In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff moves by notice of motion and by order to show cause, for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendant from terminating her medical insurance coverage: Papers Considered 1. Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause/Affidavit of Marie Litrenta; 2. Affidavit of John Chow in Opposition/Exhibits A-D; 3. Memorandum of Law after Hearing; 4. Memorandum of Law in Opposition after Hearing. DECISION & ORDER Factual and Procedural Background Based upon the limited record at this stage of the litigation, plaintiff, Marie LiTrenta, became employed by the defendant Chappaqua Central School District on August 1, 2000, as Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum and Technology. The Handbook on Personnel Practices and Procedures for the District, dated January 1982 and in effect at the time of plaintiff’s employment, provides, in pertinent part, that retirees with a minimum district service of five years are entitled to lifetime health benefits on the district’s group health plan. On January 10, 2002, the then Superintendent of Schools, James F. Donovan, issued a memo to the benefits clerk stating that the plaintiff is entitled to the administrator’s benefit package as a vested employee upon her retirement which includes medical, dental, vision, and life insurance as per the current administrator’s contract. Plaintiff thereafter advised the Superintendent that she would be retiring effective February 2, 2003. Although plaintiff retired with less than five years of service, the District had paid her medical benefits through 2019. In May 2019, plaintiff was notified by the District that she was not eligible for health insurance through the school district and that such coverage would terminate after June 30, 2019. She was further advised that the District would no longer contribute to reimbursement of the cost of Medicare Part B. As a result, plaintiff commenced this action against the District for breach of contract. Plaintiff, by order to show cause, sought a temporary restraining order which this Court granted on the record pending the resolution of this motion, restraining the defendant from taking any action to terminate her current medical coverage. Plaintiff also moves for a preliminary injunction pending the resolution of this action to enjoin the defendant from taking any action to terminate her medical coverage. A preliminary injunction hearing was held before this Court on June 17, 2019. Plaintiff testified on her own behalf. John Chow testified on behalf of the school district. After the hearing the parties were permitted to submit post hearing memoranda. At the outset, the Court notes that plaintiff’s primary medical coverage is Medicare, which plaintiff confirmed at the hearing. Thus, the plaintiff’s damages at issue are the Medicare Part B reimbursement she had been receiving from the District which amounts to approximately $300 per month. Plaintiff testified that she had worked in public education for thirty years and began her career in the Bronxville Public School District where she worked for approximately 19 years. Plaintiff then became principal of the Briarcliff Middle School and thereafter Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum for the Chappaqua Central School District. Plaintiff testified that upon accepting employment with Chappaqua, she had the assurance from the then Superintendent Dr. Donald Parker, that upon retirement, the District would pay her lifetime benefits for medical coverage. She testified that she would not have taken the position with Chappaqua without that assurance since she was eligible for lifetime medical benefits with the Briarcliff school district. Plaintiff testified that she retired from the Chappaqua School District in 2003 to work in private schools in Miami and in Manhattan. According to plaintiff, upon her retirement she was assured by the then Superintendent Dr. James Donovan that the district would provide her with lifetime medical benefits even though she had less than five years of service with the district. Plaintiff admitted during the hearing that she was aware that for a school district to contract with an employee, the terms of the contract must be authorized by the district’s Board of Education. John Chow testified that he was the Assistant Superintendent for Business for the Chappaqua Central School District since 2007. He is responsible for the District’s finances included salaries, benefits, and operations. He identified the District handbook and testified that it includes a retirement benefits provision which requires retirees to have five years of service with the district for continued medical coverage. Mr. Chow identified the Board of Education meeting minutes from November 5, 2002, which reflect plaintiff’s resignation for purpose of retiring effective February 2, 2003. Mr. Chow testified that he found no employment contract between the District and plaintiff and the minutes from the November 5th meeting do not reflect that the requirements of the District handbook are being waived for this employee. The administrator’s benefit package requires five years of service to qualify for retiree health benefits. Mr. Chow testified that plaintiff was not a vested employee because she had less than five years of service with the district. Mr. Chow explained that the Board of Education would not have received any record showing that the plaintiff specifically was receiving retiree health benefits. The budget only includes a budget line for health insurance and all retirees and current employees are collectively on that one line represented by a dollar figure. Discussion Plaintiff argues that she is likely to succeed on her claim for breach of contract. To that end, she argues that it was always the intent of the parties that she would receive life-time medical benefits and that such contract was formed at the time she was hired by the District. Plaintiff argues that the acts of the Superintendent, if outside the scope of his authority, is chargeable against the school district and that, in any event, Superintendent Donovan acted within the scope of his employment. Further, plaintiff argues that the only remedy for her is reinstatement to the District medical plan since money damages are difficult to