DECISION AND ORDER On March 28, 1995, defendant was indicted and charged with three counts of murder in the second degree (intentional, depraved indifference and felony-murder) and one count of manslaughter in the first degree, in connection with the February 21, 1995 death of Joaquin Molina, a pastor at a church in the Bronx who was shot to death while clutching his bible upon returning home from an evening church service. At trial, it was established that defendant had attempted to rob Mr. Molina of the bible he had been holding in his hands, having mistaken the bible for a briefcase. After a brief struggle over the bible, defendant fired one gunshot that killed Mr. Molina. On February 12, 1997, following a jury trial in which this Court presided, defendant was convicted of one count of murder in the second degree (the felony murder count).1 On March 7, 1997, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of twenty five years to life.2 In a decision dated January 25, 2001, the Appellate Division, First Department, inter alia, found that the verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence, and that there was no basis for a reduction of defendant’s sentence. Now, in pro se papers filed some twenty years after his conviction, defendant moves pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate his conviction alleging numerous claims based upon various forms of prosecutorial misconduct and defense counsel ineffectiveness.3 Defendant’s most salient claims can best be grouped into three categories: 1) newly discovered evidence; 2) Brady violations; and 3) ineffective assistance of counsel. More specifically, these claims relate to: 1) the People’s alleged failure to disclose the psychiatric history of one of its key witnesses, Glynn Jones, a jailhouse informant to whom defendant confessed; 2) the purported recantation of Franklin Linsalato, an eyewitness who testified in the Grand Jury, but did not testify at trial;4 3) the People’s alleged failure to correct the testimony of Glynn Jones and two other key witnesses, Rachel Gilchrist and John Wooden, with respect to the purported benefits they received for testifying; 4) defense counsel’s failure to call a witness at trial identified as William Sadberry, who purported to see two black males fleeing the scene of the shooting, which defendant claims is inconsistent with his being (per his current assertion) a white male; and 5) counsel’s failure to introduce into evidence certain newspaper articles that defendant claims the jailhouse informant, Glynn Jones, was exposed to prior to meeting defendant. Having reviewed the entire trial record and the voluminous submissions of the parties, for the following reasons, the Court concludes that all of defendant’s claims are meritless and therefore his motion is denied without a hearing. The Evidence at Trial At trial, three civilian witnesses testified on behalf of the prosecution as to matters directly associated with the shooting: Margaret Molina, the deceased’s sister; Rachel Gilchrist, who was with defendant before and after the shooting and to whom defendant made inculpatory statements; and John Wooden, who observed defendant and two other individuals running from the building immediately after hearing a gunshot. In addition, the People called as a witness a jailhouse informant, Glynn Jones, to whom defendant admitted shooting Mr. Molina, and three police witnesses who were present at the scene in the immediate aftermath of the shooting and who participated in the investigation of the shooting. Ms. Gilchrist testified that she resided at 2487 Davidson Avenue, Apt. 4A, and that on the evening of February 21, 1995, at approximately 8:00 to 9:00 p.m., two acquaintances — defendant and his friend, Steve — came to her door and entered her apartment. Gilchrist had known defendant for one to two months, and stated that defendant had been to her apartment on six to eight prior occasions and Steve had been there ten to twenty times before. As he had done on each prior occasion that he had come to her apartment, at Gilchrist’s request, prior to entering the apartment, defendant placed his black gun, which Gilchrist described as an automatic with a clip, under a pillow in the hallway outside Gilchrist’s apartment. Gilchrist, defendant, and Steve proceeded to sniff a bag of heroin. About an hour after the two men arrived, defendant left Gilchrist’s apartment by himself, and Steve departed twenty minutes thereafter. According to Ms. Gilchrist, between approximately 11:30 and midnight, defendant returned to her apartment by himself. Defendant entered the apartment and explained to Gilchrist that he no longer had his gun because he had sold it for crack. Defendant then lit a piece of crack, turned off the lights and television and looked out of a window that overlooked the rear of 30 West 190th Street (where the fatal shooting had taken place approximately one-half hour earlier). Gilchrist turned the television back on and saw defendant shaking and in a fetal position on her bed. Defendant said that he had “just killed a man on 192nd Street.” Gilchrist was frightened and stared at defendant with mouth agape, and defendant