In this contested accounting proceeding commenced by the Public Administrator (the “PA”), as administrator of the above-captioned estate, Valesca Guerrand-Hermes (“Valesca” or “movant”), decedent’s ex-wife and an estate creditor, moves for summary judgment on her objection to the PA’s account and also moves for summary dismissal of certain objections to the account filed by other purported creditors. BACKGROUND Decedent died intestate on April 21, 2010, survived by four minor children. The estate, valued at approximately $4,000,000, is subject to multiple claims, three of which are the subject of the instant motion. First, movant, who is the mother of decedent’s two marital children, has asserted a claim for $2,000,000 based on decedent’s failure to maintain a life insurance policy as required under their settlement agreement and judgment of divorce. Second, Vladlena Belolipskaia Guerrand-Hermes (“Vladlena”), the mother of one of decedent’s nonmarital children (“Vladi”), alleges that she is entitled to $2,101,980 in unpaid child support. Finally, decedent’s father, Patrick Guerrand-Hermes (“Patrick”) and decedent’s uncle, Xavier Guerrand-Hermes (“Xavier”) have together asserted a claim for $750,000 for a loan they purportedly made to decedent. The PA allowed movant’s claim for $2,000,000 and allowed Patrick’s and Xavier’s claim for $750,000, but she rejected Vladlena’s claim for $2,101,980. Guardians ad litem were appointed for each of the children, and various objections to the PA’s account were filed by movant, by Vladlena, and by the guardians ad litem for decedent’s two nonmarital children. Patrick and Xavier have not appeared in this proceeding. VALESCA’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT In the instant motion, movant seeks summary judgment on her objection to the PA’s allowance of Patrick’s and Xavier’s $750,000 claim, asserting that Patrick and Xavier had assigned this claim to her. Movant also seeks summary dismissal of: (1) Vladlena’s objection to the PA’s allowance of movant’s claim for $2,000,000; (2) Vladlena’s objection to the PA’s rejection of her own claim for $2,101,980 for child support (movant further requests that Vladlena be precluded from submitting any child support claim in excess of $28,109.73); and (3) objections filed by Vladlena and by the guardians ad litem for decedent’s two nonmarital children to the PA’s allowance of Patrick’s and Xavier’s $750,000 claim. The PA submitted an affidavit in partial support of the instant motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of the above-described objections to her account. The PA opposes the instant motion to the extent it seeks summary judgment on movant’s own objection to the PA’s account. Vladlena and the guardians ad litem for the two nonmarital children oppose the motion in its entirety. To the extent that movant seeks to dismiss objections to the PA’s account filed by other parties, the motion is denied because movant is not the proper party to seek such relief. In an accounting proceeding, the fiduciary is in the best position to defend her account against objections thereto, including the decision as to whether to move for summary dismissal of a particular objection. By making her own motion for summary dismissal of certain objections, Valesca effectively usurped the role of the PA in deciding how to best defend the account. The fact that the PA filed an affidavit in support of those prongs of Valesca’s motion does not cure Valesca’s lack of standing to make it; only the PA can move for summary dismissal of an objection to her account. For that reason, the three prongs of the motion which seek summary dismissal of objections filed by Vladlena and the guardians ad litem are denied. If, in light of this decision, the PA decides to move for summary dismissal of any of the above-described objections, the court directs the parties to limit their responsive papers to a simple statement either referring and reiterating their prior submissions to the instant motion, or withdrawing such prior submissions. VALESCA’S OBJECTION TO THE ACCOUNT Valesca seeks summary judgment on her own objection to the PA’s account regarding the PA’s proposed repayment to Patrick and Xavier of the $750,000 that they had transferred to decedent via his divorce lawyer. Valesca agrees with the PA’s position to the extent that the PA characterizes the transfer as a loan, as opposed to a gift, but she contends that Patrick and Xavier assigned their rights to repayment to her. In support of her contention that Patrick and Xavier assigned her their right to receive repayment of the $750,000, Valesca has submitted affidavits executed by Patrick and Xavier in which they each affirm that they had loaned $750,000 to decedent in order to ensure that he would have sufficient funds to satisfy his financial obligations under the settlement agreement he had entered into with Valesca in 2009 in their divorce proceeding. According to their affidavits, after decedent’s death, they “made a gift to Valesca of the monies we loaned to [decedent] to be used for the benefit of [decedent's marital children].” Such gift, according to the affidavits, is evidenced by an email sent from Patrick to decedent’s divorce attorney and Valesca on June 14, 2010, in which he instructed decedent’s attorney to do all he could to effectuate the release of these funds to Valesca. Thus, Valesca contends that $598,271.11 (the amount recovered by the PA from the divorce attorneys’ escrow accounts) should be paid directly to her. In asserting this objection to the PA’s allowance of the claim of Patrick and Xavier, Valesca is not acting in her capacity as an estate creditor, but rather, as the recipient of a gift from Patrick and Xavier, who themselves were deemed by the PA to be estate creditors. As such, Valesca lacks standing to assert this objection. Courts have held that a creditor of a creditor (or in this case, a purported donee of a creditor) is neither a necessary party to an accounting proceeding nor a person interested in the decedent’s estate (see Matter of Riegel, 165 Misc 265, 267 [Sur Ct, NY County 1937] ["The law properly confines the right…to object to an account to persons legally interested. It excludes from appearance in a proceeding alleged creditors of creditors, or of legatees and other classes of beneficiaries"]; see also Matter of Wallace, NYLJ, Jan. 28, 2011, at 26, col 5 [Sur Ct, NY County 2011]). Therefore, this prong of Valesca’s motion is denied and her objection to the PA’s allowance of Patrick and Xavier’s $750,000 claim is dismissed due to her lack of standing to assert it (see CPLR 3212[b]; Merritt Hill Vineyards v. Windy Heights Vineyard, 61 NY2d 106 [1984][on a summary judgment motion, the court may grant summary disposition in favor of the non-moving party]). CHILD SUPPORT CLAIM ASSERTED BY VLADI’S GUARDIAN AD LITEM Vladi’s guardian ad litem has asserted a child support claim on Vladi’s behalf against decedent’s estate “in the amount to be proven at trial, but in no event less than $388,400.” Generally, where provisions for child support are incorporated into a court order, it is the custodial parent, and not the child, who has the requisite standing to maintain an action to enforce such provisions (see Forman v. Forman, 17 NY2d 274 [1966] citing Kendall v. Kendall, 200 App Div 702 [1922]; Miller v. Miller, 82 AD3d 469 [1st Dept 2011] ["the right to receive child support belongs to the custodial parent, not to the child"]). Since Vladi, and by extension, her guardian ad litem, lacks standing to enforce a claim for child support which is based on a court order directing that support payments be made to Vladlena (through the Support Collection Unit), this claim is dismissed sua sponte. This decision constitutes the order of the court. Dated: February 3, 2022
