Plaintiff Brian Cavanaugh filed this federal action after a Connecticut probate court issued an order recognizing the validity of a state lien against Cavanaugh’s interest in an estate. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Dooley, J.) applied the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and abstained from adjudicating Cavanaugh’s suit because of the ongoing state probate proceedings. The Younger abstention doctrine is an exception to the general rule that federal courts must hear and decide cases within their jurisdiction. Apart from certain state civil enforcement proceedings, the doctrine applies only to those civil proceedings “involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013). This narrow class of cases does not include all ongoing state probate proceedings that concern the validity of a lien. Because the District Court ought not to have abstained pursuant to Younger, we VACATE and REMAND for further proceedings. RAYMOND LOHIER, C.J. Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation…to exercise the jurisdiction given [to] them.” Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); see Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013). Under the Younger abstention1 doctrine, however, federal courts refrain from interfering with three categories of state proceedings. One of these is “pending civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78 (cleaned up). In this appeal, which involves a state probate proceeding, we clarify that Younger abstention applies only to a narrow class of state civil proceedings. Civil probate proceedings are no more invulnerable to federal court interference than any other state civil proceedings, unless the state order at issue protects the State’s administration of its judicial system or its process for compelling compliance with the judgments of its courts. Because the District Court in this case appears to have misunderstood the narrow scope of Younger to extend to state probate proceedings that concern the validity of a lien, we vacate its decision and remand for further proceedings. BACKGROUND On October 1, 2011, Brian Cavanaugh, a Connecticut resident, became a member in the HUSKY D health insurance program, a Medicaid health insurance program provided by the Affordable Care Act and offered by Connecticut to its residents. From October 3, 2011, through November 16, 2011, Cavanaugh received “rehabilitation and other services to help to attain or retain capability for independence or self-care.” Compl. 15. The parties dispute whether federal or state funds were used to pay for these services.2 In July 2018 a probate proceeding was commenced in the Connecticut State Probate Court for the District of Saybrook to administer the will of Cavanaugh’s deceased grandmother, DiBirma Burnham. The probate court determined that Cavanaugh was to inherit $44,565.96 under the will. In March 2019, however, the Commissioner of the Department of Administrative Services of the State of Connecticut (the “Commissioner” or “DAS”) filed a state statutory claim against the Burnham estate under Connecticut General Statutes §§17b-93, 17b-94, 17b-224, 18-85b, 46b-129, and 46b-130, seeking the lesser of $57,915 or fifty percent of Cavanaugh’s distributive share of the estate for repayment of the medical services Cavanaugh received in 2011. The executor of Burnham’s estate later filed a financial accounting report that listed the amounts each beneficiary, including Cavanaugh, was to receive from the estate. The report did not mention the Commissioner’s lien, however, and it omitted from its list of proposed distributions $30,000 in cash bequests intended for Cavanaugh and his brother. The Commissioner objected to the financial accounting report. The objection, together with the discrepancies between the will and the proposed distributions, prompted the probate court to hold a hearing attended by the executor of Burnham’s estate, the executor’s attorney John Watts (counsel for Cavanaugh in this action), and the Commissioner’s attorney. During the hearing, Watts “argued that DAS had no standing in the matter and should not be allowed to object to the accounting.” Supp. App’x 14. The probate court ultimately rejected the financial report and ordered “a memo of law that would justify the Proposed Distribution” and “a brief on the issue of DAS’s standing.” Id. In January 2020, after the executor withdrew the financial report, Watts filed a brief challenging the Commissioner’s standing on a number of grounds, including that the Commissioner lacked “a legally protected interest in the estate because it is a creditor of a beneficiary and not of the estate.” Id. at 15. The probate court rejected that challenge. Cavanaugh’s “share of the estate is subject to [the Commissioner's] lien” under Connecticut law, the court concluded, and the Commissioner “has the right to object to the Proposed Distribution in the Financial Report” since “[t]he court’s acceptance or rejection of the Proposed Distribution in the Final Financial Report for the estate could adversely affect this interest.” Id. at 15-16. The probate court then determined that fifty percent of Cavanaugh’s distributive share, which was less than the Commissioner’s claim for $57,915, “would go toward repayment of [Cavanaugh's] debt to [the Commissioner].” Id. The probate court ordered “[t]he fiduciary” to file a Financial Report/Final Account “in accordance with the provisions of the decedent’s Will” with the probate court within thirty days of its order. Id. at 16. Cavanaugh filed this §1983 action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Dooley, J.), alleging that the Commissioner’s lien violated the Fourteenth Amendment and three provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396 et seq.3 Among other relief, Cavanaugh asked for (1) a declaratory judgment that the Commissioner did not have a statutory lien on his inheritance or his grandmother’s estate, and (2) a permanent injunction enjoining the Commissioner from asserting the lien or enforcing various sections of the Connecticut General Statutes “in a manner that violates” federal law. Compl.
