Plaintiff-Appellant Clive V. Cooper appeals from a district court order compelling arbitration of his claims for breach of fiduciary duty under §502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (âERISAâ), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(2). Cooper filed suit in 2016 as representative of an ERISA Plan and its participants. He alleged that Defendant-Appellee Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc. (âRuaneâ), a third-party investment manager and plan administrator retained by Cooperâs employer, DST Systems, Inc. (âDSTâ), mismanaged the assets of DSTâs 401(k) profit-sharing fund, causing it to lose substantial value. When he joined DST, Cooper agreed with DST to arbitrate âall legal claims arising out of or relating to employment.â The district court concluded that Cooperâs ERISA claims against Ruane ârelate toâ Cooperâs employment and that Ruane, although not a signatory to the agreement to arbitrate, was entitled to rely on it to compel arbitration. On review, we conclude that the district court erred. Cooperâs ERISA claims for breach of fiduciary duty are not properly understood to be ârelated toâ his employment: none of the facts Cooper would have to prove to prevail on his claims pertain to his employment; and other individuals and entities that were never employed by DST could have brought identical claims, including other Plan beneficiaries, the Secretary of Labor, and DST itself. See ERISA §502(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. §1132(a)(2). Moreover, Congress explicitly authorized plan beneficiaries and others to sue individual fiduciaries in federal court for breach of their duties under ERISA: to interpret the Arbitration Agreement as mandating arbitration of ERISA fiduciary claims would unacceptably undercut the viability of such actions. See Coan v. Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2006). That result is neither required by the Arbitration Agreementâs express language nor acceptable in light of ERISAâs protective purposes. REVERSED. Judge Sullivan dissents in a separate opinion. SUSAN CARNEY, C.J. Plaintiff-Appellant Clive V. Cooper appeals from an August 17, 2017 order of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.), granting the motion of Defendant-Appellee Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc. (âRuaneâ) to compel arbitration of Cooperâs claims against it. Acting on behalf of a putative class of plan participants and an employee benefit plan, Cooper sued Ruane under §502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (âERISAâ), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(2), claiming damages arising from Ruaneâs alleged breach of fiduciary duty and mismanagement of a profit-sharing fund sponsored by Cooperâs employer, DST Systems, Inc. (âDSTâ). When he joined DST as a software development manager, Cooper agreed with DST to arbitrate âall legal claims arising out of or relating to employmentâ (the âArbitration Agreementâ or âAgreementâ). Appâx 159. Although Ruane is not a signatory to the Arbitration Agreement, the district court concluded that Ruane can compel Cooper to arbitrate his ERISA fiduciary claims against Ruane because the claims ârelat[e] toâ Cooperâs employment with DST and are therefore covered by the Agreementâs operative clause. On de novo review, we conclude that the district court erred. Cooperâs claims for breach of fiduciary duty in Ruaneâs management of the fund are not properly understood to be ârelated toâ his employment: the record provides an inadequate basis for finding that the parties intended the Agreement to reach profit-sharing fund related claims under ERISA. None of the facts Cooper would have to prove to prevail on his breach of fiduciary duty claims pertain to his own employment with DST; and other individuals and entities that were never employed by DST â including the Secretary of Labor and DST itself â could have brought identical claims. See ERISA §502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(2). Moreover, in §409 of ERISA, Congress imposed liability on individual fiduciaries for breach of their duties under ERISA: to interpret the generic employment related language of the Agreement as mandating arbitration of these claims would unacceptably undercut the viability and public purpose of such actions. See Coan v. Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2006). Such a result is not required by the Agreementâs terms and, in the absence of any such terms, we decline to construe it to conflict with ERISAâs protective purposes. We therefore REVERSE the order of the district court compelling arbitration and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. BACKGROUND The following account is drawn from the record before the district court when it adjudicated Ruaneâs motion. The facts as described here are largely undisputed by the parties; any disagreements are noted. I. Factual Background A. Cooper, the DST 401(k) Plan, and Ruaneâs role In 1999, Cooper, an engineer and former business owner, left early retirement and began working as a software development manager at DST, an information processing and software company headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri. As a DST employee, Cooper participated in a profit-sharing plan provided by DST (the âPlanâ) and covered by ERISA. The Plan had two elements: a participant-directed 401(k) component, in which DST matched employee contributions; and a profit-sharing account (âPSAâ) component, to which only DST contributed, doing so based on a percentage of its employeesâ eligible wages. Plan participants (that is, all DST employees) were enrolled in the PSA when they began working for DST; they were not allowed to decline participation. Employees were also bound to keep their PSA assets in the fund throughout their employment with