Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this Motion and Cross Motion: Papers Numbered Notice of Motion, Memorandum of Law, Affidavit in Support and Exhibits 1 Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Opposition, Notice of Cross Motion, Cross Motion, and Exhibits 2 Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Cross Motion 3 DECISION/ORDER Upon the foregoing papers and after due deliberation, the Decision/Order on this Motion and Cross-Motion is as follows: The defendant First Niagara Bank, N.A:, n/k/a KeyBank (“First Niagara” or “KeyBank” when referring to First Niagara’s successor)1 moves this Court for an order (1) extending ex post facto the time for First Niagara to respond to the Complaint to the date of the instant motion, and (2) dismissing the Complaint in its entirety pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7). Plaintiffs Tamm Consulting and Einar Tamm (collectively, “Tamm”) cross moves this Court for an order pursuant to Insurance Law §1213(c) to compel First Niagara to post an $11 million dollar bond, as security, in this action. For the reasons set herein, First Niagara’s motion to respond ex post facto and to dismiss is granted in its entirety. Tamm’s cross motion to compel security is denied. Background This action arises out of personal injuries and damage to personal property sustained by Tamm. Tamm alleges that in 2015, he leased a storage unit at a c1imate-controlled self-storage building (the “building”). The building is located at 206 North Ave, Webster, NY 14580. Tamm alleges that defendants 206 North Ave LLC, Climate Controlled Self Storage Inc. (“CCSS”), and Dimitri Stefanou, who he collectively refers to as the “landlord,” own the building. 206 North Ave LLC owns the building. Mr. Stefanou is the President of CCSS and the Manager of 206 North Ave LLC. Sometime in early 2015, a large-scale renovation commenced to convert the building’s upper floors into loft apartments. Tamm alleges that the “landlord” (Mr. Stefanou, CCSS, and/or 206 North Ave LLC) hired several contractors for the renovation. Tamm alleges that after a visit to the building in June 2015, he and several defendants agreed to move Tamm’s property to a different storage unit. On the day of the move, Tamm observed that his property in the storage unit was “covered in petroleum-impacted water damage and lead dust/debris (and potential asbestos),” which was “shaken loose by” the contractors’ demolition. Tamm further alleges that during the move, and as a result of the demolition, he was “showered by…toxic…debris” falling from the ceiling. This debris allegedly caused serious injury to Tamm’s left elbow, which later required surgery. In sum, Tamm alleges that Mr. Stefanou, 206 North Ave LLC, CCSS, and several contractors engaged in “sloppy practices outside and upstairs” of the storage unit, which caused his injuries. Tamm contends that First Niagara is liable because it is the “principal financial enabling business force behind” his losses, “overlooking environmental and safety risks and lending covenants to make deals.” Tamm alleges that First Niagara exerted “ultimate control” over the building. First Niagara denies these allegations. Tamm also alleges that First Niagara, though not registered as an insurer in New York, engages in the business of insurance. Specifically, Tamm alleges in his cross motion that First Niagara Bank undertakes insurance business with hundreds of employees in New York; collected nearly $30,000 in insurance premiums from the “landlord” (Mr. Stefanou, CCSS, and/or 206 North Ave LLC); and underwrites insurance and insured risks associated with the renovation. Tamm further alleges that First Niagara Bank’s policies indicate that he is an insurance beneficiary of agreements between First Niagara Bank, 206 North Ave LLC, and CCSS. In support of these contentions, Tamm submits an unauthenticated “Building Loan Agreement” (“BLA”) between First Niagara Bank, 206 North Ave LLC, and CCSS. First Niagara contends that Tamm misinterprets the BLA. The Motion to Dismiss A motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7) requires that the Court favorably view the pleadings to determine whether a valid cause of action exists. Leon, 84 N.Y.2d at 87-88. On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction. See CPLR §3026. Moreover, a pro se complaint should be construed liberally in favor of the pleader. Rosen v. Raum, 559 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (1st Dept 1990). The Court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory. See Leon, 84 N.Y.2d at 87-88, Sokoloff v. Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 409,414 (2001). A CPLR §3211 motion should be granted only where “the essential facts have been negated beyond substantial question by the affidavits and evidentiary matter submitted.” Biondi v. Beekman Hill House Apartment Corp., 257 A.D.2d 76, 81 (1st Dept. 1999). Factual claims either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not presumed to be true or accorded favorable inference. Biondi 257 A.D.2d at 81, citing Kliebert v. McKoan, 228 A.D.2d 232 (1st Dept. 1996), Iv denied, 89 N.Y.2d 802. At the outset, the Court finds that Tamm’s contentions about First Niagara Bank are wholly without merit. It is uncontroverted that First Niagara Bank and KeyBank are not registered insurance providers in New York. First Niagara Financial Group and KeyCorp, the respective bank holding companies for the banks, are also not registered insurance providers. Tamm has not identified nor provided to the Court any insurance policy issued by First Niagara Bank, First Niagara Financial Group, KeyBank, or KeyCorp. First Niagara Bank was merely a bank, which lent money to 206 North Ave LLC and CCSS. KeyBank, First Niagara Bank’s successor after a merger, is just a bank. To support his claims, Tamm argues that the “landlord” (either Mr. Stefanou, CCSS, or 206 North Ave LLC, or some combination of these defendants) collected nearly $30,000 in insurance premiums from First Niagara Bank. It appears that Tamm relies on one of the schedules to the BLA, which sets forth the various forms of consideration for the contract. Based off the Court’s review, the $30,000 figure represents closing costs resulting from the loan, not any insurance premiums. In further support of this claim, Tamm annexes news articles and other documentation. Among these unauthenticated documents, Tamm annexes a Certificate of Liability Insurance, which names “First Niagara Risk Management, Inc.” as the producer. First Niagara Risk Management is not a party to this action. It is also not a party to the BLA. Though 206 North Ave LLC is the certificate holder listed on the Certificate, it is unclear if this document relates to the instant dispute. To clarify, First Niagara Risk Management was a financial services operation that offered insurance products. It operated as a wholly owned subsidiary of First Niagara Bank. See First Niagara Financial Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (March 17, 2015). When KeyCorp merged with First Niagara Financial Group, KeyCorp also acquired First Niagara Risk Management. Tamm’s exhibits, offered to demonstrate that First Niagara Bank is an insurer, explicitly state that First Niagara Risk Management operated separately from the bank. One of Tamm’s exhibits explicitly states that KeyCorp’s insurance subsidiary is a separate entity from KeyBank. Based on the Court’s review of the exhibits, insurance products offered by First Niagara Risk Management (and its successor at KeyCorp) are underwritten by entities unaffiliated with the banks. First Niagara Bank and KeyBank are not insurers, despite wholly owning these subsidiaries. Furthermore, there is no rational basis, in law or in fact, to support Tamm’s argument that Tamm is a beneficiary of any insurance policy or agreements pursuant to the BLA. The BLA is a loan agreement. It does not confer insurance benefits onto either party. The BLA only mentions insurance to the extent that lender First Niagara Bank required borrowers 206 North Ave LLC and Climate Controlled Self Storage Inc to maintain certain insurance policies, such as title and casualty insurance. Even if First Niagara Bank were somehow an insurer in this contract, Tamm is not a beneficiary to the agreement. To the extent that First Niagara Bank would be responsible for the indemnification of costs under the BLA, it would indemnify the borrowers, 206 North Ave LLC and Climate Controlled Self Storage Inc. Moreover, the BLA explicitly provides that the borrowers would indemnify the lender for any claims arising out matters relating to the loan or loan documents. Nothing in the BLA requires First Niagara Bank, or any other First Niagara entity, to indemnify parties outside the contract such as Tamm. Lastly, nothing in the BLA suggests that First Niagara Bank exerted a high degree of control over the renovation of the building. First Niagara Bank was simply a lender, which lent money to 206 North Ave LLC and CCSS on the condition that these entities use the funds to renovate the building. There is no relationship between any of the First Niagara entities discussed herein, including First Niagara Risk Management, and Tamm. Though Tamm’s allegations may be dismissed outright without further discussion, the Court will set forth a legal basis for the denial of each cause of action below. Tamm’s Navigation Law Claims Tamm alleges that First Niagara, among others, violated Navigation Law §181. Navigation Law §181 provides that “(a]ny person who has discharged petroleum” is strictly liable, “without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs and all direct and indirect damages, no matter by whom sustained, as defined in