ascertain and thus insufficient as the cost of future medical benefits cannot be precisely determined. Defendant argues that the plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits. Defendant argues that the former Superintendent was not empowered to enter into any agreement with the plaintiff or make any enforceable promise concerning her lifetime district-funded health benefits upon her retirement beyond what was authorized in the handbook. Defendant argues that only the Board of Education could lawfully enter into such a contractual undertaking and then only by a duly authorized public vote of a majority of its members. CPLR 6301 provides: A preliminary injunction may be granted in any action where it appears that the defendant threatens or is about to do, or is doing or procuring or suffering to be done, an act in violation of the plaintiff’s rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual, or in any action where the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled to a judgment restraining the defendant from the commission or continuance of an act, which, if committed or continued during the pendency of the action, would produce injury to the plaintiff. The party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate a probability of success on the merits, danger of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction and a balance of equities in its favor (see Nobu Next Door, LLC v. Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839 [2005]; CPLR 6301). “Irreparable injury, for purposes of equity, has been held to mean any injury for which money damages are insufficient.” (DiFabio v. Omnipoint Communications, 66 AD3d 635 [2d Dept 2009]). Economic loss, which is compensable by money damages, does not constitute irreparable harm (see EdCia Corp. v. McCormack, 44 AD3d 991, 994 [2d Dept 2007]). “Provided that the elements required for the issuance of a preliminary injunction are demonstrated in the plaintiff’s papers, the presentation by the defendant of evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to any of such elements shall not in itself be grounds for denial of the motion. In such event the court shall make a determination by hearing or otherwise whether each of the elements required for issuance of a preliminary injunction exists” (CPLR 6312[c]). In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate the elements required for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The District’s Handbook on Personnel Practices and Procedures provides that lifetime medical benefits would be funded by the District for certain employees with a minimum district service requirement of five years. The plaintiff has not presented any contract with the Board of Education waiving the five-year requirement. The minutes from the July 11, 2000, Board of Education meeting, when plaintiff was hired, are devoid of any resolution by the Board approving a waiver of the five-year minimum service requirement for plaintiff to receive lifetime benefits. The letter dated July 13, 2000, from Superintendent Parker advising plaintiff that the Board accepted his recommendation for her employment also makes no mention that the five-year minimum service requirement for lifetime benefits had been waived. Pursuant to the Education Law, the power to enter into employment contracts is vested exclusively in boards of education (see Kight v. Wyandanch Union Free Sch. Dist., 84 AD2d 749 [2d Dept 1981]; Education Law, §1709[16]). Thus, the plaintiff’s reliance on Superintendent Parker’s oral assurance upon her hiring that she would be provided with lifetime medical benefits and the January 2002 internal correspondence from Superintendent Donovan to the benefits clerk that plaintiff is entitled to the administrator’s benefit package upon her retirement as a vested employee, i.e. an employee with at least five years of service, does not avail plaintiff of entitlement to a preliminary injunction. The superintendents did not have the power or authority to enter into any contract with the plaintiff to waive the five-year employment requirement for lifetime medical benefits. Neither the verbal assurance of the superintendent nor the correspondence came from the Board of Education. Moreover, generally, a board of education will not be liable for the unauthorized acts of its agents (see Matter of Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., 129 AD3d 1067, 1072 [2d Dept 2015]). There has been no evidence submitted nor testimony elicited at the hearing establishing that the District’s Board of Education waived the five-years of service requirement so that plaintiff would be entitled to lifetime health insurance. Nevertheless, plaintiff claims that the Board ratified and is estopped from terminating her benefits as they have paid them since she retired in 2003. “[A] governmental entity may ratify a contract made on its behalf which it has the authority to make even if the contract was initially invalid because the person who executed it did not have the requisite authority. Such agreements not previously approved by the governing body may be ratified by subsequent conduct, such as making payments pursuant to the agreement, which is inconsistent with any other supposition than that it intended to adopt and own the act done (internal citations omitted)” (Atalaya Asset Income Fund II, LP v. HVS Tappan Beach, Inc., __AD3d__, 2019 NY Slip Op 06583, 2 [2d Dept September 18, 2019] quoting Elia v. Highland Cent. School Dist., 78 AD3d 1265 [3d Dept 2010]). There has been no evidence presented that the Board of Education knew that plaintiff was being treated as vested even though she had less than five years of service with the District to support a finding that the Board ratified any contract between the former superintendent and plaintiff. Finally, the plaintiff failed to allege damages of a noneconomic nature and therefore, has not demonstrated irreparable injury (see DiFabio v. Omnipoint Communications, Inc., 66 AD3d 635 [2d Dept 2009]). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED and the temporary restraining order is lifted. The parties are directed to appear in the Preliminary Conference Part, room 811, on November 18, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. for further proceedings. Dated: October 4, 2019 White Plains, New York