said that he was just kidding. Fifteen minutes later defendant left Gilchrist’s apartment. On cross examination, Gilchrist admitted that at the time of the incident she was a crack addict who smoked crack daily, and that she may have smoked crack the morning of the shooting. However, Gilchrist was steadfast that she was not high when defendant entered her apartment with Steve at 9:00 p.m. and when he subsequently returned by himself at 11:30 p.m. Gilchrist also admitted that the Bronx District Attorney’s Office (BxDAO) helped relocate her by giving her a one way ticket to Michigan to live with her sister. In addition, Gilchrist testified that the BxDAO on one occasion gave her $100 to help her stave off an eviction in Michigan, as well as round-trip bus tickets between Michigan and the Bronx to permit her to attend her father’s funeral. Glynn Jones, the jailhouse informant, filled in the gap in Gilchrist’s testimony regarding the shooting itself. Jones testified that he met defendant on March 16, 1995, when they were both in custody and housed at the Bronx House of Detention. At the time, Jones was serving a sentence of fifteen to life having been convicted of arson in the first degree in 1984 for throwing an incendiary device into the unoccupied home of his girlfriend’s sister. Jones testified that on March 16, 1995, at approximately 6:00 p.m., he was in the day room doing law work5 when defendant, who had been in custody since his arrest on the instant charges on March 5, 1995, approached Jones and told him that he had been indicted for murdering a priest. Defendant began to talk to Jones about his case and requested Jones’ assistance in filing a motion to dismiss the indictment. Defendant soon became agitated and told Jones that he could not do the time and that there were a number of individuals who would testify against him, including Rachel, Pepsi, Willie, Steve, and possibly Frankie. Defendant explained to Jones that on the day of the shooting, he, Frankie, and Steve had been hanging out and smoking crack, when defendant decided to rob someone. According to defendant, he and Frankie went inside the lobby of 30 West 190th Street and Steve stayed outside of the building acting as a lookout. When a man entered the building carrying what he perceived to be a briefcase, defendant told Jones that he pulled out his gun and attempted to take the briefcase from the man. When the man pulled back the briefcase, defendant said that he shot him. Defendant then picked up what he believed was a briefcase and quickly realized it was a bible, dropped it, and exited the building. Defendant said that he turned right at the corner and went upstairs to Rachel’s apartment, stayed there for awhile, and then left and returned to the crime scene, which was roped off by police tape. Defendant said that he was told by an individual he identified as “Acid” that somebody shot the priest in the building. In addition to telling Jones what happened, defendant drew a diagram to illustrate what happened and gave the diagram to Jones.6 Defendant indicated on the diagram the names of streets, the building where the shooting took place (30 West 190th Street), and the building on Davidson Avenue where Rachel resided. Further, defendant placed three dots in the lobby area of 30 West 190th Street indicating where he, Frankie, and the victim were located and where Steve was positioned outside the building, and he wrote the names Steve and “Frankie cop snitch” on the diagram. Defendant also drew a line on the diagram indicating the route he took after the shooting from 30 West 190th Street to Rachel’s apartment and circled Rachel’s name over her apartment on Davidson Avenue. On cross examination, Jones admitted to having six convictions, including the arson case for which he was incarcerated. Jones also admitted that he had testified on behalf of the prosecution in three other murder trials, but claimed that he did so because he became aware that witnesses in those cases had been threatened. Jones stated that he had received no benefit for testifying in the other three murder cases and did not expect to receive a letter to the Parole Board from any of the ADAs who prosecuted the three other cases. However, at the behest of the trial prosecutor of the instant murder case (ADA Jeffrey Rosenbaum), Jones was offered and expected to receive a letter to the Parole Board from Rosenbaum indicating that he testified for the prosecution in the instant murder trial.7 Jones also testified that he was not shown any newspaper articles regarding the instant case. Jones also denied having been under psychiatric care while in state prison, and specifically responded to defense counsel’s question about whether he sought such treatment while incarcerated by stating that “he was not psychiatric”. Although counsel did not ask follow-up questions with respect to this answer, Jones later elaborated that while incarcerated he had attended group therapy and alternative-to-violence programs, and had learned to respect both people and life. Finally, Jones admitted to having been placed in punitive segregation ten to fifteen times for various infractions he committed in his