MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Renee Annette Richards brings this action individually and as the executrix of the estate of her late husband, Robert E. Richards, alleging that his death was caused by a defective inferior vena cava (“IVC”) filter designed, manufactured, and sold by Cordis Corporation. (See generally Dkt. No. 64). Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to seal certain portions of her motion to approve the parties’ settlement of this wrongful death action. (Dkt. No. 224). Plaintiff has provided the Court with unredacted copies of the documents she seeks to seal, which the Court has reviewed in camera. Defendant joins Plaintiff’s motion to seal with respect the specific amount of the parties’ settlement and any financial terms that can be used to derive that amount. (Dkt. No. 226). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is denied. II. LEGAL STANDARD “The notion that the public should have access to the proceedings and documents of courts is integral to our system of government.” United States v. Erie County, 763 F.3d 235, 238-39 (2d Cir. 2014). “Indeed, the common law right of public access to judicial documents is said to predate even the Constitution itself.” Id. at 239. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution “also protects the public’s right to have access to judicial documents.” Id. A party seeking to seal documents submitted to a court bears the burden of showing that sealing is proper. See DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 826 (2d Cir. 1997). A. Common Law Right of Access The Second Circuit has articulated a three-step process for determining whether documents should be sealed in light of the common law right of access. “Before any such common law right can attach…a court must first conclude that the documents at issue are indeed ‘judicial documents.’” Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006). To constitute a judicial document, “the item filed must be relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” United States v. Amodeo (“Amodeo I”), 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). Second, after determining that the documents are judicial documents and that the “common law presumption of access attaches,” the Court must “determine the weight of that presumption.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119. According to the Second Circuit, the weight to be given the presumption of access must be governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts. Generally, the information will fall somewhere on a continuum from matters that directly affect an adjudication to matters that come within a court’s purview solely to insure their irrelevance. United States v. Amodeo (“Amodeo II”), 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995). When a document plays a role in a court’s adjudication of litigants’ substantive rights — a function that is “at the heart of Article III” — the presumption is strong, but “[a]s one moves along the continuum, the weight of the presumption declines.” Id. When “documents are usually filed with the court and are generally available, the weight of the presumption is stronger than where filing with the court is unusual or is generally under seal.” Id. at 1050. Third, the court must balance any “competing considerations” against the weight of the presumption of access. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120. “Such countervailing factors include but are not limited to ‘the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency’ and ‘the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.’” Id. (quoting Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050); accord Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 2016). When weighing privacy interests, courts should consider “the degree to which the subject matter is traditionally considered private rather than public.” Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051. Courts should also assess the “nature and degree of injury,” paying heed to “the sensitivity of the information and the subject” but also to “how the person seeking access intends to use the information.” Id. at 1051 (explaining that “[c]ommercial competitors seeking an advantage over rivals need not be indulged in the name of monitoring the courts”). B. First Amendment Right of Access The First Amendment right of access stems from the qualified right of the public and the press “to attend judicial proceedings and to access certain judicial documents.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (quoting Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2004)). Once a court concludes that there is a qualified First Amendment right of access to the judicial documents at issue, it may only seal the documents “if specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating the closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Id. (quoting In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987)). “Broad and general findings by the trial court…are not sufficient to justify closure.” Id. (quoting In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d at 116). Examples of “higher values” may include law enforcement interests, the privacy of innocent third parties, Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050, and the attorney-client privilege, Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125. III. DISCUSSION A. Settlement Amount “Although in many — if not most — cases, a settlement agreement would not qualify as a ‘judicial document,’” a settlement that “is submitted for court approval is indisputably a document that is ‘relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process,’ and thus a ‘judicial document’ subject to the presumption of access.” Jones v. Smith, 319 F. Supp. 3d 619, 624 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Wolinsky v. Scholastic, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 332, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)); see also ABC v. XYZ Corp., No. 18-cv-11653, 2019 WL 1292503, at *6, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47287, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2019), report-recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 1304466, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46421 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2019); Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that the “presumption in favor of the public’s common law right of access to court records…applies to settlement agreements that are filed and submitted to the district court for approval”). The “public has an interest in knowing the contents of materials upon which a court makes a decision, including a determination of whether to approve a settlement.” Chase v. Corr. Med. Care, Inc., No. 14-cv-474, 2015 WL 9308269, at *2, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170982, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2015); Olano v. Designs by RJR, Ltd., No. 17-cv-5703, 2017 WL 4460771, at *2, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166279, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2017) (observing, in the context of Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) settlements which, like wrongful death settlements, are subject to court approval, that the “overwhelming majority of courts in this Circuit that have analyzed the propriety of redacting FLSA settlement amounts or filing FLSA settlement agreements under seal have disapproved of those requests” due to the strong presumption of public access). Here, Plaintiff seeks to file under seal the following documents: (1) Notice of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Settlement Approval;1 (2) the Declaration of Nicholas R. Farnolo in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Approval of Settlement, and (3) Exhibits A, C, D, E, F, H, and I to Mr. Farnolo’s Declaration. (Dkt. 224-1, at
