DECISION AND ORDER I. Introduction This is a diversity action commenced by two corporations1 doing business in New York now against the former chief executive officer of Diamond Mountain Manufacturing (“DMM”), a tribal corporation. Plaintiffs allege DMM breached their contracts. Plaintiffs claim that this executive, Gretchen Cox2, misrepresented to Plaintiffs about DMM’s willingness to waive sovereign immunity, her ability to implement such a waiver, and DMM’s actual waiver. After DMM’s alleged breach of contract, Plaintiffs sought arbitration of their dispute with DMM, but DMM successfully argued that it never waived its sovereign immunity. The arbitrator agreed and held that DMM enjoyed tribal sovereign immunity Allegany Capital Enterp. v. Cox, No. 19CV160, 2021 WL 534803, at *2, 3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2021) (Docket No. 23), and DMM did not waive its sovereign immunity, id. at *16. Plaintiffs then commenced this action against three officers (including then-chief executive officer Cox) for their misrepresentations leading to Plaintiffs entering into the breached contracts. Cox with her co-Defendants moved to dismiss on sovereign immunity and personal jurisdiction grounds (Docket No. 17). This Court denied Cox’s Motion to Dismiss, while granting dismissal of codefendants Stacy Dixon and Jolene Robles, Allegany Capital, supra, 2021 WL 534803 (Docket No. 23). In that Decision and Order, this Court held that the present record failed to show that DMM and its parent Susanville Indian Rancheria Corporation (“SIRCO”) were arms of the Susanville Indian Rancheria to have DMM enjoy that nation’s tribal sovereign immunity, id. at *16. As a result, this Court held that immunity did not extend to Cox as an officer of DMM. Familiarity with that Decision and Order is presumed. Now before this Court is Defendant Cox’s Motion for Reconsideration3 of denial of dismissal of the case against her (Docket No. 26). For reasons that follow, Defendant Cox’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied. II. Background A. Proceedings Plaintiffs filed the initial Complaint on February 1, 2019 (Docket No. 1) and amended it on February 22, 2019 (Docket No. 8). Cox resigned as Chief Executive Officer of DMM on March 15, 2019 (Docket No. 26, Cox Decl. 2). Cox and Defendants moved to dismiss on May 20, 2019 (Docket No. 17). This Court granted the motion to codefendants but denied to Cox, Allegany Capital, supra, 2021 WL 534803 (Docket No. 23). Cox filed her Answer to the Amended Complaint on February 26, 2021 (Docket No. 25). B. Motion to Reconsider (Docket No. 26) Cox also moved for reconsideration of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 26). Responses to this motion initially were due March 15, 2021, and any replies by March 22, 2021 (Docket No. 27). After Plaintiffs moved for extensions of time to respond (Docket Nos. 29, 31), responses eventually were due by April 26, 2021, and reply by May 3, 2021 (Docket No. 32; see Docket No. 30, Order granting first extension). Plaintiffs then filed their timely response (Docket No. 33), and Cox her reply (Docket No. 34). Upon the deadline for Cox’s reply, the motion was deemed submitted without oral argument. III. Discussion A. Applicable Standards 1. Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), when this Court directs judgment be entered against some (but not all) of the Defendants (as was done here, Allegany Capital, supra, 2021 WL 534803, at *23, Docket No. 23), that Decision and Order “may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see 10 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2660, at 148 (Civil ed. 2014); North v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 892 F. Supp.2d 297, 299 (D.D.C. 2012) (district court has inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders as justice requires); Chiclow v. Fischer, 309 F. Supp. 3d 14, 16 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (Wolford, J.) (same). “The Second Circuit has ‘limited district courts’ reconsideration of earlier decisions under Rule 54(b) by treating those decisions as law of the case.’ Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2003). Under the law of the case doctrine, ‘when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.’ Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983). A district court ‘has discretion to revisit earlier rulings in the same case, subject to the caveat that “where litigants have once battled for the court’s decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.”‘ Reyes v. Phillips, No. 02 CIV. 7319 (LBS), 2005 WL 2173812, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1964)). Crichlow, supra, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 16 (Docket No. 33, Pls. Memo. at 1). Judge Wolford then observed that revision of an Order under Rule 54(b) is appropriate upon a showing “(1) ‘an intervening change in controlling law,’ (2) ‘the availability of new evidence,’ or (3) ‘the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice,’” id. (citation omitted) (Docket No. 26, Def. Memo. at 4). The error of law must be clear, id. (Docket No. 26, Def. Memo. at 4). “[t]he standard for granting a [motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); J.B. Sterling Co. v. Verhelle, 470 F. Supp. 3d 298, 301 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (Wolford, J.) (Docket No. 33, Pls. Memo. at 1-2). 2. Necessary Party, Rule 19 As previously stated, Allegany Capital, supra, 2021 WL 534803, at *8-9 (Docket No. 23), a party is required to be named in a case where because of that person’s absence this Court cannot accord complete relief among the existing parties, or “that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may: “(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or “(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). This is a defense that can be raised by motion, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). When joinder is not feasible, “the court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed,” id. R. 19(b). Factors to consider here include “(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might prejudice that person or existing parties; “(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: “(A) protective provisions in the judgment; “(B) shaping the relief; or “(C) other measures; “(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would be adequate; and “(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). If after this analysis the case cannot proceed, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7) is properly granted, see, e.g., Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 932 F.3d 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2019). When asserting nonjoinder, the party must state the name and (if known) address of the person or entity that should be joined if feasible but not joined and the reasons for not joining that person, Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(c). B. Contentions Cox now moves to reconsider denial of her Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 17) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) for failure to join DMM as a necessary party (Docket No. 26). Cox argues that since she resigned, she no longer has access to DMM records and emails and had no further affiliation with DMM (id. Def. Decl.
3, 4; id., Def. Memo. at 5; Docket No. 28, Def. Corrected Decl.