DST; they could withdraw from their account only at the end of their employment. Ruane, a third-party investment advisor, was engaged by DST in 1973 to manage the investment of the PSA funds. DST maintained an Advisory Committee to monitor Ruaneâs performance. Ruane reported periodically to the Committee. Ruane was still managing the PSA funds over two decades later, in 1999, when DST hired Cooper. The Plan entered into a series of investment management agreements (âIMAsâ) with Ruane, establishing its relationship with Ruane and defining Ruaneâs duties and responsibilities. Subject to some limitations (that is, any investment guidelines that DST or the Plan chose to set forth in the IMAs), the IMAs provided that Ruane exercised âfull authority and sole discretionâ over PSA investments. See, e.g., Conf. Appâx 10. The discretion accorded Ruane in the IMAs made Ruane a Plan fiduciary under ERISA â a conclusion that Ruane does not dispute.1 The IMAs contained no arbitration clause.2 Section 102(a) of ERISA requires covered employee benefit plans to furnish summary plan descriptions (âSPDsâ) of a planâs terms to participants. 29 U.S.C. §1022(a). SPDs must be âsufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.â Id. Throughout Cooperâs employment at DST, the Plan duly provided SPDs to its participants, including Cooper. Those SPDs, which from year to year during his employment were generally identical in relevant part, state: The people who operate your Plan, called âfiduciariesâ of the Plan, have a duty to do so prudently and in the interest of you and other Plan participants and beneficiariesâŚ. If it should happen that Plan fiduciaries misuse the Planâs moneyâŚyou may seek assistance from the U.S. Department of Labor, or you may file suit in a federal court. E.g., Appâx 569-70. The SPDs do not mention arbitration. As a Plan participant, Cooper received notices and communications from or on behalf of the Plan. Those documents identified Ruane as the manager of the PSA assets. Among the notices he received were annual reports of DSTâs contributions on behalf of Plan participants and on Ruaneâs latest investment performance with Plan assets. Account statements updated Cooper on the performance of stocks selected by Ruane for inclusion in the PSA portfolio and disclosed Ruaneâs quarterly investment management fee for managing the PSA. Cooper alleges that DST did not subject Ruane to any investment limitations from the inception of its relationship in 1973 until November 2015, when the huge losses that eventually gave rise to Cooperâs complaint had already substantially occurred. As of year-end 2014, under Ruaneâs management, shares in Valeant Pharmaceuticals represented almost 30 percent of the Planâs total assets of more than $1.4 billion. By November 2015, when DST first imposed any guidance on Ruane, Valeantâs stock was already in the midst of its steep decline. And by March 4, 2016, Valeantâs share price had dropped dramatically, purportedly causing the value of the PSAâs overall holdings to decline from a preceding 52-week high of $414.7 million to $97 million.3 Cooper alleges that Ruaneâs catastrophic over-allocation of Plan assets to Valeant shares breached its fiduciary duty to Plan participants and to the Plan generally. Accordingly, Cooper charges that Ruane is liable under ERISA for the PSA participantsâ losses. B. The Arbitration Agreement In 2008, after he became a DST employee, Cooper received a copy of the companyâs âAssociatesâ Handbook,â which explains DSTâs employment-related policies, benefits, standards of conduct, and programs. As required, he signed an acknowledgment that he had received the Handbook. Appâx 503. The Handbook contains a section on arbitration. In relevant part, it states: For employment-related legal disputes that are not resolved through our Open Door Policy or Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Policy, the Company has implemented an arbitration program under the DST Output Arbitration Program and Agreement that is set forth in the Addendum to this Handbook. Id. at 99. The Arbitration Program and Agreement, in turn, mandates arbitration of âall legal claims arising out of or relating to employment, application for employment, or termination of employment, except for claims specifically excluded under the termsâ of the Agreement. Id. at 159. As claims âspecifically excluded,â it names four subject areas: â[1] workersâ compensation benefits, [2] unemployment compensation benefits, [3] ERISA-related benefits provided under a Company sponsored benefit plan, [and,] [4] claims filed with the National Labor Relations Board.â Id. The Agreement provides further that any arbitration under the Arbitration Program will be âadministered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and conducted under the AAAâs Employment Arbitration Rules.â Id. at 156. Cooper duly signed the Acknowledgment and Agreement Form, which cautioned that if he did not âopt out in writing within 30 days after [he] receive[d] the [Arbitration Agreement],â then he and DST âshall be considered to have agreedâ to the Arbitration Agreement âas a binding contract to waive the right to judge or jury trial and to resolve employment-related legal claims under the terms [of the Agreement].â Id. at 162. Cooper did not opt out. II. Procedural History In March 2016, Cooper filed this lawsuit naming Ruane, DST, and others (primarily DST employees) as defendants. Not long after, choosing to mediate his claims with DST and others in a private forum, he voluntarily dismissed his claims against all Defendants except Ruane. In November 2016, after a period of discovery related to its motion, Ruane moved for an order compelling Cooper to arbitrate his claims. The following year, the district court issued an Opinion and Order compelling arbitration. The district courtâs order rested on two determinations. At the threshold, the court concluded that Cooperâs claims were covered by the Arbitration Agreement: they ârelat[ed] toâ his employment within the meaning of the Agreement, the Court held, because âthe claims concern how poorly DST and Ruane managed the assets which Cooper considered to be his compensation.