Judges Rivera, Garcia, Cannataro and Halligan concur. Chief Judge Wilson concurs in result in an opinion. Judge Singas concurs in result in a separate concurring opinion.
The People appeal from an order of the Appellate Division that vacated defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree after concluding that two elements of that crime were not proven by legally sufficient evidence. Although we agree with the People that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that one element of that crime was not proven, we agree with the Appellate Division that a second element was not satisfied. We therefore affirm. I. This case arises from hostilities that developed among factions of the Bronx Trinitarios gang. On June 20, 2018, the leaders of two of those factions—Los Sures and the Bad Boys—directed their members to seek out and attack members of another group, the Sunsets. Defendant was a probationary member of Los Sures who set out with other gang members to find and attack Sunset members. The group came across 15-year-old Lesandro Guzman-Feliz, otherwise known as Junior. Mistakenly believing Junior to be a Sunset member, the group chased him, dragging him from a bodega and stabbing him with knives and a machete. Defendant delivered the fatal blow by stabbing Junior in the neck with a knife, after which Junior lived for at least several minutes as he struggled to make his way to a hospital two blocks away before he bled to death. The entire attack was captured on surveillance video. Defendant was tried with four other codefendants and was convicted of first-degree murder pursuant to Penal Law §125.27 (1) (a) (x), among other crimes. On appeal, the Appellate Division unanimously modified by vacating defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder and dismissing that count of the indictment, and otherwise affirmed (People v. Estrella, 214 AD3d 459 [1st Dept 2023]). The Court concluded that two of the necessary elements of first-degree murder were not satisfied by legally sufficient evidence. First, the Appellate Division held that “defendant and his accomplices did not engage in a ‘course of conduct’ involving the intentional infliction of extreme physical pain” (id. at 460). Second, the Court held that “the record also fails to support the conclusion that defendant ‘relished’ or ‘evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain’ ” (id.). The Appellate Division rejected defendant’s contention that his conviction of second-degree murder was not supported by legally sufficient evidence (see id.). A Judge of this Court granted the People’s application for leave to appeal and denied defendant’s application (40 NY3d 934 [2023]). II. “A verdict is legally sufficient when, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the People, ‘there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” (People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007], quoting People v. Acosta, 80 NY2d 665, 672 [1993]). “A sufficiency inquiry requires a court to marshal competent facts most favorable to the People and determine whether, as a matter of law, a jury could logically conclude that the People sustained its burden of proof” (id.) ” ‘This deferential standard is employed because the courts’ role on legal sufficiency review is simply to determine whether enough evidence has been presented so that the resulting verdict was lawful’ ” (People v. Li, 34 NY3d 357, 363 [2019], quoting Acosta, 80 NY2d at 672). Penal Law §125.27 (1) (a) (x) provides that a defendant who kills another commits first-degree murder when, with intent to kill: “defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon the victim prior to the victim’s death. As used in this subparagraph, ‘torture’ means the intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical pain; ‘depraved’ means the defendant relished the infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing debasement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain” (Penal Law §125.27 [1] [a] [x]).1 This “torture murder” subdivision therefore required the People to prove that defendant and his accomplices acted pursuant to a “course of conduct” intended to inflict and which in fact inflicted extreme physical pain upon Junior before his death.2 The People were also required to prove that defendant himself “relished” the infliction of extreme physical pain upon Junior “evidencing debasement or perversion,” or that defendant “evidenced a sense of pleasure” at inflicting extreme physical pain upon Junior (id.). The Appellate Division concluded that neither of these elements were established by legally sufficient evidence (see Estrella, 214 AD3d at 460). A. Penal Law §125.27 (1) (a) (x) does not define the term “course of conduct.” However, other Penal Law statutes use the same phrase and are thus instructive. In the context of interpreting the harassment statute, we have held that a single, isolated act is insufficient to establish a course of conduct (see People v. Valerio, 60 NY2d 669, 670 [1983]; People v. Wood, 59 NY2d 811, 812 [1983]). Similarly, the Appellate Division has held that