this section.” A “discharge” is further defined as “any intentional or unintentional action or omission resulting in the releasing, spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping of petroleum into the waters of the state or onto lands from which it might flow or drain into said waters.” Navigation Law §172(8). The Navigation Law must be liberally construed. See Huntington Hosp. v. Anron Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., 250 A.D.2d 814, 815 (2d Dept 1998). However, liability as a “discharger” under the Navigation Law is “based upon conduct, not status.” See 1093 Group, LLC v. Canale, 72 A.D.3d 1561, 1562 (4th Dept 2010). Tamm’s allegations in the complaint are inconsistent. In the section titled “Notice of Damage Claims” discussing the Navigation Law causes of action, Tamm alleges that various entities, including the contractors, discharged petroleum. Later in the complaint, Tamm alleges that First Niagara, among others, discharged petroleum. There is no description of what conduct First Niagara undertook that qualifies as a discharge under the law. Tamm’s factual claim that First Niagara discharged petroleum is inherently incredible. See Biondi 257 A.D.2d at 81. First Niagara, even if actually acting as an insurer, is a corporate entity. First Niagara is not directly engaged in construction. As liability under the Navigation Law is based upon conduct, the cause of action under §181 is dismissed. Tamm’s Environmental Conservation Law Claims Tamm alleges that First Niagara, among others, violated New York Environmental Conservation Law §37-0107. ECL §37-0107 states: “No person shall store or release to the environment substances hazardous or acutely hazardous to public health, safety or the environment in contravention of rules and regulations promulgated pursuant hereto.” (See 6 NYCRR 597.1 for list of hazardous substances.) However, the ECL does not create a private cause of action to recover damages for violations of this provision. See Geysir Sales Corp., Inc. v. Arctic Glacier, Inc., 78 A.D.3d 653 (2d Dept 2010). Thus, dismissal of this cause of action is warranted. Tamm also alleges that First Niagara, among others, violated ECL §71-2703. ECL §71-2703 imposes civil, administrative, and criminal sanctions to enforce provisions under Article 27 of the ECL. However, per ECL §71-2727, enforcement of violations of Article 27 of the ECL is the purview of the Commissioner and the Attorney General. There is no private cause of action to recover damages under this statute. See Town of Wilson v. Town of Newfane, 181 A.D.2d 1045 (4th Dept 1992) (holding that because the ECL specifically authorizes the Attorney General to enforce rules and regulations under ECL Article 27, the ECL does not confer a private cause of action). Tamm’s causes of action under the ECL must be dismissed. Tamm’s Negligence Claims Tamm asserts two causes of action against several defendants sounding in negligence. The first cause of action is a general negligence claim. The second cause of action is a personal injury negligence claim. The threshold question in tort cases is whether the alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to the injured party. Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, 98 N.Y.2d 136, 138 (2002). Generally, banks do not owe non-customers a duty of care. See Elmaliach v. Bank of China, Ltd., 110 A.D.3d 192,207 (1st Dept 2013); Winkler v. Battery Trading, Inc., 89 A.D.3d 1016, 1018 (2d Dept 2011) (noting that as a general rule, banks do not owe non-customers a duty to protect them from intentional torts of customers). Here, Tamm has not sufficiently alleged the existence of a relationship between him and First Niagara, which would give rise to a duty of care. Tamm does not allege to be a customer of First Niagara (or KeyCorp). First Niagara did not personally engage in the alleged conduct, nor did it direct others to do so. To the extent First Niagara must indemnify any costs or harms, First Niagara would indemnify the defendants, not Tamm. Accordingly, the causes of action for negligence are dismissed. Tamm’s Labor Law Claims Tamm brings claims against First Niagara, among others, for violations of Labor Law §§200, 240(1) and 241(6). These causes of action are predicated on the alleged existence of an employer-employee relationship between Tamm and First Niagara. Labor Law §200 codifies a landowner and general contractor’s common law duty to maintain a safe workplace for employees. See Lombardi v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290, 294 (1992). All contractors and owners have a duty to furnish scaffolding and other safety devices for the protection of workers subject to the risks of elevated work sites. Labor Law §240(1); Jock v. Fien, 80 N.Y.2d 965, 967-68 (1992). Protected activities under Labor Law §240(1) include the “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure.” Additi6nally, the Labor Law affords protection to individuals engaged in “constructing or demolishing buildings…in areas in which construction, excavation, or demolition work is being performed.” Labor Law §241(6). Recovery under the Labor Law is predicated upon a showing that the plaintiff was “actually employed to work on a construction site, i.e., ‘a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was both permitted or suffered to work on a building…and that he was hired by someone.’” Blandon v. Advance Contracting Co., Inc., 264 A.D.2d 550, 552 (1st Dept 1999). These causes of action are predicated on the alleged existence of an employer-employee relationship between Tamm and First Niagara. Tamm alleges that the landlord (Mr. Stefanou, CCSS, and/or 206 North Ave LLC) “offered to hire and pay” him for “his labor and expenses” to move his own personal property from his storage units. Then, he alleges that several other defendants also agreed to hire him to dismantle shelving and oversee the move of his property. It is inherently incredible that Tamm would enter into an agreement with eleven different parties to move his property from one storage unit to another. It is even more incredible to suggest that this agreement would somehow include First Niagara. The allegations of a duty arising under §200 are inherently incredible. Furthermore, according to Tamm, the inference that First Niagara exerted sufficient control over the renovation and somehow hired him, does not fall within any of the prescribed categories of protected activities in §240(1). Assuming arguendo that dismantling some shelves inside one storage unit is possibly “altering” the structure, “altering” under §240(1) requires “making a significant change to the configuration or composition” of the structure. Acosta v. Banco Popular, 308 A.D.2d 48, 50 (1st Dept 2003); Joblon v. Solow, 91 N.Y.2d 457 (1998). Dismantling shelves in one storage unit is not a significant change. In the same vein, Tamm was notinvolved in construction as defined by §241(6). There is no legal or factual basis for Labor Law causes of action against First Niagara. Accordingly, the causes of action under the Labor Law are dismissed. Tamm’s Nuisance and Trespass Claims Tamm alleges that First Niagara, among others, committed trespass and private nuisance onto his storage unit. Tamm alleges that First Niagara, among others, caused a “substantial and unreasonable interference” with his “right to use and enjoy” the storage unit. He alleges that the nuisance constituted the “risks” from various “caustic and toxic chemicals.” Private nuisance arises from an interest in the use and enjoyment or property, requiring a substantial interference, intentional and unreasonable, reckless, or negligent in character, on a person’s property right to use and enjoy land, caused by another person’s conduct in acting or failing to act. Berenger v. 261 West LLC, 93 A.D.3d 175, 181 (1st Dept 2012). Trespass to real property requires injury to the right of possession. Bloomingdales, Inc. v. New York City Transit Authority, 13 N.Y.3d 61, 66 (2009). Tamm does not sufficiently set forth a cause of action in nuisance against First Niagara. Tamm alleges that the nuisance and trespass arise from the intrusion of “toxic” chemical and falling debris in his storage unit, among other things. It is inherently incredible that First Niagara engaged in this conduct. Moreover, Tamm does not sufficiently allege that First Niagara, through its alleged exertion of control over the other defendants, caused the nuisance or trespass. Accordingly, the causes of action for nuisance and trespass are dismissed. Tamm’s Claim for Declaratory Judgment Tamm seeks, pursuant to CPLR §3001, a declaratory judgment that each of the defendants is jointly and severally liable, in indemnification or contribution, for any liability and/or costs imputed onto Tamm arising from the presence of petroleum in the storage unit. Tamm further seeks to have this declaratory judgment enforced by a bond of at least $20 million. Tamm alleges “there is a significant likelihood that Plaintiffs may be subject to liability to third parties, including both governmental and private parties.” Tamm does not further identify these third parties. A declaratory judgment is a means to establish the respective legal rights of the parties based on a given set of facts, not to declare findings of fact. See Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Foundation, 70 A.D.3d 88, 99 (1st Dept 2009). A declaratory judgment serves “some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural relation either as to present or prospective obligations.” Touro College v. Novus University Corp., 146 A.D.3d 679 (1st Dept 2017) (quoting James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N.Y. 298, 305 (1931)). A declaratory judgment requires