OPINION & ORDER OF DISMISSAL Miranda Johnson (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that a medical device Defendants designed and manufactured injured Plaintiff (as well as many others) in violation of strict products liability laws as well as various theories of negligence.1 (See generally Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).) The relevant chronology of events is as follows: on August 13, 2021, Defendants filed the instant Motion To Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute (the “Motion”), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), 37(d)(1)(A)(i), and 41(b). (Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 52).) As made clear by the Court’s July 27, 2021, Scheduling Order, Plaintiff was to respond by September 10, 2021. (See Dkt. No. 51.) Plaintiff did not do so. (See Dkt.) On September 21, 2021, the Court issued an Order instructing Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ Motion by October 5, 2021 or risk dismissal. (Order (Dkt. No. 56).) Plaintiff has not done so. (See Dkt.) Given the Plaintiff’s actions — or lack thereof — balanced by consideration of Plaintiff’s interests, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion and dismisses the Action without prejudice. I. Discussion A. Standard of Review This Court has the authority to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a case may be involuntarily dismissed if a plaintiff “fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” Id. Although Rule 41(b) expressly addresses a situation in which a defendant moves to dismiss for failure to prosecute, it has long been recognized that a district court has the inherent authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute sua sponte. See LeSane v. Hall’s Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)). While dismissal under Rule 41(b) is subject to the sound discretion of district courts, see United States ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 250-51 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit has stated that a Rule 41(b) dismissal is “a harsh remedy to be utilized only in extreme situations,” LeSane, 239 F.3d at 209 (quoting Theilmann v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 455 F.2d 853, 855 (2d Cir. 1972)). The Second Circuit has further cautioned that “pro se plaintiffs should be granted special leniency regarding procedural matters.” Id. (italics omitted); see also Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[D]istrict courts should be especially hesitant to dismiss for procedural deficiencies where…the failure is by a pro se litigant.”). “However, even pro se litigants must prosecute claims diligently, and dismissal with prejudice is warranted where the [C]ourt gives warning.” Jacobs v. County of Westchester, No. 99-CV-4976, 2008 WL 199469, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008) (italics omitted). Before exercising its discretionary authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute, a district court should consider the following factors: [1] the duration of the plaintiff’s failures, [2] whether [the] plaintiff had received notice that further delays would result in dismissal, [3] whether the defendant is likely to be prejudiced by further delay, [4] whether the district judge has take[n] care to strik[e] the balance between alleviating court calendar congestion and protecting a party’s right to due process and a fair chance to be heard…and [5] whether the judge has adequately assessed the efficacy of lesser sanctions. Wood v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-2894, 2007 WL 2049686, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007) (alterations in original) (quoting LeSane, 239 F.3d at 209); see also Hibbert v. Apfel, No. 99-CV-4246, 2000 WL 977683, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000) (same). No single factor is dispositive. See Nita v. Conn. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 16 F.3d 482, 485 (2d Cir. 1994). Each of these factors favors dismissal. B. Analysis 1. Duration of Plaintiff’s Failures Courts look first to the absolute duration of delay. “Days or weeks of delay ‘typically do[] not warrant dismissal.’” Leybinsky v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 19-CV-6154, 2020 WL 7295661, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2020) (quoting Chavis v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-9518, 2018 WL 6532865, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2018)). On the other hand, “‘[d]elays of five months or less have resulted in dismissal by courts in the Second Circuit.’” Barnes v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., No. 19-CV-431, 2020 WL 3100191, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2020) (quoting Greene v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-873, 2020 WL 2840521, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2020)); see also Antonio v. Beckford, No. 05-CV-2225, 2006 WL 2819598, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006) (noting that “a delay of between five and ten months ‘falls comfortably within the time frames found sufficient in successful Rule 41(b) motions to dismiss’” (quoting Peters-Turnbull v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., No. 96-CV-4914, 1999 WL 959375, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1999))). But this durational inquiry must also be considered in the context of when the delay occurs procedurally. For instance, while a two-month delay may be presumptively considered insufficient to warrant dismissal, see Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 186 F.3d 186, 194 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the Second Circuit has “reversed dismissals for failure to prosecute” where delays spanned “no more than 39 days” or “less than two months”), such a delay could “weigh[] strongly in favor of dismissal” when it “function[s] as a complete block to moving th[e] litigation forward,” Kent v. Scamardella, No. 07-CV-844, 2007 WL 3085438, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2007) (dismissing the case for failure to prosecute following a delay of three months). Moreover, a court must consider whether the delays are attributable to action or inaction of the plaintiff or external factors. See Drake, 375 F.3d at 258 (holding that a seventeen-month delay did not justify dismissal where multiple delays were not attributable to plaintiff). In this case, Plaintiff’s delays have, thus far, spanned six months, and they are wholly the result of Plaintiff’s inaction. Plaintiff was exceptionally difficult to reach in the early stages of discovery, resulting in her failure to appear for her deposition on multiple occasions and her conclusion of her sole deposition appearance mid-way through. (See Decl. of Toby S. Soli (“Soli Decl.”)
5-13 (Dkt. No. 53).) Plaintiff also sent unsigned and unverified authorizations and disclosures in August 2020 — three months after said paperwork was due — and has since refused to supplement with properly signed and verified documents, notwithstanding repeated requests from defense counsel. (See id.
