ORDER On February 18, 2022, I denied the defendant’s request for relief pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). (Feb. 18, 2022 Order.) The defendant now moves for reconsideration of that order. (ECF No. 443.) For the reasons discussed below, the defendant’s motion for reconsideration of my February 18, 2022 order is denied. BACKGROUND On January 13, 2021, the defendant Richard Martino pled guilty before the Honorable Roanne L. Mann to count four of a 26-count indictment, charging the defendant with conspiring to obstruct justice in violation 18 U.S.C. §§1512(c)(2), 1512(k). (ECF Nos. 235, 272, 372-21.) Specifically, the defendant admitted that by concealing his financial assets from the U.S. Probation Department, he obstructed the collection of a remaining amount on a forfeiture judgment ordered by the Honorable Carol Bagley Amon in a prior criminal case, United States v. Locasio, et al., No. 03-CR-304 (E.D.N.Y.).1 (ECF No. 272 at 42-43; ECF No. 372-21.) On November 4, 2021, the defendant moved for relief under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(f) and 18 U.S.C. §3661. (ECF Nos. 372, 373.) The defendant claims that he paid the forfeiture money judgment that Judge Amon ordered in connection with his prior conviction, that he believed he did not owe any more, and that his belief was “correct” because there was not a remaining forfeiture balance of $339,646.28. (ECF No. 373 at 10-14.) Although the defendant pled guilty to obstructing the collection of the remainder of the judgment,2 he argues that the question of whether he owes any money is “a material issue with respect to sentencing.” (Id. at 18.) He argues that Brady entitles him to “information in the Government’s files which will confirm the defense position that the money was not owed by Mr. Martino[.]” (Id. at 14.)3 According to the defendant, this information “will further ameliorate [his] punishment for having obstructed a foreseeable judicial proceeding[.]” (Id.) On January 3, 2022, the government responded, arguing that the material the defendant seeks is not Brady material, that the defendant’s sentencing proceeding is not an appropriate forum to relitigate what he owes on a forfeiture judgment from a different case and that, in any event, the outstanding forfeiture judgment is valid. (ECF No. 389.) The defendant filed a reply on January 10, 2022. (ECF No. 399.) On February 14, 2022, the defendant submitted another letter, informing the Court that “the Government and defense counsel remain divided over the material issue of whether the Government properly sought additional forfeiture funds from Mr. Martino.” (ECF No. 425.) I initially directed the parties to appear for a hearing to discuss the defendant’s motion, but canceled the proceeding after an additional review of the parties’ multiple submissions. I found the defendant’s Brady application meritless, particularly “since the defendant already conceded that [the forfeiture money judgment] was valid, agreed to waive any claims challenging its validity and made no challenge to it in front of Judge Amon, who ordered it.” (Feb. 18, 2022 Order.) I did not preclude the defendant from arguing at sentencing about the relevance of the prior forfeiture judgment to his sentence. (Id.) The defendant seeks reconsideration of my decision to deny his application without a hearing, theorizing that I was somehow misled by the government’s February 17, 2022 letter, which the defendant says misrepresented the terms of the plea agreement. (ECF Nos. 443-1, 448.) The government opposes. (ECF No. 447.) LEGAL STANDARD Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for reconsideration motions, “such motions are tacitly accepted in criminal cases in this District by virtue of Local Crim. R. 49.1(d), which requires a movant to submit a ‘memorandum setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Court has overlooked’ within ‘fourteen (14) days after the Court’s determination of the original motion.’” United States v. Baldeo, No. 13-CR-125, 2015 WL 252414, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2015), aff’d, 615 F. App’x 26 (2d Cir. 2015). Courts generally supplement Local Criminal Rule 49.1(d) with the standard for civil reconsideration motions under Local Civil Rule 6.3. Id. (citing United States v. Leaver, 358 F. Supp. 2d 273, 277 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.2005)); see also United States v. Robinson, No. 16-CR-545, 2018 WL 5928120, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2018); United States v. James, No. 02-CR-0778, 2007 WL 914242, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2007) (“[W]hen deciding motions for reconsideration in criminal matters, courts in this district have resolved such motions according to the same principles that apply in the civil context.”) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Local Civil Rule 6.3 requires the moving party to identify “the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Court has overlooked.” A motion for reconsideration “is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple.” Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (July 13, 2012). Rather, “[t]he standard for granting a motion for reconsideration ‘is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.’” Robinson, 2018 WL 5928120, at *19 (quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)). DISCUSSION The defendant’s motion does not meet this strict standard. The defendant has not presented any new facts or controlling law that I overlooked in my earlier ruling. Instead, he argues that the government’s February 17 letter misrepresented the terms of the plea agreement, “propel[ing] the Court into its decision to deny the motion before hearing the parties.” (ECF No. 443-1 at 4-9.) According to the defendant, the “Outstanding Forfeiture Money Judgment” is distinct from the “MARTINO Forfeiture Money Judgment” that Judge Amon ordered; the defendant highlights the following portion of the plea agreement in support of this point: The defendant acknowledges that the Office contends that the defendant presently owes approximately Three Hundred Twenty Three Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty Three Dollars and Two Cents ($323,943.02) (the “Outstanding Forfeiture Money Judgment”) stemming from the criminal forfeiture money judgment entered in United States v. Richard Martino, et al., 03-CR-304 (CBA) (E.D.N.Y.) (the “MARTINO Forfeiture Money Judgment”). In consideration for the other terms set forth in this agreement, the defendant agrees to waive any claim he may have challenging the validity of the MARTINO Forfeiture Money Judgment and agrees to pay the Outstanding Forfeiture Money Judgment as set forth below. (ECF No. 443-1 at 5 (quoting ECF No. 372-21 6).) Repeating an argument that he has made in multiple submissions, the defendant claims that he paid the “MARTINO Forfeiture Money Judgment,” and that the “Outstanding Forfeiture Money Judgment” of $323,943.02 is “fake” and does not exist. (ECF No. 443-1 at 4-6; see ECF No. 373 at 21 (“There was no ‘Outstanding Forfeiture Money Judgment’ at all[.]“); ECF No. 399 at 7 (arguing that the outstanding forfeiture judgment is a “fiction”).) He further argues that the plea agreement obligates him only to waive any challenge to the “MARTINO Forfeiture Money Judgment,” but that he did not waive any challenge as to the “Outstanding Forfeiture Money Judgment.” (ECF No. 443-1 at 4-6.) The defendant’s interpretation of the plea agreement is inconsistent with the agreement’s plain language, which clearly defines the “Outstanding Forfeiture Money Judgment” as the part of the “MARTINO Forfeiture Money Judgment” that the government contends is remaining. (ECF No. 372-21 6.) The two do not appear to be distinct, contrary to the defendant’s strained interpretation. As I already stated in my order dated February 18, 2022, the defendant agreed to waive any challenge to the prior forfeiture judgment, which includes the outstanding balance. As the plea agreement shows, he also agreed to pay the outstanding forfeiture judgement of $323,943.02 (id.
