OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Thomas Richard (“Plaintiff”) filed his complaint against Multinex Co. LTD (“Nerdy” or “Defendant”) on July 17, 2019, alleging multiple causes of action including, violation of §51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and accounting. Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following is taken from the Complaint (ECF No. 1), and Plaintiff’s declaration in support of his motion for default judgment (Richards Decl., ECF No. 21), and are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion. Plaintiff is a resident of New York. (Compl. 2). Defendant is a company is principally located in Seoul, South Korea with a flagship store located in New York. (Compl. 2.) Defendant is a manufacturer and seller of T-shirts and other apparel. (Compl. 3). Defendant distributes its products throughout the United States and South Korea. (Compl. 1). When Plaintiff was 16, he alleges that he met with representatives from Defendant about an opportunity to model for Defendant’s apparel line. (Richards Decl., ECF No. 21
3-6.) Defendant requested a “baby” picture of the Plaintiff in order to be used on “a sticker”. (Compl. 8.) Plaintiff agreed and sent Defendant a photo of himself as a 5-year-old on or about March 27, 2017. (Id.) Plaintiff then took part in two photo shoots for Defendant: the first on April 1, 2017 and the second on May 18, 2017. (Compl. 10). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant mispresented the rationale for wanting the photo of the Plaintiff. Instead of his baby photo being used for a sticker, it was used on a T-shirt (the “Richards T-shirt”). (Compl. 11.) Plaintiff was shown the Richards T-shirt with his photo printed on by Defendant on June 1, 2017. (Compl. 12). Plaintiff alleges that he did not give consent to Defendant for the creation, use and sale of the Richards T-shirt. (Compl. 15.) Plaintiff further alleges that because he was a minor at the time of the agreement with Defendant, he could not give consent or authorization for such a transaction. (Compl. 16). On or about August 2017, Plaintiff noticed a post on Defendant’s Instagram account which showed several models wearing a t-shirt with Plaintiff’s baby photo on it. (Richards Decl., ECF No. 21 19.) Plaintiff then went to Defendant’s website and realized that the t-shirts with his baby image on them were for sale. (Id. 20.) In September 2017, he reached out to Defendant’s representative via Instagram to inquire about the post and “to discuss the issue of Nerdy selling merchandise with my image without my permission.” (Id. 21.) Plaintiff alleges that from August 2017 through early 2019, Defendant sold the t-shirt for $55.00 each in the United States and 55,000 Korean Won each in South Korea. (Id. 25; Compl. 14.) PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff filed the Complaint on July 17, 2019, alleging: (1) violation of Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law; (2) fraudulent misrepresentation, (3) fraud in the inducement, (4) fraud, (5) negligent misrepresentation, and (6) accounting. (See generally Compl.) On July 18, 2019, the Court issued the summons for Defendant Multinex. On October 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed a letter motion for extension of time in order to effective service and request that the Court permit service via mail under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). (ECF No. 7.) The motion was granted on October 3, 2019. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff filed an affidavit of service on January 8, 2020 indicating that Defendant had been served via mail on October 6, 2019, and that Defendant’s deadline to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint had been October 27, 2019. (ECF No. 10.) The same day, Plaintiff filed a proposed certificate of default (ECF No. 11), which the Clerk of Court entered the same day (ECF No. 13). On June 22, 2020, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why this action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute because Plaintiff had not yet moved for default judgment. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff filed a letter response indicating that he intended to move for default judgment (ECF No. 16), and filed his motion for default judgment and supporting papers on October 7, 2020. (ECF Nos. 19-23.) The Court subsequently issued an additional Order to Show Cause directing Defendant to show cause in writing why default judgment should not be entered against it. (ECF No. 24.) To date, Defendant has not appeared in this action nor otherwise defended itself with respect to the allegations in the Complaint. LEGAL STANDARD A party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought is in default when it has failed to plead or otherwise defend the suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). A default judgment entered on well-pleaded allegations in a complaint establishes a defendant’s liability. Belizaire v. RAV Investigative and Sec. Servs. Ltd., 61 F. Supp. 3d 336, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In evaluating a motion for default judgment, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations of the non-defaulting party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Id. Nonetheless, because a party in default does not admit conclusions of law, a district court must “determine whether the [plaintiff's] allegations establish [the defendant's] liability as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009)). Courts generally disfavor default judgments, “and clear preference exists for cases to be adjudicated on merits[.]” United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A., 220 F.R.D. 404, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5070 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). “ [D]efault judgments are, thus, reserved for rare occasions and any doubts should be resolved in favor of defaulting party.” Id. In deciding whether to grant default judgment, District Courts have looked at “plaintiff’s unopposed submissions”, not solely the facts alleged in the complaint. Antoine v. Brooklyn Maids, 26, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 3d 68, 78 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). DISCUSSION I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Before granting a motion for default judgment, a court must first determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 125-27 (2d Cir. 2011); see, e.g., Sung Taek Kwon v. Leg Res., Inc., No. 15-CV-9658 (RWL), 2018 WL 2316630, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2018); Bracken v. MH Pillars Inc., 290 F.Supp.3d 258, 262-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 500 (2006) (“The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction…may be raised…by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.”) (citation omitted). The Court finds that Plaintiff has established that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. For diversity jurisdiction, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between…citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(2). Here, Plaintiff is a resident of New York, while Defendant is a company incorporated in South Korea with its principal place of business in South Korea. (Compl.