thirteen years in state prison. John Wooden testified that he lived in the neighborhood where the shooting took place and on the date of the incident he was making a phone call at a public phone on the corner of 190th Street and Davidson Avenue, and from his vantage point, he had a clear view of 30 West 190th Street. While talking on the phone, Wooden heard gunshots that emanated from inside of a building. Wooden believed the shots came from inside a building based upon the 25 years he had spent in the army and his familiarity with weapons and gunshots. Wooden hung up the phone and saw three males exit a building on 190th Street and run towards Davidson Avenue. When the three males were directly across the street from him, Wooden realized that he recognized the three males as defendant, Frank, and Steve.8 Wooden observed defendant, Frank, and Steve run past him, down Davidson Avenue, and into the building where Rachel Gilchrist resided.9 Wooden was cross examined with respect to his ability to clearly recall and see the events he described, his failure to immediately come forward to law enforcement, and an alleged inconsistent statement he made to a detective regarding whom he had observed. In addition, Wooden denied that he had received any benefit for his testimony and that the trial prosecutor had assisted him in obtaining Section 8 housing. Wooden, however, admitted that “Victim Services” had assisted him in obtaining a Section 8 apartment because he had been a victim of an unrelated assault that rendered him disabled. Finally, Wooden denied hearing or reading about the case on television or in the newspaper. Margaret Molina, the victim’s daughter, testified that on February 21, 1995 she lived with her parents at 30 West 190th Street and that her father was a beloved assistant pastor at a neighborhood church and that he had attended a church service that evening. Between 11:05 and 11:15 p.m., Molina, upon hearing a loud banging at the door to her apartment, opened the door and saw the superintendent of the building standing there with her father’s bible in his hand. Molina identified the bible and testified that the bible looked like a briefcase because it had handles that pulled out. The superintendent explained that her father had been hurt and was in the lobby. Ms. Molina went downstairs and saw her father lying on the ground “with his eyes turned” and became hysterical. The following day she identified her father’s body at the morgue. Ms. Molina was briefly and gently cross examined with respect to the fact that the shooting received much publicity in both the newspaper and on television, and that the newspaper articles that she had read included such details as her father being a pastor and that he died clutching his bible. Moreover, Molina testified that nothing was stolen from her father and that when the bible was returned to her, she later found an envelope containing cash from the church offerings inside of it. A number of police witnesses also testified, including the lead detective, Daniel Hourihan. On February 21, 1995, Detective Hourihan responded to a radio communication of shots fired at 30 West 190th Street. When he arrived, he observed Mr. Molina in the lobby of the building lying on his side bleeding profusely from his chest. Hourihan attempted to question Molina, but Molina was having difficulty breathing and was incoherent. After a two week investigation that included police interviews of numerous witnesses, on March 5, 1995, defendant was arrested and taken to the 52nd Precinct. After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant made an oral, written, and videotaped statement.10 In his oral statement, defendant stated that on the date of the shooting he was standing in front of 30 West 190th Street with an individual he identified as “Pepsi”. When he heard a bang in the hallway, defendant said he ran south on Davidson Avenue and into Rachel’s apartment. In his written statement, which he signed, defendant wrote, in sum and substance, that on February 21, 1995 at approximately 11:00 p.m., he was standing with Pepsi in the vestibule of 30 West 190th Street smoking crack when he observed Frankie harassing an old man inside the building. As he and Pepsi were leaving the building, he heard a bang and ran. As he was running to Rachel’s apartment, Steve ran up behind him. Defendant further stated that he went inside Rachel’s apartment, but Rachel refused to let Steve in. Once inside the apartment defendant looked out the window. Hourihan was cross-examined with respect to the circumstances surrounding defendant’s statements, his interview of Wooden and the inconsistencies in his police report memorializing Wooden’s statements, the location where Wooden was standing when Wooden claimed to have had a clear view of 30 West 190th Street, the fact that he never recovered the murder weapon, and the publicity surrounding the case. Two police officers testified to the recovery of a 9mm bullet and shell casing in the vestibule area of 30 West 190th Street and to dusting the crime scene for fingerprints, which did not result in the recovery of any useful fingerprint evidence. Finally, the medical