â Cooper v. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc., No. 16-CV-1900, 2017 WL 3524682, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2017).4 Having determined that the Agreement applied to Cooperâs claims, the court then concluded that Ruane, although a non-signatory, was entitled under principles of equitable estoppel to enforce the Agreement against Cooper. See, e.g., Ross v. Am. Express Co., 547 F.3d 137, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2008).5 Several subsidiary findings undergirded this conclusion. First, Ruane had a sufficiently âcloseâ relationship with DST to enable it to assert DSTâs arbitration rights: Ruane was DSTâs agent appointed as the Planâs investment manager and they maintained a longstanding relationship; and Cooper, through his receipt of regular written communications about Ruaneâs role as the Planâs sole investment manager, âreasonably would have knownâ that Ruane was âaffiliated or associatedâ with DST. Cooper, 2017 WL 3524682, at *6. Second, the claims Cooper asserted against DST and Ruane substantially overlapped. Id. at 7. Finally, Cooperâs ERISA claims and the subject matter of the Arbitration Agreement were sufficiently intertwined, the court ruled, to justify requiring Cooper to arbitrate with Ruane, reasoning that the âintertwinedness requirement,â see Ross, 547 F.3d at 143, âis satisfied when a signatoryâs claims arise from the subject matter of the underlying agreement.â Cooper, 2017 WL 3524682, at *7. Cooper now appeals. He challenges the district courtâs ruling on equitable estoppel as well as its predicate determination that the Arbitration Agreement governs his claims. In the end, we need not reach the estoppel issue, because we conclude that the Agreement does not apply to Cooperâs claims in the first place. DISCUSSION As described above, the Agreement between Cooper and DST provides that its arbitration requirement âcovers all legal claims arising out of or relating to employment.â Appâx 159. On review, we conclude that this language does not encompass the claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought by Cooper on behalf of the Plan against Ruane under ERISA §502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(2).6 It is a familiar principle that the Federal Arbitration Act (âFAAâ) âembod[ies] [a] national policy favoring arbitration.â Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 228 (2d Cir. 2016) (alterations in original). Even so, the law is undisputed that âa court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.â Granite Rock Co. v. Intâl Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 297 (2010) (emphasis in original); accord Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 229 (â[T]he FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.â). Courts consider two factors when deciding if a dispute is arbitrable: â(1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and, if so, (2) whether the scope of that agreement encompasses the claims at issue.â Holick v. Cellular Sales of N.Y., LLC, 802 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2015). In deciding a motion to compel arbitration, courts apply a âstandard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment.â Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 229. Courts must âconsider all relevant, admissible evidence submitted by the parties and contained in pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together withâŚaffidavits,â and must âdraw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.â Id. We review de novo the grant of a motion to compel arbitration. Lawrence v. Sol G. Atlas Realty Co., 841 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2016). I. The meaning of the Agreementâs phrase ârelating to employmentâ Section 502(a)(2) of ERISA allows lawsuits âby the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate reliefâ under §409 of the statute. 29 U.S.C. §1132. Section 409, in turn, imposes liability on fiduciaries who breach their duties âto make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary.â Id. §1109. The statute further makes fiduciaries that breach their duties subject to equitable relief, including removal from their position as fiduciary. Id. Sections 502(a)(2) and 409, read together, mean that a plaintiff suing for breach of fiduciary duty under §502(a)(2) may seek recovery only for injury done to the wronged plan. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008). The question before us, then, is whether such claims for fiduciary breach â because none dispute that is what Cooper has alleged â are covered by the phrase âall legal claims arising out of or relating to employmentâ used in his Arbitration Agreement with DST. Appâx 159. Ruane does not contend that Cooperâs claim against it âaris[es] out ofâ Cooperâs employment at DST, leaving the crux of the dispute located in the phrase ârelating to employment.