a justiciable controversy, “in which not only does the plaintiff ‘have an interest sufficient to constitute standing to maintain the action but also the controversy involve present, rather than hypothetical, contingent or remote, prejudice to plaintiffs.” Touro College, 146 A.D.3d at 679 (citations omitted). Tamm’s allegations fail to identify any present controversy or disputed relationship between the parties in this action that would be resolved by the issuance of the requested declaration. See id. The fact that a court may be required to determine the rights of the parties upon the happening of a future event does not render a declaratory judgment advisory. Hussein v. State, 81 A.D.3d 132, 135 (3d Dept 2011), aff’d, 19 N.Y.3d 899 (2012). However, declaratory judgment is improper where the likelihood of a future event is controlled by the action of a third party. Id (citations omitted). Accordingly, the cause of action for declaratory judgment is dismissed. Tamm’s Claims for Unjust Enrichment and Quantum Meruit Tamm alleges that at the behest of First Niagara, among others, he provided labor and materials to dismantle shelving in and move property from his storage unit. Tamm alleges that he did this to facilitate the renovation. This unpaid labor unjustly enriched defendants to the tune of at least $450,000. This figure comes from Tamm’s estimation of the “net increase” in his own insurance premiums. Tamm also alleges that First Niagara was unjustly enriched in its failure to pay him, failure to avoid causing the damage to his property, and the transfer of “risks” onto him. As the Court has set forth above, to the extent First Niagara is responsible for paying anyone, it would be the parties to the BLA, 206 North Ave LLC and CCSS. It is not clear how an increase in Tamm’s insurance premiums enriches First Niagara, as they are not Tamm’s insurer. Setting aside that First Niagara is not an insurer, Tamm’s allegations are inherently incredible. To successfully plead unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show that (l) the other party was enriched (2) at his own expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the other party to retain what is sought to be recovered. Georgia Malone & Co., Inc. v. Rieder, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 516 (2012). Though privity is not required, a plaintiff cannot prevail on an unjust enrichment claim unless it has a sufficiently close relationship with the other party. Id. at 516, 517. A pleading for unjust enrichment will fail where “the pleadings fail[] to indicate a relationship between the parties that could have caused reliance or inducement.” Id. at 517, quoting Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16 N.Y.3d 173, 182 (2011). The allegations that First Niagara hired Tamm, or otherwise exerted such a degree of control over the other parties such as to be involved in this hiring, are inherently incredible. It is also inherently incredible that First Niagara would be enriched by Tamm’s moving and dismantling shelves inside his storage unit. Accordingly, the cause of action for unjust enrichment is dismissed. Tamm also pleads a cause of action for quantum meruit. The quantum meruit claim arises from the allegation that First Niagara, among others, “fully received the benefit of the labor and materials” Tamm provided in moving his property and dismantling shelves. To state a cause of action to recover in quantum meruit, a plaintiff must allege (1) the performance of services in good faith, (2) the acceptance of the services by the person to whom they are rendered, (3) an expectation of compensation therefor, and (4) the reasonable value of the services allegedly rendered. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP v. Carucci, 63 A.D.3d 487, 489 (1st Dept 2009). Tamm has not pleaded to the acceptance of his moving and/or dismantling services by First Niagara. Accordingly, the claim for quantum meruit is dismissed. Tamm’s General Business Law Claims Tamm alleges that First Niagara, among all defendants, violated General Business Law §349, which prohibits “deceptive acts and practices” in the conduct of any business in New York. These deceptive acts and practices must be consumer oriented, materially deceptive, and cause injury to the plaintiff. See Stutman v. Chemical Bank, 95 N.Y.2d 24, 29 (2000). The plaintiff must demonstrate that the acts and practices have a “broader impact on consumers at large.” Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 85 N.Y.2d 20, 25 (1995). Private disputes, unique to the parties, do not fall within the ambit of this statute. Id; see also Anthony Trachina General Contracting Corp. v. Greco Bros. Ready Mix Concrete Co., Inc.; 138 A.D.3d 647,648 (1st Dept 2016). Tamm alleges in the complaint that First Niagara is engaged in the “sale of construction services to loans to consumers seeking to build, remodel or refinance,” but materially misled him to believe that he would be “wholly indemnified and reimbursed” for his losses. Tamm has not alleged that this material misrepresentation applies to other consumers. The harms alleged fall outside the ambit of GBL §349. Where a dispute is “unique to the parties,” GBL is not the proper vehicle for relief. See Shou Fong Tam v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.; 79 A.D.3d 484,496 (1st Dept 2010) (holding in dispute over insurer’s handling of policy that while insurance disputes may fall within the ambit of GBL §349, “private contractual disputes upon matters not affecting the consuming public are not actionable under this section”). Accordingly, the cause of action under GBL §349 as to First Niagara is dismissed. The Motion to Extend Time to Respond Ex Post Facto First Niagara moves this Court for an order extending ex post facto the time to respond to the Complaint to the date of the instant motion. First Niagara alleges that the summons was purportedly served on one of its bank branch locations in Buffalo, New York on October 22, 2018. First Niagara alleges that due to this method of service, KeyCorp (First Niagara’s successor) was not aware of Tamm’s action until December 20, 2018. Defense counsel asserts Tamm refused to stipulate to an extension of time, despite granting such requests to other defendants. Upon Tamm’s refusal, First Niagara filed the instant motion on January 3, 2019. In support of these allegations, First Niagara annexes the affidavit of Rochelle Satow, an Assistant Vice President and Subpoena Processing Manager for KeyCorp’s legal department. Satow affirms that the Buffalo bank branch does not have a legal department on-site and thus, there was a delay in alerting KeyCorp’s legal department about the summons and complaint. Satow describes this as an “honest mistake,” an explanation which the Court credits. Pursuant to CPLR §2004, the Court may extend a party’s time to respond to the complaint “upon good cause shown.” In exercising its discretion, the Court may consider factors such as the length of the delay, the existence of prejudice to the non-moving party, and the reason provided for the delay. Tewari v. Tsoutsouras, 75 N.Y.2d 1, 12 (1989). In addition, an affidavit of merit is not required where no default order or judgment has been entered. Cirillo v. Macy’s, Inc., 61 A.D.3d 538, 540 (1sts Dept 2009). Here, the reason offered for the delay is an “honest mistake” arising from a miscommunication between a bank branch in Buffalo, New York and KeyCorp’s Legal Department in Ohio. Upon learning of the lawsuit, KeyCorp proceeded reasonably and sought an extension from Tamm first, which Tamm refused. The delay was approximately two months long. Further supporting the granting of an extension, Tamm has not demonstrated prejudice. Tamm alleges that he is “managing 2 lawsuits (NYS and federal) against over 20 defendants, with a backlog of 5 documents to file in weeks.” Though the Court understands that navigating factually complex, multi-party litigation is challenging for anyone, let alone a pro se litigant, this is not prejudice. KeyCorp sought an extension of their time to respond, which would have benefitted Tamm in managing his ongoing litigation. Instead, Tamm refused. Now, Tamm claims that he is prejudiced by having to respond to KeyCorp’s motion in the “limited time;” However, Tamm submitted a lengthy and detailed affirmation in opposition to First Niagara’s motion to dismiss and a cross motion, both annexing numerous exhibits. Plainly, there is no prejudice to Tamm. In light of the strong public policy favoring the resolution of cases on their merits, see Siwek v. Phillips, 71 A.D.3d 469 (1st Dept 2010), the Court hereby grants First Niagara the extension ex post facto. The Cross Motion to Compel Security Tamm cross moves this Court pursuant to Insurance Law §1213(c) to compel First Niagara to post security in this action. As the Court has dismissed all causes of action against First Niagara in this action, Tamm’s cross motion is moot and academic. The cross motion is accordingly denied. Accordingly, it is, ORDERED and ADJUDGED that defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7) is granted in its entirety. And it is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant’s motion to extend ex post facto the time to respond to the complaint to January 3, 2019 is granted. And it is further ORDERED and ADJUDGED that plaintiff’s cross motion to compel security pursuant to Insurance Law §1213(c) is denied. And it is further ORDERED and ADJUDGED that defendant serve a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry within thirty (30) days from the date of entry upon all parties herein and upon the clerk of the Court. This constitutes the decision and order of the Court. Dated: September 30, 2020
