By: Ling-Cohan, J.P., Gonzalez, JJ. 17-189. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. CHARLES CALIZAIRE, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Laurie Peterson, J.), rendered October 13, 2016, affirmed. The court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion. There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations, which are supported by the record (see People v. Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759, 761 [1977]). The police had, at least, an objective credible reason to approach defendant’s stationary vehicle and ask for basic identification information, since the vehicle was double-parked, which constituted a traffic infraction (see People v. Omowale, 83 AD3d 614, 618 [2011], affd 18 NY3d 825 [2011]; People v. Citron, 255 AD2d 452 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 1030 [1998]) and had a piece of cardboard with handwritten numbers and letters instead of a rear license plate, an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §402(1)(a) (see People v. Ocasio, 85 NY2d 982, 984 [1995]; People v. Thomas, 19 AD3d 32, 36-37 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 795 [2005]). As one of the officers questioned defendant, he observed a switchblade knife, in plain view, in the center console between the front seats of the car. This observation gave the officer the authority to seize the knife (see People v. Brown, 96 NY2d 80, 88-89 [2001]; People v. Vanderpool, 157 AD3d 831 [2018]; People v. McKane, 267 AD2d 253 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 922 [2000]) and provided probable cause to arrest defendant (see People v. Smith, 125 AD3d 897, 898 [2015], cert denied 25 NY3d 1077 [2015]). The court also properly denied suppression of defendant’s statement that he had the knife for “protection.” The statement did not require Miranda warnings because defendant was not in custody (see People v. Archer, 137 AD3d 449 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1128 [2016]; People v. Brown, 92 AD3d 455 [2012], lv denied 18 NY3d 955 [2012]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
By: Ling-Cohan, J.P., Gonzalez, JJ. 19-197. 92 East LLC, pet-app, v. JESSICA LEE, “JOHN DOE” AND “JANE DOE”, res-res — Order (Gary F. Marton, J.), dated January 25, 2019, affirmed, with $10 costs. Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on its possessory claim was properly denied, since it failed to demonstrate the absence of triable issues of fact with respect to the respondents’ family member succession defense. Although petitioner’s motion relies heavily on evidence indicating that respondent Chun Lam Lee, the son of the deceased rent controlled tenant, lived and worked in Maryland with his wife, respondent Fei Lam Lee, in the two years prior to tenant’s death, respondent Chum Lam Lee’s affidavit in opposition alleges that he and his wife are in the restaurant business and are required to spend several days per week in Maryland, where they stay in dormitory accommodations provided by their employer. Respondents have also submitted documentary proof indicating that they maintained extensive ties to the subject apartment during the relevant period. This conflicting evidence as to respondents’ residence creates factual issues precluding summary judgment. Civil Court also providently exercised its discretion in granting respondents’ motion to amend their answer to assert a succession claim by respondent Jessica Lee, the granddaughter of the deceased tenant. Evidence in the record indicates that Jessica returned to the apartment, where she lived years earlier, in May 2013 and resided there with her parents, respondents Chun Lam Lee and Fei Lam Lee, as well as her grandfather (tenant) for several years prior to tenant’s death in 2016. Respondents’ delay in seeking to amend a pleading does not warrant denial of the motion, in the absence of prejudice (see Cherebin v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 43 AD3d 364, 365 [2007]), i.e., “some indication that the [opposing party] has been hindered in the preparation of [its] case or has been prevented from taking some measure in support of [its] position” (Kocourek v. Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., 85 AD3d 502, 504 [2011][internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, petitioner has failed to demonstrate any such prejudice or surprise (see Tri-Tec Design, Inc. v. Zatek Corp., 123 AD3d 420 [2014]). Nor do we find any abuse of discretion in the denial of petitioner’s request for costs and attorneys’ fees as a condition for the amendment (see CPLR 3025[b]; Peach Parking Corp. v. 346 W. 40th St., LLC, 52 AD3d 260, 261 [2008]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