the “course of conduct” element necessary to convict defendant of third-degree stalking requires “a series of acts ‘evidencing a continuity of purpose’ ” (People v. Ubbink, 120 AD3d 1574, 1575-1576 [4th Dept 2014], quoting People v. Payton, 161 Misc 2d 170, 174 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1994]). We agree with defendant that by using the phrase “course of conduct” in the torture murder subdivision, the legislature intended to require a series of distinct acts before the victim’s death that are intended to inflict and actually inflict extreme physical pain (see also Mem of Assembly Codes Comm, Bill Jacket, L 1995, ch 1 at 22). We therefore reject the People’s assertion that the relevant “course of conduct” commenced with the gang’s planning meeting held before the attack on Junior. The plain text of the statute requires that the “course of conduct” actually inflict extreme physical pain upon the victim before death (Penal Law §125.27 [1] [a] [x]). Defendant’s planning, as well as the psychological pain suffered by Junior while he was being chased by defendant and his accomplices, although horrible to contemplate, are not part of the course of conduct required under the statute; the planning did not cause Junior physical pain. Moreover, we disagree with the People that the course of conduct element would be satisfied if defendant’s fatal blow to Junior’s neck was the only wound to cause Junior extreme physical pain before his death. A single, isolated act cannot satisfy the course of conduct element (see Valerio, 60 NY2d at 670; Wood, 59 NY2d at 812), and the statute clearly states that a “course of conduct” must inflict the requisite extreme physical pain before death. We therefore agree with the Chief Judge that the course of conduct must cause extreme physical pain, not solely the fatal blow that caused Junior’s death (see Wilson, Ch. J., concurring op at 6-7). We disagree, however, to the extent that the Chief Judge suggests that we have rendered Penal Law §125.26 (2) (a) “entirely superfluous” (see id. at 7). The legislative history for the 2009 amendment that added this subdivision makes clear that in response to a specific crime of child abuse, the legislature intended to eliminate the “relish” or “pleasure” requirement where a defendant tortures a child less than 14 years old (see Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2009, ch 482, at 6 ["In view of the atrocious nature of such a crime, when it is alleged that a parent has killed a child in a tortuous manner, the prosecution, in order to seek a life-without-parole sentence, should not have to prove that the defendant relished or evidenced a sense of pleasure in inflicting extreme physical pain. This bill eliminates that element of proof in the case of an adult alleged to have killed a child, assuring that a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole may be sought in such circumstances"]). That is the key distinction between the two statutes, not the “course of conduct” requirement, which exists in both Penal Law §125.27 (1) (a) (x) and §125.26 (2) (a). We nevertheless disagree with the Appellate Division that the People’s evidence was not legally sufficient to establish the course of conduct element. The Appellate Division’s holding appears to be based upon its conclusion that although defendant’s fatal stab wound to Junior’s neck caused Junior extreme physical pain before his death, the other injuries Junior suffered beforehand were “superficial” (see Estrella, 214 AD3d at 459-460). The medical examiner who performed the autopsy testified that aside from the stab wound to his neck, Junior suffered several other sharp force injuries, as well as other blunt force injuries and defensive wounds. Junior’s neck wound ultimately caused his death by exsanguination, and the medical examiner described his remaining sharp force injuries as “superficial,” meaning that they impacted only the top layers of skin. The medical examiner clarified that “superficial” was a medical term, and that it had no bearing on the pain the wound would have caused. This testimony as well as the surveillance video established that before defendant stabbed Junior in the neck, defendant’s accomplices dragged Junior from the bodega, stabbed him multiple times with knives and a machete, and that Junior suffered several sharp force injuries, blunt force injuries, and defensive wounds as a result. There was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could conclude that these additional wounds, coupled with the fatal stab wound, caused Junior extreme physical pain before his death. Although a rational jury might have also concluded that only the fatal stab wound caused Junior extreme physical pain, we are required to draw every reasonable inference in the People’s favor on a legal sufficiency review (see Li, 34 NY3d at 364). A rational jury could have concluded that Junior’s other wounds, inflicted pursuant to a course of conduct during which Junior was dragged from the store to the street, and then while on the ground subjected to several stab wounds of varying degrees from multiple