facilities providing reproductive health care services in this District — is the subject of the present action. The Arcara Injunction was generally designed to curb certain conduct in the vicinity of reproductive health care facilities in order to protect and ensure, among other things, patients’ peaceable access to such facilities. See Operation Rescue Nat’l, 273 F.3d at 201. One method specified in the injunction by which to accomplish this intention was to enjoin and restrain, without exception, “demonstrating, congregating, standing, sitting, or lying on, or posting or carrying signs, or being present within fifteen feet of either edge of any doorway, walkway or driveway entrance to any such facility.” (Dkt. # 1-1 at 1(G)). The Second Circuit referred to this buffer zone as a “nonporous no-protest zone.” Operation Rescue Nat’l, 273 F.3d at 211. The injunction thus limited protest actions in two significant ways. First, it established a 15-foot buffer zone at facilities like PPR, within which no protest activity was to occur. Second, the injunction eliminated a provision contained in a prior injunction — the 1992 injunction at issue in Schenck — which had allowed two sidewalk counselors to engage in certain activity within the 15-foot buffer zone. On appeal to the Second Circuit, the buffer zone and the elimination of the sidewalk-counselor exception were raised and, with some modification, the Second Circuit affirmed both provisions in the Arcara Injunction. Over the years, fast approaching 20 years, anti-abortion protestors have largely complied with the dictates of the Arcara Injunction. In the present action, the plaintiff Jim Havens (“Havens”), individually and on behalf of ROC Love Will End Abortion (“ROC Love”), an unincorporated association of pro-life Rochester-area residents (together with Havens, the “plaintiffs”), principally seeks a declaration from this Court that he and others associated with him can engage in conduct specifically prohibited by the Arcara Injunction at PPR, and an order precluding defendants New York State Attorney General Letitia James (the “AG”) and the City of the Rochester (the “City”) (together with the AG, the “defendants”) from enforcing the Arcara Injunction against them. (See Dkt. # 1 at 12-13). In a nutshell, Havens contends that he is not barred from engaging in protest activities within the 15-foot buffer zone and he should be free to engage in “sidewalk counseling” activities with any woman approaching PPR without consequence. (See generally Dkt. # 1). Pending are three motions in relation to plaintiffs’ complaint: (1) plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing the Arcara Injunction against them while this case is pending (Dkt. # 2); (2) the City’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. # 6); and (3) the AG’s similar motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Dkt. # 7). The Court held oral argument on these motions on November 4, 2019. (Dkt. # 19; see also Dkt. # 23 (transcript of oral argument, cited herein as “Tr. __”)). At plaintiffs’ request, the Court also permitted post-argument submissions (Dkt. ## 21, 22), which only Havens and the AG submitted (Dkt. ## 24, 25). The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions. For the following reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint (Dkt. ## 6, 7) are granted, and plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. # 2) is denied. Plaintiffs’ complaint is therefore dismissed. BACKGROUND A. The Arcara Injunction1 1. Relevant Provisions On March 22, 1999, because of serious and ongoing protests, threats and obstruction occurring at reproductive health care facilities in the Western District of New York, the Attorney General of the State of New York, pursuant to the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (“FACE”), 18 U.S.C. §248, et seq., and New York State public nuisance and trespass laws, commenced an action to enjoin illegal activity at these facilities. See generally Operation Rescue Nat’l, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20059 at 1. That action ultimately resulted in the issuance of the Arcara Injunction. (Dkt. # 1-1). The injunction was designed to be, and was, broad in scope: both as to those subject to the injunction and as to the prohibited activities. The injunction of course applied to the scores of named defendants, as well as “John and Jane Does”2 and other persons acting on behalf of or “in concert with” defendants. Specifically, the injunction applied to: “defendants[,] the officers, directors, agents, and representatives of defendants[,] all other persons whomsoever, known or unknown, acting in defendants’ behalf or in concert with defendants[,] and any persons present protesting against defendants’ activities, and receiving actual or constructive notice of th[e] [Arcara Injunction].” (Dkt. # 1-1 at 3). The injunction “enjoined and restrained” conduct described therein at “any facility providing reproductive health care services in the Western District of New York…including any hospital, clinic, physician’s