Before Boudin, Circuit Judge, Souter, Associate Justice,
*fn1 and Selya, Circuit Judge.
When the plaintiff-appellant, Jesus Ramos, was committed to the Worcester County House of Correction in Massachusetts as a pre-trial detainee on April 4, 2003, he was addicted to heroin, from which he was forced to abstain. In anticipation of his physical reaction he was given medication at the direction of the defendant-appellee, Dr. Thomas Patnaude, the institution’s medical director, according to a protocol designed to mitigate the agony of withdrawal and prescribed by the doctor in thousands of previous cases. The treatment spanned a three-day period and was repeated twice over the nine days after commitment, during which Ramos was taken on two occasions to the nearest hospital for outpatient and inpatient care that included intravenous fluid for dehydration and exploratory chest surgery. All told, the following distressing and in some instances threatening conditions were noted: “extreme dehydration, acute renal failure, advanced respiratory distress, subcutaneous emphysema, mediastinal emphysema, presumed esophageal perforation, malnourishment, metabolic alkalosis, hypokalemia, and pneumothorax of the right chest and total collapse of the right lung.” Ramos v. Flynn, No. 06-10645-GAO, 2009 WL 2207191, at *1 (D. Mass. July 22, 2009). These clinical notations do not, however, fully capture the reality of Ramos’s account of the course of his withdrawal, being left to lie, as he alleged, in the foul products of chronic incontinence and vomiting, on occasion unprotected from the chill of cold weather outside as windows were opened to mitigate the resulting stench.
In the aftermath of the allegedly horrific experience, Ramos brought suits in state and federal courts, including the present action, which was originally against seventeen defendants. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 he claimed a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for reckless indifference to his medical needs and, as to some defendants, for failure to train institutional personnel to respond to inmates’ medical needs. He also invoked the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction by adding state law tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment to the present appellees on all claims, on various procedural and substantive grounds. It held for them on procedure after concluding that Ramos had failed to avail himself of the House of Correction’s grievance procedure for raising his complaints and should accordingly be barred from federal litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requiring exhaustion of available administrative remedies before resorting to the federal courts, and the court drew a comparable conclusion as to the tort claims under state law. The court nonetheless considered the merits and held that facts not subject to genuine dispute and disputed facts that might be resolved in Ramos’s favor failed to show any action or failure to act going beyond negligence or malpractice to the point of deliberate indifference to substantial risk of serious harm to health, which would be necessary in order to state a § 1983 claim under the Due Process Clause; it drew a comparable conclusion about the state law tort claims, and entered summary judgment for the appellees. On de novo review, Sullivan v. City of Springfield, 561 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2009), we affirm.