assailants, caused him extreme physical pain before his death. We respectfully disagree with the Chief Judge that the statutory definition of “serious physical injury” is relevant to the meaning of “extreme physical pain” (see Wilson, Ch. J., concurring op at 4-6). The legislature could have chosen to define extreme physical pain, as it did with serious physical injury (see Penal Law §10.00 [10]), or it could have chosen to equate torture with a level of injury rather than a level of pain, but it did not. In People v. Stewart (18 NY3d 831 [2011]), upon which the concurrence relies, the Court acknowledged that “pain may itself be disabling,” but the victim did not testify that his pain rose to that level (see id. at 832-833). Here, as the Chief Judge acknowledges, Junior was not alive to testify to the amount of pain he was in before his death. The jurors, who were presented with all the evidence regarding Junior’s wounds, including graphic videotape evidence, were entitled to give the statutory words their ordinary meaning and rely upon their common sense and life experience to determine if Junior’s physical pain would have been “extreme” (see generally People v. Versaggi, 83 NY2d 123, 129-131 [1994]). We further disagree that the legislature’s use of the term “course of conduct” evinces a legislative intent to require a series of acts that are chargeable as separate crimes (see Wilson, Ch. J., concurring op at 8-9). The legislature could have required that multiple underlying crimes be committed for the element of torture to be satisfied. Indeed, the legislature has structured other crimes in precisely this manner by imposing both a durational element and requiring that multiple crimes be committed during that period (see e.g. Penal Law §130.80). Inasmuch as our role in interpreting the statute is to effectuate the intent of the legislature (see generally People v. Holz, 35 NY3d 55, 59 [2020]), we decline to add an element that the legislature did not see fit to impose. Ultimately, although this case may not fit the paradigm of torture murder that most would envision, “all that was needed for the…charge to be sustained was for the People to satisfy its elements” (Li, 34 NY3d at 363 [internal quotation marks omitted]). B. We agree with the Appellate Division, however, that the People failed to establish by legally sufficient evidence that defendant “relished the infliction of extreme physical pain” or “evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain” (Penal Law §125.27 [1] [a] [x]). The People’s evidence with respect to this mens rea element consisted of testimony that, shortly after attacking Junior, defendant stated in a boastful tone that Junior was “not gonna eat for a good long time because [defendant] hit him in the neck.” The People also presented evidence that defendant sought out Los Sures leadership after the attack to claim responsibility for stabbing Junior in the neck. This evidence demonstrates, at most, that defendant took pride in having killed Junior, not that he took pleasure in causing Junior extreme physical pain before his death. The statute is clear that the defendant must relish or take pleasure in inflicting extreme physical pain, not simply in killing the victim (see Penal Law §125.27 [1] [a] [x]). Moreover, inasmuch as the defendant must also intend that the victim be killed, and the statute requires that the victim’s extreme physical pain occur prior to death, the statute requires that the defendant inflicted extreme physical pain and took pleasure in doing so before killing the victim (see id.). Of course, intent can be inferred from conduct, and a defendant will rarely announce in the presence of witnesses that they are taking pleasure from inflicting pain upon the victim (see generally People v. Rodriguez, 17 NY3d 486, 489 [2011]). When a defendant inflicts needlessly brutal or prolonged suffering upon the victim before death, a rational jury may, based on the totality of the evidence, reasonably infer that the defendant took pleasure in inflicting extreme physical pain (see People v. Williams, 78 AD3d 574, 575 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]; see also People v. Bohn [decided today]).3 Those circumstances are not present here. There was no evidence presented that defendant was aware at the time of the attack of how long it took Junior to die after he stabbed him, inasmuch as defendant and his accomplices immediately fled the scene of the attack. Defendant’s boasting was evidence that he believed that the murder would gain him status in the gang and that he took pleasure in causing Junior’s death. But the statute requires the defendant to take pleasure in inflicting extreme physical pain before the victim dies, not merely to take pleasure in the murder, even a murder that is particularly heinous, or in the perverse gains achieved by killing another. We therefore conclude that the Appellate Division correctly held that the People failed to establish this element of the first-degree murder statute with legally sufficient evidence. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be affirmed.