â7 The district court concluded, and Ruane urges on appeal, that Cooperâs fiduciary claims ârelate toâ Cooperâs employment at DST primarily for two reasons: first, in a âbut forâ causation approach, because he would not have those claims but for his employment at DST; second, because Cooperâs stake in the Plan is part of his overall compensation from DST, and compensation is, of course, a feature of his employment. Cooper counters that his claims do not ârelate toâ his employment at DST in any meaningful sense. He urges, looking to the text of the Arbitration Agreement, that ERISA fiduciary claims are distinct from those it identifies as subject to mandatory arbitration. The distinctness of their substance is emphasized, he contends, by the simple observation that none of the facts he would have to prove to establish his ERISA fiduciary claims (that Ruane failed as fiduciary when it overconcentrated the fundâs assets) have any bearing on his employment at DST â other than the pedestrian fact that he was employed by DST and thereby became a Plan participant. We evaluate these arguments next. A. Additional language in the Agreement Both parties draw attention to language in the Arbitration Agreement in addition to the ârelating to employmentâ phrase, arguing that the context in which that additional language appears leaves no doubt that the pivotal phrase is best read to support their respective constructions of the Agreement. For his part, Cooper submits that, although the Agreement describes the covered claims as ânot limited toâ those listed, it is nonetheless significant that, aside from the catch-all reference to âother statutory and common law claims,â all the categories that are listed as covered are personal to the employee.8 Thus, the text tells the reader that covered claims include, for example, wrongful discharge, discrimination, harassment, retaliatory discharge, compensation and leave disputes, defamation, and so on, as set forth more fully here in the margin. Appâx 159. In keeping with the sense that the Agreement is addressing matters personal to the employee as an individual, Cooper observes that the listed categories of exclusions are similarly personal: as noted earlier, the Agreement provides that â[t]he only claims excluded [from the mandatory arbitration clause]âŚare claims by an Associate for workersâ compensation benefits, unemployment compensation benefits, ERISA-related benefits provided under a Company sponsored benefit plan, or claims filed with the National Labor Relations Board.â Id.9 Applying the venerable canon of construction known as ejusdem generis â the rule that âgeneral words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words,â Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001) â we are inexorably led to the conclusion, Cooper urges, that the clause should not be read to cover his fiduciary breach claims against Ruane, which he brings not on his personal account but under ERISA, on behalf of the Plan and the Planâs other participants. Cooper draws further (if more peripheral) support for his position from the Agreementâs directive that any required arbitration be âconducted under AAAâs Employment Arbitration Rules,â Appâx 156, a signal (he argues) that the Agreement speaks only to disputes between employers and employees and not to ERISA-based disputes between fiduciaries and Plan members. Ruane, in turn, points out that the Agreementâs mandatory arbitration clause covers âstatutoryâ claims in general â a term that, it insists, must include ERISA fiduciary claims. Appelleesâ Br. 23-24. Ruane also reads the Agreementâs express carve-out of ERISA benefit claims, noted above, in light of its contrasting silence regarding ERISA fiduciary claims, suggesting that the difference must mean that the latter are not similarly excluded. Although both partiesâ textual interpretations have some force, we think Cooperâs more persuasive in the end than Ruaneâs. Neither is sufficiently conclusive to resolve the issue, however, and so we proceed to analyze the operative phrase, ârelating to employment.â B. The limits of the phrase ârelating to employmentâ in the context of an arbitration agreement Turning our attention, then, to the phrase ârelating to employment,â we focus first on the limitations that we see as implicit in the phrase ârelating toâ in the context of an employment-based arbitration agreement. Decisions of other circuits provide helpful insight. In particular, in United States ex rel. Welch v. My Left Foot Childrenâs Therapy, LLC, 871 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2017) (âWelchâ), the Ninth Circuit interpreted an employee arbitration clause that expressed coverage for âany claimsâ â similar to that found here â as not covering an employeeâs suit under the False Claims Act (âFCAâ).10 In Welch, a whistleblower sued her former employer under the FCA, alleging that the employer had presented fraudulent Medicaid claims to the government. Id. at 795. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courtâs denial of the employerâs motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the plaintiffâs FCA claims were not ârelated toâ her employment for purposes of the relevant arbitration agreement. Id. at 798. The appellate court rejected the proposition that her claims must be ârelated toâ her employment simply because she would not have been in a position to pursue those claims âbut forâ her employment by the defendants. Id. at 798-99. In support of this conclusion, the court reasoned (as Cooper does here) that the subject matter of an FCA claim does not implicate any facts particular to the plaintiffâs employment. Id. at 799. Thus, Welch could have brought an identical FCA claim against the defendant-employer had she been a non-employee who simply stumbled into similar potentially inculpatory information about the company. The Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits have also analyzed the meaning of employment arbitration clauses with similar ârelating toâ language, both of them in the context of suits seeking recovery for alleged sexual assault perpetrated by fellow employees in employer-provided residential quarters during off-duty hours. See Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1208, 1218-20 (11th Cir. 2011); Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 2009). These cases also bear on Cooperâs claims. The Jones and Doe courts both accepted that the sexual assault alleged in each case would not have occurred âbut forâ the plaintiffâs employment with the defendant company, but determined nonetheless that the circumstances giving rise to the claim were outside the scope of her employment. âRelatednessâ could not encompass everything that touched employment in any way, these courts posited. Accordingly, in Jones, the Fifth Circuit observed that ââ[i]f ârelate toâ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy,â the phrase would not have much limiting power because âreally, universally, relations stop nowhere.