office or other facility that provide[d] medical, surgical, counseling or referral services relating to the human reproductive system, including services relating to pregnancy or the termination of a pregnancy.” (Id. at 1(A)). One such facility was Planned Parenthood of the Rochester/Syracuse Region, Inc., located at 114 University Avenue in Rochester, New York — the facility at issue in the current case. (Id. at 6; see also Dkt. # 1 at 1). The conduct enjoined at these facilities included “trespassing on, standing, sitting, lying or being present in or on, or blocking, impeding or obstructing ingress or egress from, any parking lot, driveway, driveway entrance, or walkway entrance…and the parking lots used by the patients and staff of any such facility.” (Dkt. # 1-1 at 1(B)). Also prohibited was “physically abusing, grabbing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or tortuously harassing persons entering or leaving, working at or using the services of any such facility.” (Id. at 1(D)). In addition, the Arcara Injunction enjoined “demonstrating, congregating, standing, sitting, or lying on, or posting or carrying signs, or being present within fifteen feet of either edge of any doorway, walkway or driveway entrance to any such facility.” (Id. at 1(G) (emphasis supplied)).3 Furthermore, the Arcara Injunction enjoined those covered by the injunction “from inducing, directing, aiding or abetting in any manner, others to take any of the actions described in [the Arcara Injunction].” (Id. at 4). The Arcara Injunction also specified that it was not to be construed “to limit defendants and those acting in concert with them from exercising their legitimate rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,” or to “supersede or diminish the obligation of federal, state and local law enforcement authorities to fulfill their duties and responsibilities in enforcing federal and state laws and local ordinances.” (Id. at 7). 2. Second Circuit Decision in 2001 Affirming the Arcara Injunction in Part The Second Circuit’s decision in 2001 affirming the most significant aspects of the Arcara Injunction speaks directly to issues now raised by Havens in the present action. In one sense, the Circuit’s rulings would seem to control and in essence constitute the law of the case here. The Circuit’s decision established several important principles which affect, and in several particulars, control the present action. On the one hand, Havens seems to acknowledge the precedential effect of the Circuit’s decision, affirming the 15-foot buffer zone and eliminating the so-called sidewalk-counselor exception. In fact, at oral argument on the pending motions, counsel for Havens stated “[w]e’re not challenging the [Arcara Injunction] at all.” (See Tr. 5:25-6:1). In spite of that disclaimer, however, the papers submitted by Havens and counsel forcefully argue that the 15-foot buffer zone interferes with Havens’s First Amendment rights and prevents Havens and others from effectively conversing with and “counseling” those women entering PPR. (See, e.g., Dkt. # 1 at 37 (describing the 15-foot buffer zone as “very burdensome” on plaintiffs’ ability to counsel “abortion-minded women who approach” PPR, and stating that buffer zone prevents plaintiffs from having “intimate conversation in close proximity” with these women)). Although the Arcara Injunction listed numerous individuals and entities, only two defendants in that case pursued an appeal before the Second Circuit. See Operation Rescue Nat’l, 273 F.3d at 190. The Court of Appeals discussed the activities of one of the defendants, Mary Melfi, in depth and determined that the injunction was well warranted based on her conduct. See id. at 193-97. Although not a defendant to the current action, as discussed in greater detail below, Melfi — now Mary Jost — is mentioned prominently in the papers now before the Court. Specifically, Melfi challenged the constitutionality of the injunction, its impact on First Amendment rights, the onerous nature of the 15-foot buffer zone, and the sidewalk-counselor exception. The Second Circuit dealt with each item, ruled against Melfi and upheld the injunction. As far as the injunction’s constitutionality, the Second Circuit noted that it was “well settled” that an injunction like the Arcara Injunction, which was “directed at protestors outside of abortion clinics but based on their unlawful behavior,” was “content neutral.” Id. at 202. Moreover, the injunction served to protect the “significant governmental interest[s]” of: “ (1) ensuring public safety and order; (2) protecting freedom to receive reproductive health services; (3) advancing medical privacy and the well-being of patients seeking care at facilities; and (4) safeguarding private property.” Id. These interests were “capable of supporting injunctive restrictions on protest behavior.” Id. The Second Circuit also approved the 15-foot “no-protest” buffer zone at PPR. See id. at 204 (“[t]he Supreme Court has previously reviewed and sustained court-made buffer zones of fifteen feet at these