OPINION & ORDER Michael Campa (“Plaintiff”) brings this pro se Action asserting claims aginst Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (“Defendant”) for disability-based discrimination and failure to accommodate, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §296 et seq. (See Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 23).) Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (the “Motion”). (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 66).) For the following Reasons, The Motion Is Denied. I. Background A. Factual History The following facts are taken from Defendant’s statement pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, (Def.’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Def.’s 56.1″) (Dkt. No. 69)), Plaintiff’s response, (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl.’s 56.1″) (Dkt. No. 85, at 1-24)), and the admissible evidence submitted by the Parties.1 The Court recounts only those facts necessary for consideration of the instant Motion. 1. Employer and Regulatory Scheme Defendant operates the Indian Point Energy Center (the “Center”), a nuclear power plant in Buchanan, New York. (Def.’s 56.1 1.) Defendant holds a license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the “Commission”), and as such is subject to the requirements set out in 10 C.F.R. §73.55, regarding the physical protection of nuclear power plants. As relevant here, Defendant is required to “maintain a physical protection program, to include a security organization,” that ensures “that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.” 10 C.F.R. §73.55(b)(1). Defendant is also required to “demonstrate the ability to meet Commission requirements through the implementation of the physical protection program, including the ability of armed and unarmed personnel to perform assigned duties and responsibilities required by the security plans.” Id. §73.55(b)(5). More specifically, Defendant is required to “maintain a security organization that is…qualified…to implement [its] physical protection program,” and “may not permit any individual to implement any part of the physical protection program unless the individual has been…qualified to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with appendix B…to this part.” Id. §§73.55(d)(1), (3). Appendix B, in turn, provides that Defendant “may not allow any individual to perform any security function…until that individual satisfies the…qualification requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved…qualification plan, unless specifically authorized by the Commission.” Id. app. B, Part VI, §A(6). Those qualification requirements include “[g]eneral physical qualifications”: “Individuals whose duties and responsibilities are directly associated with the effective implementation of the Commission-approved security plans…may not have any physical conditions that would adversely affect their performance of assigned security duties and responsibilities.” Id. §B(2)(a). 2. Plaintiff’s Hiring and Disability In February 2007, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as an armed Nuclear Security Officer (“NSO”) at the Center, a position housed within the Security Department and responsible for the Center’s physical protection. (Def.’s 56.1
5, 8; Aff’n of Christina M. Schmid, Esq. in Supp. of Mot. (“Def.’s Decl.”) Ex. I (employment offer letter) (Dkt. No. 67); Def.’s Decl. Ex. B (Deposition of Michael Campa) (“Campa Dep.”) 55, 74; Pl.’s Decl. in Opp’n to Mot. (“Pl.’s Decl.”) 20 (Dkt. No. 87).) As an NSO, Plaintiff’s responsibilities included the “[i]mplementation of defensive strategy, answering alarms, interdiction of external threat[s],” conducting searches of “vehicle[s], material[,] and personnel,” and conducting “vehicle escorts” and patrols. (Def.’s Decl. Ex. C (Deposition of Daniel Gagnon) (“Gagnon Dep.”) 15-16; Def.’s Decl. Ex. D (Deposition of Mitchell Wood) (“Wood Dep.”) 17-18.) The terms of Plaintiff’s employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), which provides, in relevant part, that NSOs “must qualify and re-qualify” for the position “by meeting the criteria specified” by the Center. (Def.’s 56.1
