DECISION AND ORDER Defendant, JOHN ALCANTARA, is charged with Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law §120.00 [1]) and Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law §240.26 [1]). The People move this court to order an examination pursuant to Article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law to determine if Defendant is an incapacitated person. Defendant opposes the People’s application in its entirety and moves this court to dismiss the accusatory instrument based on a March 21, 2023, order by the court in the Queens County Criminal Court case under Docket No. CR-001669-23QN, finding Defendant to be an incapacitated person as defined by CPL 730.10 (1). The order was based on a February 10, 2023, examination of Defendant.1 After a review of the parties’ submissions, all relevant records, statutes, and caselaw, the People’s motion for an examination to determine if Defendant is an incapacitated person pursuant to CPL 730 is GRANTED. The court’s reasoning is as follows: PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January 21, 2023, Defendant was arraigned in Queens County Criminal Court on a felony criminal complaint under Docket No. CR-001669-23QN, on charges of Strangulation in the Second Degree (Penal Law §121.12) and Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law §120.00 [1]) (hereinafter “the Felony Case”). The court ordered an examination under CPL 730.30 (1) and Defendant was released on his own recognizance. On February 10, 2023, Defendant was examined pursuant to CPL 730.20 and 730.30 to determine his fitness to proceed in the criminal proceeding. Defendant was examined by two psychologists, both of whom found him to be an incapacitated person and therefor unfit to proceed at that time (see Defendant’s Motion Exhibit B). On March 9, 2023, Defendant did not appear in Queens County Criminal Court for his Felony Case and a bench warrant was stayed. On March 15, 2023, Defendant again did not appear in Queens County Criminal Court for his Felony Case and a bench warrant was ordered. On March 20, 2023, Defendant was involuntarily returned to court due to the new arrest in the instant case. Defendant was arraigned on the instant Queens County Criminal Court complaint under Docket No. CR-007826-23QN, on charges of Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law §120.00 [1]) and Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law §240.26 [1]). Defendant’s bench warrant on the Felony Case was also vacated. Both of Defendant’s cases were adjourned to March 21, 2023, and Defendant was retained in custody, bail being set in both cases. On March 21, 2023, the parties appeared for Defendant’s Felony Case in Part AP6 of Queens Criminal Court. Both the Defense and the People confirmed the findings of incapacity based on the CPL 730 examination conducted on February 10, 2023, and the court found Defendant to be incapacitated pursuant to CPL 730. The court issued a temporary order of observation pursuant to CPL 730.40 and Defendant was committed to the custody to the Commissioner of the Office of Mental Health (OMH) for a period of up to 90 days (see Defendant’s Motion Exhibit A) (hereinafter “the Santacroce Order”). On that same day, on March 21, 2023, after the conclusion of the Felony Case in part AP6 of Queens Criminal Court, defense counsel appeared in Part AP1 of Queens Criminal Court on the instant case. In this court part, the People declined to have the court find that Defendant was an incapacitated person under CPL 730 and issue a final order of observation, and as this case is a misdemeanor, to have this case dismissed (see CPL 730.40 [2]). On March 29, 2023, the instant matter was on again in Part AP1 in Queens Criminal Court. Again, the People declined to have the order issued on March 21, 2023, in the Felony Case, applied to this case. Instead, the People sought an order for a CPL 730 examination on the instant misdemeanor docket. The court set a motion schedule for the parties to brief this issue, and this matter was adjourned for decision to April 17, 2023.2 The matter was thereafter adjourned to June 21, 2023, following receipt of the parties’ papers. Thereafter, on June 15, 2023, OMH notified the court that Defendant had been found to no longer be an incapacitated person, based on an evaluation conducted on June 12, 2023. On June 21, 2023, the People and Defense counsel appeared in Part AP6 for Defendant’s Felony Case. The court adjourned the matter to July 7, 2023, in order to produce Defendant in court and for the parties to confirm the finding of fitness. With regard to the instant misdemeanor case, on June 21, 2023, the court reserved its decision on the pending motion, given the change in Defendant’s competency status, and gave the parties an opportunity to address the effect that the finding by the OMH that Defendant was no longer an incapacitated person had on the People’s motion. Thereafter, both parties communicated to the court that despite the change in Defendant’s status, neither party wished to change or amend their position. The court adjourned the instant case to July 7, 2023. On July 7, 2023, in Part AP6 on the Felony Case, both parties confirmed the findings that Defendant was fit to proceed to trial. The court will now address the merits of the parties’ submissions. ARGUMENT The People argue that the finding of Defendant’s incapacity on March 21, 2023, in his Felony Case, and the concurrent confirmation by the People, has no bearing on a finding of Defendant’s fitness to proceed in the instant misdemeanor case (People’s Motion at 2). In the main, the People argue that the plain language in the statute requires a new examination (id. at 2-3). In opposition to the above, Defendant argues that the People are collaterally estopped from asserting that a new CPL 730 examination is required, because the Queens County District Attorney’s Office had already confirmed a finding of incapacity on March 21, 2023, in court Part AP6, in Defendant’s Felony Case, and that on that date, Judge Santacroce had issued a finding of incapacity (Defendant’s Motion at 6). In support of his argument, Defendant cites to People v. Santana, 80 NY2d 92 (1992). Defendant argues that consistent with the Court’s ruling in Santana, that the People are collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues of Defendant’s capacity to proceed (id. at 6-7). DISCUSSION As a threshold matter, when analyzing a statute, the court first looks to the plain meaning of the language in the statute (People ex rel. Molinaro v. Warden, Rikers Is., 39 NY3d 120, 124 [2022] ["where the language of the statute