ââ 583 F.3d at 238-39 (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)). Similarly, in Doe, the Eleventh Circuit held that the phrase ârelated toâ âmarks a boundary by indicating some direct relationship; otherwise, the term would stretch to the horizon and beyond.â 657 F.3d at 1218 (emphasis added). To be sure, Cooperâs claims are not perfectly analogous to the sexual assault cases, nor is the language in the Arbitration Agreement between Cooper and DST identical to that found in Welch, Jones, or Doe. Unlike those cases, something more than mere but-for causation connects Cooperâs claims and his employment relationship with DST: his stake in the Plan is indeed part of his compensation at DST, as Ruane stresses, and it provides him the standing he needs to sue on behalf of the Plan. These considerations create a more substantial nexus to his employment at DST than does, as in the sexual assault cases, criminal conduct by other employees occurring outside of work hours or duties. Nevertheless, we weigh heavily the consideration that none of the facts relevant to the merits of Cooperâs claims against Ruane relates to his employment. Cooperâs claims hinge entirely on the investment decisions made by Ruane; the substance of his claims has no connection to his own work performance, his evaluations, his treatment by supervisors, the amount of his compensation, the condition of his workplace, or any other fact particular to Cooperâs individual experience at DST. Moreover, as pointed out in Welch, 871 F.3d at 799, and mentioned above, others who were never DST employees could have brought claims identical to those stated by Cooper â for example, the mismanagement claims could have been pursued by other Plan beneficiaries (such as spouses, heirs, or designees of participants); by other Plan fiduciaries, including DST itself; and by the Secretary of Labor. See ERISA §502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(2) (authorizing plan participants and beneficiaries and the Secretary of Labor to bring a civil action for breach of fiduciary duties). We therefore agree with the approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Welch that, in the context of an employment arbitration agreement, a claim will ârelate toâ employment only if the merits of that claim involve facts particular to an individual plaintiffâs own employment. See Welch, 871 F.3d at 799. Here, the merits of Cooperâs claims do not involve such facts. II. Our adequacy-of-representation requirement regarding ERISA fiduciary claims Although explicit language to the contrary in the Arbitration Agreement might create a different legal problem â one of enforceability â absent such plain language we observe that the reading of the Arbitration Agreementâs ârelating to employmentâ language that we adopt here would create tension with our case law governing the prerequisites applicable to plaintiffs pursuing ERISA fiduciary actions. Such a result is neither required by the Agreementâs language nor desirable in light of ERISAâs protective purposes. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236 (2013) (noting that âan arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rightsâ cannot be enforced). In Coan v. Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2006), we construed ERISA §502(a)(2) to require parties suing on behalf of a plan to demonstrate their suitability to serve as representatives of the interests of other plan stakeholders. We explained: â[T]he representative nature of the section 502(a)(2) right of action implies that plan participants must employ procedures to protect effectively the interests they purport to represent.â Id. at 259. Citing, as examples of such procedures, class certification or joining other plan participants as parties, id. at 261 â measures the Coan plaintiff, fatefully, had not undertaken â we stressed that such procedural safeguards are meant to ensure that any ârecovery inures to the benefit of the plan as a whole.â Id. at 261. The Arbitration Agreement between Cooper and DST, in contrast, requires that all arbitrated claims âbe asserted, heard and resolved on a single Associate basis.â Appâx 158. It prohibits joinder of multiple parties and class or collective actions. Id. at 158-59. It is unclear, then, how, under the terms of the Agreement, an employee can bring an ERISA fiduciary claim that satisfies Coanâs adequacy requirement, while concurrently complying with the Agreement. If we read the Agreement to mandate arbitration for ERISA fiduciary claims such as Cooperâs, a signatory seeking to bring such a claim is caught in a bind: Either she brings a claim in arbitration in some representative capacity, as our case law requires, and the claim is dismissed for violating the Agreementâs prohibition on bringing claim in a representative capacity; or she brings a claim absent the required procedural safeguards, and courts in this Circuit decline to enforce any award she secures in arbitration for running afoul of Coan. Looking at the same facts through a different lens, Ruaneâs reading of the Arbitration Agreement appears to make it impossible to bring an ERISA fiduciary action that satisfies both the Agreement and the Coan representative adequacy requirement, potentially rendering at least