DECISION and ORDER INTRODUCTION FLSA plaintiffs sometimes make the decision to bring a collective action in a state where the employer-defendant is not “at home.” By this, I mean that the employer’s headquarters is elsewhere. And the employer’s business is incorporated elsewhere. That choice is a gamble because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 582 U.S. 255 (2017). Courts are split about if Bristol-Myers requires a connection between each plaintiff’s claim and the forum state in collective actions. Plaintiff Scott Kimble made that gamble here. Kimble brought this collective action in the Western District of New York. Yet his employer, Defendant Opteon Appraisal, is headquartered in Arizona and incorporated in Delaware. Certainly, Kimble’s claim is connected to New York because it arose here. The question before me is if out-of-state plaintiffs who did not work for Opteon in New York and did not reside in New York during the relevant time can join Kimble’s FLSA collective action. I hold that they cannot. These out-of-state plaintiffs lack a sufficient connection to this forum. Kimble’s gamble thus does not pay off. Apart from plaintiffs whose claims have sufficient connection to New York who join Kimble’s collective action, this Court lacks specific jurisdiction under Bristol-Myers. And this Court lacks general jurisdiction over Opteon because Opteon is not “at home” in New York State. SUMMARY I summarize my ruling on Kimble’s pending motion for corrective action. For the reasons stated here and below, I DENY IN PART and RESERVE IN PART on Kimble’s motion for corrective action and equitable tolling. This Court lacks specific jurisdiction under Bristol-Myers. While general jurisdiction is easy to explain, this Court’s lack of specific jurisdiction under Bristol-Myers warrants discussion. This Court lacks specific jurisdiction over the FLSA claims of out-of-state plaintiffs who would like to join Kimble’s collective action for the following reasons. First, I see no reason to analyze this case as I would a Rule 23 class action. FLSA collective actions — where each plaintiff is a party — are a far cry from Rule 23 class actions. FLSA collective actions do not have a place in the carve-out for personal jurisdiction courts have used for class actions. Second, I note that the FLSA does not provide for nationwide service of process. So, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) steps in, bringing with it New York’s long-arm provision. Rule 4(k)(1)(A) analyzes jurisdiction from the perspective of a state court in the forum state. Third, I analyze specific jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(1)(A) and New York’s long-arm provision. Applying Bristol-Myers to New York’s long-arm provision and Rule 4(k)(1)(A) yields an unambiguous result: because Bristol-Myers requires that each plaintiff’s claim be connected to New York State, this Court lacks specific jurisdiction over out-of-state plaintiffs’ FLSA claims against Opteon. Only in-state plaintiffs’ claims are connected to this forum and Opteon’s actions within it. Finally, even if that were not so, I find that New York’s long-arm provision does not provide this Court jurisdiction over out-of-state plaintiffs who may want to opt in (or already have). Such claims are unrelated to Opteon transacting business in New York. In sum, under Bristol-Myers, absent the showing of a connection to New York, this Court lacks specific jurisdiction over the FLSA claims of out-of-state plaintiffs looking to join, or who have joined, Kimble’s collective action. I summarize the relief awarded and next steps I require the parties to take. I cannot provide corrective notice or corrective action to out-of-state plaintiffs when this Court lacks general and specific jurisdiction over their FLSA claims. I thus DENY Kimble’s motion insofar as it seeks corrective action for these out-of-state plaintiffs. I likewise DENY Kimble’s request for equitable tolling made in his motion for corrective action. Kimble does not adequately discuss application of the standard for equitable tolling in his moving papers. But I grant Kimble leave to renew. Although it may be cold comfort, I find that a hearing on corrective action is warranted for the plaintiffs over whom this Court does have personal jurisdiction. I thus RESERVE decision on that portion of Kimble’s motion seeking corrective action. Kimble may request a hearing on corrective action no later than 14 business days after the date of this order for plaintiffs over whom this Court has personal jurisdiction. I also provide this timeframe so that the parties can determine next steps as to the out-of-state plaintiffs who have already opted into Kimble’s action. Within the same 14-day window, I direct the parties to meet and confer about if these claims should be dismissed or if certain claims — or this entire action — should be transferred to another jurisdiction, such as one where Opteon is “at home.” Any stipulation and proposed order regarding dismissal or transfer of those claims (or this entire action) must be filed within 14 days of this order. Absent a stipulation, I direct the parties to propose a briefing schedule for any motions they believe are appropriate, or to propose a briefing schedule for appealing portions of my decision and order to the Hon. Frank P. Geraci, Jr., Senior District Judge. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Scott Kimble filed his collective action complaint on July 14, 2023. (ECF No. 1.) Kimble seeks relief under the FLSA, codified in relevant part at 29 U.S.C. §216(b). (Id. 1.) Defendant Opteon is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona.1 (Id. 5.) Opteon is an appraisal company, employing allegedly “over 200 full-time Staff Appraisers who work from their homes throughout the United States.” (Id. 6.) Working remotely, these Staff Appraisers “evaluate residential properties.” (Id. 8.) The complaint alleges that Opteon asks much of its Staff Appraisers. The complaint alleges that Opteon demands that its Staff Appraisers work long hours without overtime. Kimble alleges that Opteon “often assigns Staff Appraisers” like him large numbers of appraisals “which necessitates” that he “work in excess of forty hours” per week. (Id. 12.) Yet Opteon does not pay overtime. (Id. 13 (“Instead, as part of Opteon’s business model, it pays Staff Appraisers a fixed percentage of the fee received by Opteon for each [appraisal] report.”).) Opteon also requires its Staff Appraisers to work more than 40 hours per week by requiring quick turnarounds. Kimble asserts that Opteon micro-manages its Staff Appraisers, “minutely detailing” their “duties from start to finish of the process of generating an appraisal report[.]” (Id. 23.) This micro-managing includes mandating specific actions within short timeframes — without regard for how much the Staff Appraiser has already worked that day or that week. (Id.
24, 30.) Kimble and other Staff Appraisers are “required to monitor Opteon’s work assignment system during the day and immediately respond when they receive an assignment.” (Id. 27.) Worse, “as of January 17, 2023, Opteon implemented a six-day work week, requiring Staff Appraisers to meet Saturday deadlines.” (Id. 28.) Kimble alleges that Opteon senior staff “advised” him and other Staff Appraisers “that they should be operating on a schedule of tenhour workdays, six days per week, resulting in a sixty-hour work week.” (Id. 29.) If true, the complaint’s allegations demonstrate serious violations of the FLSA. But Opteon has a powerful rejoinder. Opteon timely asserts a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Recognizing the import of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers, Opteon included a personal jurisdiction defense in its answer. (Answer at 10, ECF No. 6, Sept. 29, 2023.) And Opteon asserted the defense in the parties’ proposed discovery plan when Kimble indicated he would move to compel identification of potential collection action members. (Proposed Discovery Plan