is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning"]). Here, the statute provides as follows: At any time after a defendant is arraigned upon an accusatory instrument other than a felony complaint and before the imposition of sentence, or at any time after a defendant is arraigned upon a felony complaint and before he is held for the action of the grand jury, the court wherein the criminal action is pending must issue an order of examination when it is of the opinion that the defendant may be an incapacitated person. (CPL 730.30 [1] [emphasis added]). The unambiguous and plain language of the statute states that the court “must” issue an order or examination when it is of the opinion that the defendant may be an incapacitated person relating to an accusatory instrument (CPL 730.30 [1]). This language is mandatory in nature. Moreover, it provides the exclusive procedure within the statute for determining an individual’s incapacity (see CPL 730.30 [1]). Defendant argues, however, that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should act to prohibit the People from requesting, and the court granting, a new CPL 730 examination. The doctrine of collateral estoppel was first developed in civil litigation (see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 US 436, 444 [1970]). This doctrine ” ‘precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same.’ ” (Sang Seok Na v. Schietroma, 172 AD3d 1263, 1265 [2d Dept 2019], quoting Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 [1984]). “Collateral estoppel allows ‘the determination of an issue of fact or law raised in a subsequent action by reference to a previous judgment on a different cause of action in which the same issue was necessarily raised and decided.’ ” (New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d at 500, quoting Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 NY2d 481, 485 [1979]). Further, this doctrine applies when: “(1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.’” (Schietroma, 172 AD3d at 1265, quoting Conason v. Megan Holding, LLC, 25 NY3d 1, 17 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]). When applied to criminal law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel protects criminal defendants from being tried for the same issue in more than one criminal trial through the double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment (Swenson, 397 US at 445 [the established rule of collateral estoppel in "federal law is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy"]; see U.S. Const. Amend. V). As a threshold but dispositive matter, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not act to bar the People from a new examination in this case, as the statute specifically provides that a new examination must be conducted (see CPL 730.30 [1]). Moreover, and in any event, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would not be applicable here independent of the language of CPL 730.30 (1). Rather, the issues in both cases are not identical. Rather, the issue in the first felony matter relates to whether confirming the felony matter will result in further observation. The issue in the instant matter relates to whether confirming will result in dismissal. Indeed, this reading of the statute is consistent not only with the plain language of the statute, but also with the framework of the statute and with its recognition that findings of incapacity are fluid in nature and can change (see CPL 730.40, 730.60). And indeed, as evidenced in this case, the determination did, in fact, change. Particularly given that a finding of incapacity could result in dismissal of this case, it was reasonable for the people, and wholly consistent with the statute, to require that a new examination be held. Finally, notwithstanding the clear language of CPL 730 and the above, Defendant relies on Santana to support his argument that the People are collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of Defendant’s fitness to proceed. In Santana, the Court did apply a finding of incapacity under CPL 730 in one court, to a case pending in another court. However, the Court in Santana could not have been clearer when it stated that its decision applies to “the unique circumstances of this case where defendant remained an incapacitated person by virtue of the interrelated effect of two orders of New York State Supreme Court.” (Santana, 80 NY2d at 102). Consistent with this, Santana is inapposite to this matter for a number of reasons. As a threshold matter, Santana does not involve an interpretation of CPL 730. Rather, it concerns the interpretation of the language set forth in CPL 30.30. And as shown here, the language in CPL 730 clearly requires there to be an independent evaluation of capacity for each case. Moreover, and consistent with the above, Santana involved a matter, as the Court referenced, where the defendant remained incapacitated “by virtue of two orders.” (Santana, 80 NY2d at 102). Here, and directly related to the requirement of the statute that there be an independent finding of capacity, there has been only one determination of incapacity made, and no such finding has ever been made in this case. Finally, the conclusion that Santana is inapplicable is further reinforced by the fact that any time period for application of a finding of incapacity in one case to another would be unworkable and undermine the intent of the statute that the fitness of the individual to proceed is fluid in nature, and subject to change and reassessment. Indeed, assuming that a finding of fitness in one case could be applied to another, at what point does an examination in one case, become no longer applicable to another case; 15 days after an examination, 30 days, 60 days, etc.? Further, such application could also have unfair results. For example, if Defendant had initially been found to be fit to proceed, would it have been fair to allow the People to argue that that finding had to be applied to the instant case? Or further, is it fair to assert that now that there had been a finding of fitness in the Felony Case, that it must be applied to the instant case? Rather, because of the fluid nature of mental illness and the finding of incapacity related to it, each case must be determined on its own, consistent with its own unique timing relating to the examination and findings of unfitness.3 CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, the court finds, consistent with the statute, that a new examination must be conducted pursuant to CPL 730.30 (1). Accordingly, an examination pursuant to CPL 730.30 (1) is ordered. This constitutes the decision and order of the court. Dated: August 7, 2023