this part of the Agreement unenforceable. Am. Express Co., 570 U.S. at 236. It is true that this conundrum would not necessarily justify, on its own, a countertextual reading of an arbitration agreement that explicitly applied to a given circumstance. But in this case, we have already concluded that the plain meaning of ârelating toâ in the Agreement does not encompass Cooperâs claims. To the extent the Agreementâs text may permit other interpretations, we also decline to adopt an unnecessary reading that casts its enforceability into doubt, in derogation of ERISAâs protective purposes.11 CONCLUSION We conclude that the breach of fiduciary duty claims that Cooper brought on behalf of the Plan under ERISA §502(a)(2) do not ârelate toâ his employment under the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I part ways with the majority because I am not convinced that Cooperâs arbitration agreement with DST Systems, Inc. (âDSTâ) (the âArbitration Agreementâ) clearly and unambiguously excludes Cooperâs breach of fiduciary duty claims from arbitration. Where, as here, an arbitration agreement uses broad language that is ambiguous about whether an issue in dispute is arbitrable, we must resolve that ambiguity in favor of arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Memâl Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). I would therefore affirm the district courtâs conclusion that Cooperâs claims ârelate to his employmentâ within the meaning of the Arbitration Agreement. See Cooper v. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc., No. 16-cv-1900 (WHP), 2017 WL 3524682, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2017). As a result, I would also reach the issue that the majority does not: whether Ruane Cooper & Goldfarb, Inc. (âRuaneâ), âa non-signatory to the Arbitration Agreement, may compel Cooper to arbitrate his claims under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.â Id. at *5. Admittedly, I find this question to be a closer call. Nevertheless, because of Cooperâs knowledge about Ruaneâs role in managing the profit-sharing account (âPSAâ) and his characterization of DST and Ruane as closely intertwined throughout this litigation, I would also affirm the district courtâs equitable estoppel holding. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I. In light of the presumption in favor of arbitrability, the Arbitration Agreementâs broad language requires a finding that Cooperâs claims are arbitrable. The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that âany doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,â including when âthe problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself.â Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memâl Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25); see First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 & n.8 (1995); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commcâns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986); see also Granite Rock Co. v. Intâl Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 314 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part) (âIn determining the scope of an arbitration agreement, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that an order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.â (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). This Court has recognized that while this interpretive rule departs from ordinary principles of contract interpretation, see John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 254 F.3d 48, 58 (2d Cir. 2001), it does so for good reason: to give effect to the âliberal federal policy favoring arbitrationâ established by the Federal Arbitration Act, In re Am. Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig., 672 F.3d 113, 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memâl Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24). Accordingly, the Second Circuit has frequently applied this rule to resolve questions regarding the scope of an arbitration clause in favor of arbitration, see, e.g., Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth., 776 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2015); JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 2004), even going so far as to explain that âfederal policy requires us to construe arbitration clauses as broadly as possible,â In re Am. Express, 672 F.3d at 128 (quoting Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1995)). Here, Cooperâs breach of fiduciary duty claims fit comfortably within the broad language employed by the Arbitration Agreement. That agreement covered âall legal claims arising out of or relating to [Cooper's] employmentâ at DST. Appâx at 159. As the majority recognizes, additional language in the Arbitration Agreement can be read to support either Cooperâs position or Ruaneâs position, depending on whether one relies on the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis or expressio unius est eclusio alterius. See Maj. Op. at 14-15. I agree with the majority that neither of these arguments, alone, âis sufficiently conclusive to resolve the issueâ of whether the operative phrase ârelating to employmentâ encompasses Cooperâs breach of fiduciary duty claims. Id. at 15. But left with this equipoise, the majority looks to extra-Circuit case law to resolve the meaning of the agreement, whereas I would apply the binding and well-settled presumption in favor of arbitrability, which requires courts to consider whether âit may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.