sites”) (citing Schenck, 519 U.S. at 380). As noted above, see supra n.3, the version of the Arcara Injunction reviewed by the Circuit significantly expanded the protective zone around the PPR facility beyond 15 feet, but the Circuit vacated that portion of the injunction finding that it unnecessarily curtailed the right of protestors to engage in their desired activities. See Operation Rescue Nat’l, 273 F.3d at 209-10. Yet the Circuit was quite clear, based on its review of the facts and citing numerous other cases upholding similar buffer zones, that the 15-foot zone here was reasonable and did not unduly curtail the ability of protestors to make their views known. See id. at 211 (stating that even with the imposition of the 15-foot no-protest zone and the elimination of the sidewalk-counselor exception, “protestors will still be able to stand along the sidewalks outside of the buffer zones, picketing and praying and passing out materials”). In other words, the Circuit noted that protestors could effectively present their message in spite of the 15-foot buffer zone. See id. at 204 (eliminating expanded buffer zone beyond 15 feet because those expanded zones “effectively prevented protestors from…communicating from a normal conversational distance along the public sidewalk,” necessarily concluding that the 15-foot buffer zone did not impose such a burden). Indeed, a 15-foot zone is rather modest, and protestors’ voices are well within earshot of visitors to PPR. At argument on the pending motions, the Court noted that 15 feet was the appropriate distance from the lecterns used by counsel to the position of the Court on the bench. (See Tr. 34:9-14). In addition, the Second Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the so-called “sidewalk counselor” exception to the 15-foot buffer zone. See Operation Rescue Nat’l, 273 F.3d at 210-11. That exception, which existed in a 1992 version of the injunction, “permitted two protestors to enter the buffer zones for the purpose of sidewalk counseling consisting of conversation of a non-threatening nature.” Id. at 210 (quotations omitted). The Second Circuit noted that “[w]hen the Supreme Court reviewed the 1992 Injunction it concluded that the sidewalk-counselor exception was not necessary for the buffer zones to survive constitutional scrutiny.” Id. (citing Schenck, 519 U.S. at 381 n.11 (“It is clear from the District Court’s opinion that its decision to allow two sidewalk counselors inside the buffer zones was an effort to bend over backwards to ‘accommodate’ defendants’ speech rights[;]…[t]he District Court was entitled to conclude on this record that the only feasible way to shield individuals within the fixed buffer zone from unprotected conduct — especially with law enforcement efforts hampered by defendants’ harassment of the police — would have been to keep the entire area clear of defendant protesters”) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied)). The Second Circuit continued: Besides being a constitutionally unnecessary accommodation, the sidewalk-counselor exception has also proven to disrupt clinic access and complicate enforcement of the injunction. In fact, insofar as protestors have disrupted clinic access in the Western District of New York, the sidewalk-counselor exception has been a primary tool used to facilitate disruptive behavior. In part, protestors abused the limited exception, which permitted only two protestors within the buffer zones, by flooding the zones with many protestors. At times, the sidewalk counselors would stand in driveways and block traffic. Protestors also took advantage of the exception to stand within buffer zones even when there were no patients to counsel. When patients were present, the ‘sidewalk counselors’ shouted at them through bull horns, notwithstanding that the exception permitted only ‘conversation of a non-threatening nature.’ Based on this record, the District Court found that protestors used the zones to make ingress and egress unreasonably difficult. We further note that the clarity of the nonporous no-protest zone will help police violations of the District Court’s order. Id. at 211 (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, the Second Circuit recognized that the sidewalk counselor exception was “logistically unsupportable,” and that the “amendment to exclude all protestors from the area immediately around entrances and driveways [was] narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interest in protecting clinic access.” Id. (emphasis supplied). B. Facts4 In October 2017, Havens formed an association consisting of “pro-life individuals who witness, counsel and pray with Havens on the public sidewalk at the Rochester Planned Parenthood facility.” (Dkt. # 1 at
13, 14). He initially called this association ROC Sidewalk Advocates for Life, but later renamed the group to ROC Love Will End Abortion in 2019. (Id. at 13). Plaintiffs specifically target “abortion-minded women”5 seeking services at PPR and “regularly assemble” at that location to engage in anti-abortion conduct. (Id. at