examiner testified that the cause of death was two gunshot wounds caused by a single bullet that had entered Mr. Molina’s upper right arm, exited his armpit, then entered his upper right chest and exited his left side. Defendant did not elect to testify and did not call any witnesses to testify on his behalf. The Evidence presented in the 440 motion papers The following evidence in the form of numerous exhibits attached to their respective motions and affirmations in opposition were submitted by the parties: Frank Linsalato (the eyewitness who testified in the grand jury and who has recanted) On March 1 and 2, 1995, during the course of the police investigation into the murder of Mr. Molina, Frank Linsalato was interviewed by Detective Hourihan, and on March 8, 1995, Linsalato gave a sworn statement to ADA Pamela Goldsmith and also testified in the Grand Jury. On each occasion (with the exception of the initial March 1st interview), Linsalato stated that on February 21, 1995, at approximately 11:05 p.m., he was in the lobby of 30 West 190th Street smoking crack when he saw defendant and Steve also in the lobby. Linsalato saw an old man that he recognized from the building enter the lobby and saw defendant approach the old man and heard defendant ask the old man for change. When the old man said he didn’t have any change, Linsalato saw defendant take a black 9mm semi-automatic gun out of his waistband, point it at the man, and shoot him. Linsalato saw defendant and Steve run out of the building towards Aqueduct Avenue. (See Defendant’s Exhibit B-5, B-8, People’s Exhibit 8, 9 — DD-5s, Transcript of Linsalato’s statement to ADA Goldsmith and Grand Jury testimony.)11 Linsalato did not testify at trial. During the course of the trial there were two lengthy colloquies between the Court and counsel regarding Linsalato, both of which suggested that by the time of trial, Linsalato had recanted his Grand Jury testimony and that if called to the witness stand by either party, he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.12 (T: 331-40.) Some twenty years after trial and months after defendant filed the instant motion, Linsalato was approached by defendant’s brothers who requested his assistance in securing defendant’s release from prison. (See People’s Exhibit 2 at pp. 49, 60, transcript of 3/22/18 interview of Linsalato at BxDAO.) Thereafter, defendant’s brother, Irving Walker, provided the BxDAO with a notarized letter dated October 26, 2017 from Linsalato. That letter stated in essence that the statements made by Linsalato in March 1995 to the police and ADA Goldsmith, in which he implicated defendant in the shooting, were false and coerced and that he lied in order to go home.13 (See People’s Exhibit 10, Linsalato 10/26/17 letter.) On March 22, 2018, at the urging of defendant’s family, Linsalato appeared at the BxDAO and was interviewed under oath by a numbers of individuals, including the former chief of the BxDAO’s Conviction Integrity Unit. (See People’s Exhibit 2 at 49, 57-58, 73-79.) In sum and substance, Linsalato said that when he was interviewed by the police at the 52nd Precinct in March 1995 he was lying when he told the police that defendant did it and that defendant had a gun. He said that his reason for lying was the officers’ threats and other coercive tactics. Linsalato claimed that the police put words in his mouth regarding defendant’s participation in the shooting and that he parroted those words in order to leave the stationhouse and get high. Though he claimed not to be present when the pastor was shot and that he wasn’t with defendant on the night the pastor was shot, he somehow knew that defendant did not shoot the pastor. Linsalato admitted that at the time of trial he was scared to testify against defendant and that he was also afraid of defendant’s brother, Eric. Linsalato told the interviewers that it was Eric who first requested his assistance and that Eric suggested to him that he write the October 26, 2017 letter to the BxDAO, that Eric was with him when he wrote the letter, and that Eric told him what words to use in the letter.14 Glynn Jones (the jailhouse informant) At trial, Jones was questioned by defense counsel about whether he had received psychiatric care while incarcerated and he denied receiving such care. To support his claim that the People failed to fully disclose the extent of Jones’ history of mental illness, defendant submits a March 15, 2000 decision by Judge David Trager of the Eastern District of New York dismissing two federal 1983 actions Jones had filed in which Jones sought $50 million in damages based on allegations that two female correction officers coerced him into having sex with them. (See Defendant’s Exhibit A-1, Jones v. City of New York, WL 516889 (EDNY 2000).) Judge Trager concluded that both of Jones’ complaints were factually frivolous. In providing background for that conclusion, Judge Trager noted that Jones was an “avid prison litigant” and a “self-described schizophrenic with anti-social personality disorder” who had been convicted of first degree arson. In addition, Judge Trager considered the excuse Jones gave for his delay in filing his complaints — that he was unable to remember these episodes of purported sexual abuse due to medication he had taken during a one year stay at a state prison psychiatric hospital — and found the excuse implausible and the complaints largely time-barred. To refute defendant’s claim that Jones was hospitalized due to mental health issues prior to defendant’s conviction on February 21, 1997, the People provide evidence from the e-justice database that indicates that when Jones was in state custody serving his fifteen to life sentence on his arson conviction, he was released from the custody of the NYS Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCs) to the custody of the NYS Office of Mental Health (OMH) on only two occasions: from March 17, 1998 to April 14, 1998 and from May 5, 1998 to October 6, 1999. (See Affirmation of ADA Carlson at p. 4, n.2.) In addition ADA Carlson avers that she spoke with Margaret Drake of the NYS OMH Legal Department who confirmed to her the accuracy of the above information and that Jones had not received any inpatient treatment from OMH prior to defendant’s conviction. (See Affirmation of ADA Carlson p. 4, n.2.) With respect to the number of parole letters Jones received for testifying in four different homicide prosecutions, Jones unequivocally testified that he expected to receive only one letter to the Parole Board from ADA Rosenbaum. Defendant asserts that Jones’ testimony in this regard is untrue and that Jones and Rosenbaum were not forthcoming regarding the number of parole letters Jones would receive. In support of this contention, defendant refers to the respondent’s brief filed by the People in opposition to defendant’s direct appeal in which the People indicated that at the time of defendant’s trial, Jones would receive not one, but had already received three letters to the Parole Board for having testified in the three other murder cases. (See People’s Exhibit 7, Respondent’s brief at p. 15.) In response, the People assert that their appellate brief was mistaken with respect to the number of parole letters defendant would receive and did receive. The People aver that ADA Carlson spoke with Jones’ parole officer, Jesus Dumeng, who confirmed that Jones’ parole file did not contain any letters on Jones’ behalf from prosecutors in the three other murder cases in which Jones testified and that Jones was not released on his earliest parole eligibility date in 1999, but rather was released in January 2001. (See Affirmation of ADA Carlson p. 4, n.2.) Moreover, Dumeng provided ADA Carlson with a copy of the only letter in Jones’ parole file, which was from ADA Rosenbaum. The letter mentions Jones having testified only in the instant case. (See People’s Exhibit 6.)15 William Sadberry Defendant submits DD-5s containing statements made by Sadberry during the course of the investigation into the murder of Mr. Molina. In those DD-5s, Sadberry told the police that he was outside 30 West 190th Street talking to Pepsi when he heard a gunshot and saw two black males run past him and down Davidson Avenue toward Fordham Road. (See People’s Exhibit 12, DD-5.) To support his claim that Sadberry would have provided exculpatory testimony and thus counsel should have called him as a witness, defendant provides an inmate information sheet from a NYS DOCCs inmate information database and a NYS DOCCs Health Services Report, both of which indicate defendant is a white male. (See Defendant’s Reply brief Exhibits 1 and 2.) To refute defendant’s claim that he is a white male, the People submit defendant’s rap sheet, the CJA report, and a police unusual occurrence report with respect to his arrest for the instant murder, all of which indicate defendant is a black male. (See People’s Exhibit 13, 14, 15.) Conclusions of Law First, defendant claims that his recent discovery that Jones had a history of mental illness is newly discovered evidence. He makes a similar claim as to a 2017/2018 recantation by Linsalato. Second, defendant also argues that the People’s failure to disclose the putative mental illness evidence and the alleged additional parole letters received by Jones constitute Brady violations. Third, defendant contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Newly Discovered Evidence With respect to Jones having an undisclosed history of mental illness, defendant bases this claim on a 2000 federal district court decision, Jones v. City of New York, WL 516889 (EDNY 2000)(Trager, J.), in which the Court dismissed Jones’s civil lawsuits as frivolous, and in doing so cited allegations made by Jones himself. As described above, Judge Trager noted that Jones is a “self-described schizophrenic with anti-social personality disorder” and that Jones had also alleged that he delayed filing his complaints because medication he had taken during a one year stay at a psychiatric hospital caused him difficulties with his memory. Although defendant deserves credit for discovering this decision and seizing upon Jones’ allegations as recounted in the decision to advance his claims, this 2000 decision is not evidence that at the time of defendant’s trial in 1997, Jones, in fact, suffered from a debilitating psychiatric