â Holick v. Cellular Sales of N.Y., LLC, 802 F.3d 391, 395 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. Pâship, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Intâl, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 1999)). I do not think there can be any doubt that the phrase ârelating to employmentâ is âsusceptible of an interpretation that coversâ Cooperâs breach of fiduciary duty claims premised on his employer-funded retirement plan. Id. As the majority itself acknowledges, Cooperâs claims have a more substantial nexus to his employment than the cases to which the majority cites dealing with sexual assault.12 See Maj. Op. 17-18. The district court properly recognized that â[t]he funds that Cooper claims Ruane mismanaged specifically originate from his employment from DSTâ and that Cooper himself âacknowledged that he considered DSTâs contributions to be a part of his compensation.â Cooper, 2017 WL 3524682, at *4. Moreover, the PSA was specifically intended âto encourage [employees] to stay with [DST] until retirement,â Appâx at 83, evidenced by the fact that any unvested funds in the PSA at the time an employee terminated his employment âfor any reason other than death, disability, or retirementâ would automatically revert back to DST, id. Taken together, these facts indicate that Cooperâs claims â made possible by and directly pertaining to Ruaneâs management of his employment compensation â can reasonably be interpreted as ârelating to [his] employmentâ at DST. Id. at 159. At the very least, Cooper has not presented evidence conclusively demonstrating that the phrase ârelating to employmentâ excludes his breach of fiduciary duty claims, as is required to overcome the presumption in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., Holick, 802 F.3d at 398 (finding that the presumption in favor of arbitration was overcome by evidence showing that the arbitration agreements at issue were not intended to cover claims that arose before the parties entered into the agreements). In holding that Cooperâs ERISA claims do not ârelat[e] toâ his employment, the majority relies on our decision in Coan v. Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2006), which held that to assert the type of ERISA claims Cooper brings here, a plaintiff must âtake adequate steps under the circumstances properly to act in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan.â Id. at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority reasons that, under the district courtâs reading of the Arbitration Agreement, Coanâs procedural requirement â coupled with the Arbitration Agreementâs separate requirement that all arbitrated claims âbe asserted, heard and resolved on a single Associate basis,â Appâx at 158 â appears to make it impossible for Cooper to arbitrate his ERISA claims. Maj. Op. at 19. The problem with the majorityâs analysis is that the Arbitration Agreementâs class-arbitration waiver is not at issue in this case. Here, we are confronted only with the question of whether Cooperâs claims are ârelat[ed] toâ his employment. Appâx at 159. Indeed, the majority concedes that the âconundrumâ of reconciling the class-arbitration waiver with Coan âwould not necessarily justify, on its own, a countertextual reading of an arbitration agreement that explicitly applied to a given circumstance.â Maj. Op. at 19-20. But the presumption in favor of arbitrability applies even where an agreement does not âexplicitly apply to a given circumstance,â id. at 20; rather, it acts a thumb on the scales favoring arbitration whenever an agreement employs language broad enough that it cannot âbe said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute,â Holick, 802 F.3d at 395 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Here, because the broad language of the Arbitration Agreement can reasonably be interpreted to cover such claims, and because Cooper has pointed to no evidence foreclosing such an interpretation, Coan should not impact our interpretation of the provision at issue in this case.13 Accordingly, I would apply the presumption in favor of arbitration and affirm the district courtâs conclusion. II. Ruane may bind Cooper to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Having concluded that Cooperâs claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement, I would also affirm the district courtâs determination that Ruane, although not a signatory to that agreement, may nevertheless compel Cooper to arbitrate his claims under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See Cooper, 2017 WL 3524682, at *5-*8. âUnder principles of estoppel, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may compel a signatory to that agreement to arbitrate a dispute whereâ (1) the non-signatory is seeking to arbitrate issues âintertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signedâ and (2) there is âa relationship among the parties of a nature that justifies a conclusion that the party which agreed to arbitrate with another entity should be estopped from denying an obligation to arbitrate a similar dispute with the adversary which is not a party to the arbitration agreement.â Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has recognized that issues are âintertwinedâ with an arbitration agreement when they arise from the âsubject matterâ of that agreement, or when those issues are âfactually intertwinedâ with a dispute between the original parties to the agreement. Id. at 127-28. And while the type of relationship sufficient to give rise to estoppel is fact-specific, this Court has found such a relationship to exist when a plaintiff alleges that the non-signatory worked in concert with a signatory to the arbitration agreement to harm the plaintiff, see Denney v. BDO Stillman, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2005), or when a plaintiff treats the signatory and non-signatory as âas a single unitâ for purposes of the litigation, JLM Indus., 387 F.3d at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted). Cooperâs claims against Ruane are sufficiently âintertwinedâ with the Arbitration