OPINION & ORDER On June 2, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Daubert motion, seeking to preclude the testimony of Defendants’ expert, Dr. Alan J. Salzberg, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See ECF Nos. 281, 283, 292. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Salzberg is DENIED. DISCUSSION Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, after a witness is qualified as an expert, the party seeking to admit expert testimony must show that, “(1) ‘the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data,’ (2) ‘the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,’ and (3) ‘the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’” U.S. v. Pryor, 474 F. App’x 831, 834 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702). The proponent of the expert’s testimony must further show that “the testimony is relevant and will assist the jury.” In re Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 341 F. Supp. 3d 213, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 982 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2020). The party seeking to introduce expert testimony “has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the admissibility requirements of Rule 702 are satisfied.” U.S. v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Trial courts serve as “gatekeep[ers],” responsible for “ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993); Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2004). Expert testimony is relevant if it “‘fits’ the facts of the case.” LVL XIII Brands, Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 209 F. Supp. 3d 612, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92). Even where the expert’s method is reliable, her testimony may fail Daubert’s fit requirement where (1) her data “is materially different from the data relevant to the facts of the case,” (2) the expert “has failed to consider the necessary factors” or based the analysis “upon a faulty assumption,” or (3) the expert’s “methodology [was] transposed from one area to a completely different context, and there is no independent research supporting the transposition.” Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 222 F. Supp. 2d 423, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citations omitted), aff’d, 84 F. App’x 76 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (summary order). “[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 157 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “when an expert opinion is based on data, a methodology, or studies that are simply inadequate to support the conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule 702 mandate theexclusion of that unreliable opinion testimony.” Ruggiero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 424 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A court should not admit expert testimony that is “‘directed solely to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert’s help.’” U.S. v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 104 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting U.S. v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also Atl. Specialty Ins. v. AE Outfitters Retail Co., 970 F. Supp. 2d 278, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (excluding expert’s opinion that “a fire causes increasing damage the longer it burns,” because “a lay person is entirely capable of reaching this conclusion without the help of an expert”). Further, a court should exclude expert testimony if it is “speculative or conjectural or based on assumptions that are so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith.” Restivo v. Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 577 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 571 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2009)). “Finally, as with all evidence, under Rule 403, the Court may exclude testimony if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or delay.” LVL XIII Brands, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 636 (citation omitted). “It is well-established that the trial judge has broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert evidence[.]” Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants’ expert, Dr. Alan J. Salzberg submitted reports critiquing two of Plaintiffs’ experts, Andrew Schwarz and Sylvia Morse. For the reasons that follow, there is no basis to preclude Dr. Salzberg’s expert testimony. A. Dr. Salzberg’s critique of Plaintiffs’ expert, Andrew Schwarz Dr. Alan Salzberg, a statistician, prepared an expert report in 2018 for Defendants, titled “Subway Accessibility Analysis,” concerning subway accessibility in New York City. See ECF No. 154-4. Dr. Salzberg was asked by Defendants to review the public elevators in the subway system to determine the elevator, station, and station stop availability for subway riders with mobility disabilities. Id. at 2-3.1 In rebuttal, Plaintiffs served an expert report from Andrew Schwarz, an economist, who developed a model to demonstrate the practical implications of elevator outages on passengers traveling on certain high-usage subway routes during rush hours. See ECF No. 154-10 at 2. Schwarz was asked to assume that Dr. Salzberg’s calculations were correct and apply Dr. Salzberg’s results to possible commuter routes identified through the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s (“MTA”) online Trip Planner tool to assess the frequency of service interruptions on routes between 20 subway stations for commuters going into Manhattan from the Bronx, Queens, and Brooklyn during the morning rush hours and returning home during the evening rush hours. Id.