Agreement because they plainly relate to the âsubject matterâ of that agreement. Ragone, 595 F.3d at 127. As discussed above, the Arbitration Agreement broadly encompasses âall legal claims arising out of or relating to employment,â including âstatutoryâ claims like the ERISA claims Cooper asserts here. Appâx at 159. Thus, as the district court recognized, Cooperâs claims relate to the express subject matter of the Arbitration Agreement. See Cooper, 2017 WL 3524682, at *8; see also Choctaw Generation Ltd. Pâship v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 271 F.3d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 2001) (estopping the signatory where the merits of the dispute the non-signatory sought to arbitrate were âbound up withâ the terms of the contract that included the arbitration clause). Moreover, Cooperâs claims against Ruane are âfactually intertwined with the disputeâ between Cooper and DST. Ragone, 595 F.3d at 128. In his complaint, Cooper makes no attempt to distinguish between DST and Ruane, and Cooperâs three causes of action are asserted without any differentiation between them. See Appâx at 42-46. The fact that Cooper has the same dispute with a signatory to the Arbitration Agreement (DST) and a non-signatory (Ruane) makes clear that his claims against Ruane are sufficiently âintertwinedâ with that agreement. See Ragone, 595 F.3d at 128 (estopping the plaintiff where she had the âsame disputeâ with the non-signatory as her counter-signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause). The closer question is whether this case involves the âpresence of the further necessary circumstance of a relationship between [Cooper] and [Ruane]â that justifies holding Cooper to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. Id. (emphasis added). Ordinarily, one might not consider the relationship between an employee and his employerâs investment manager to be a close one. But as the district court recognized, â Ruane was no stranger to Cooper.â Cooper, 2017 WL 3524682, at *6. To the contrary, Cooper was informed about Ruaneâs role as exclusive manager of the PSA, see Appâx at 77, 82, 500-01, and DST notified Cooper that he would be responsible for paying Ruaneâs fees as of January 1, 2013, id. at 458-59. In fact, Cooper testified that, in reviewing his account statements online, he was aware that he was personally paying Ruane his pro rata share of Ruaneâs investment management fees directly from his PSA account. Id. at 410. Even more compelling is the fact that Cooper has treated Ruane and DST as âas a single unitâ throughout this litigation, JLM Indus., 387 F.3d at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted), which this Court has found weighs in favor of applying equitable estoppel. For example, in Denney v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., we considered whether certain defendants associated with Deutsche Bank could compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims, where the plaintiffs had signed consulting agreements containing arbitration clauses to which the Deutsche Bank defendants were not parties. 412 F.3d at 70. The Denney court held that the Deutsche Bank defendants were entitled to compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, explaining: Having allegedâŚthat the Deutsche Bank and [signatory] defendants acted in concert to defraud plaintiffs,âŚand that defendantsâ fraud arose in connection with [the signatory defendants'] tax-strategy advice,âŚplaintiffs cannot now escape the consequences of those allegations by arguing that the Deutsche Bank and [signatory] defendants lack the requisite close relationship, or that plaintiffsâ claims against the Deutsche Bank defendants are not connected to Deutsche Bankâs relationship with [the signatory defendants]. Id. (citing Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that application of equitable estoppel is warranted when the plaintiff âraises allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contractâ (internal quotation marks omitted))). This same rationale applies to Cooperâs claims against Ruane. As the district court recognized, Cooperâs âclaims against DST and Ruane, as co-fiduciaries, are mutually dependent.â Cooper, 2017 WL 3524682, at *7. In his complaint, Cooper alleged that the breaches of fiduciary duty that gave rise to his claims âoccurred, at least in part, as a result of severe conflicts of interest between and among the fiduciaries of the DST Plan,â which primarily included DST and Ruane. Appâx at 14. Cooper further alleged that DST had âa longstanding, symbiotic relationshipâ with Ruane â which partly explained why DST continued to retain Ruane even after volatility in the PSA, id. at 29 â and that DST was âlegally responsible for monitoring the investments undertaken by [Ruane] in the PSA,â id. at 30. In his deposition, Cooper testified that âboth DST Systems and Ruane were responsible for investment monitoringâ in connection with the PSA. Id. at 412.14 Thus, â[h]aving allegedâŚthat [Ruane] and [DST] acted in concertâ to breach their fiduciary duties, Cooper âcannot now escape the consequences of those allegations by arguing that [Ruane] and [DST] lack the requisite close relationshipâ to give rise to equitable estoppel. Denney, 412 F.3d at 70. I therefore agree with the district court that Cooperâs claims against Ruane are sufficiently âintertwinedâ with the Arbitration Agreement and that the relationship between Cooper, DST, and Ruane is sufficiently close to allow Ruane to compel Cooper to arbitrate his claims. See Cooper, 2017 WL 3524682, at *6, *8. * * * Accordingly, because Cooperâs ERISA claims fall within the scope of his Arbitration Agreement with DST, and because Ruane may invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to compel Cooper to arbitrate those ERISA claims, I would affirm.