illness that inhibited his ability to perceive or recall his jailhouse interactions with defendant in 1995. Indeed, defendant has not submitted any records corroborating Jones’ self-analysis, and Judge Trager in his decision did not make any factual findings that Jones had a mental illness and if or when he had received care for a mental illness.16 At most the decision establishes that at some point Jones may have suffered from anti-social personality disorder; there was no independent basis for concluding that Jones was a schizophrenic or that he received treatment at a psychiatric hospital. Moreover, in contrast to the unsupported and ambiguous evidence proffered by defendant, the People adduced evidence demonstrating that Jones was not hospitalized for psychiatric care prior to defendant’s trial, but only received such care when he was transferred from DOCCs custody to OMH custody between March 1998 and October 1999, a full year after defendant’s trial and sentencing.17 Put simply, defendant’s uncorroborated evidence is too uncertain, unclear, and unsupported to qualify as newly discovered evidence that could affect the outcome of the case against defendant. Therefore, defendant’s motion on this ground is denied. See CPL 440.30 (4)(b), (c), and (d); CPL 440.10(g); People v. Salemi, 309 N.Y.2d 208 (1955); People v. Velasquez, 143 A.D.3d 126, 131 (1st Dept. 2016)(To vacate a judgment of conviction based on newly discovered evidence, the evidence: (1) must be such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) must have been discovered since the trial; (3) must be such as could have not been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4) must be material to the issue; (5) must not be cumulative to the former issue; and, (6) must not be merely impeaching or contradicting the former evidence.)18 Likewise, the purported 2017/2018 recantation by Frank Linsalato falls woefully short of satisfying the criteria for a viable claim based upon newly discovered evidence. Initially, inherent in any claim of newly discovered evidence, the evidence must be newly discovered; and here, at the time of trial, defendant was aware that Linsalato had recanted. Indeed, the trial record establishes that sometime prior to trial Linsalato had been intimidated by defendant and his cohorts, and that based upon that intimidation, Linsalato recanted his Grand Jury testimony implicating defendant and then refused to testify for either party at trial unless he received immunity from perjury. See pp. 10-11, supra. Thus, defendant has failed to establish that Linsalato’s purported recantation in either his October 26, 2017 letter or in his March 22, 2018 interview at the BxDAO is newly discovered evidence. In any event, Linsalato’s recantation is wholly unreliable and unworthy of belief. Similar to the fear and intimidation used by defendant against Linsalato prior to trial to deter him from testifying for the People, defendant appears to have used the same coercive tactics to procure Linsalato’s most recent recantations. Indeed, Linsalato himself admitted in his March 22, 2018 interview that he was initially approached for assistance in securing defendant’s release from jail by one of defendant’s brothers, Eric, whom he feared, that it was Eric who suggested to him that he write the October 26, 2017 letter to the BxDAO, and that Eric was with him when he wrote the letter and dictated to him what words to use in the letter. In addition, Linsalato admitted that he went to the BxDAO only after repeated phone calls from defendant’s family urging him to do so. Not only does the behavior of defendant’s family members cast doubt on the reliability of Linsalato’s recantation, but Linsalato’s March 22, 2018 interview at the BxDAO is riddled with inconsistencies and is contradicted by the evidence at trial. For example, although he was able to recall the inculpatory statements he made to the police, Linsalato initially did not recall testifying in the Grand Jury and subsequently denied ever testifying in the Grand Jury, notwithstanding incontrovertible evidence that he did so testify. Moreover, Linsalato was unable to recall key details with respect to the shooting such as his own whereabouts or whom he was with on the date of the murder. Furthermore, Linsalato’s claim that he was not present when Mr. Molina was murdered is flatly contradicted not only by his own prior statements but by Wooden’s testimony regarding his observation of defendant and Linsalato fleeing 30 West 190th Street after the shooting, and by defendant’s own statements to the police and to Jones in which he consistently stated that Linsalato was present when the priest was murdered.19 Finally, even if one were to believe Linsalato’s recantation, it would not warrant vacatur, as the recantation neither exculpates defendant nor impeaches trial testimony against defendant. The recantation does not exculpate defendant as Linsalato states that he was not present when Mr. Molina was shot, that he did not know who shot Mr. Molina, and that he was not with defendant on the night Molina was shot. It does not impeach trial testimony against defendant since Linsalato did not testify at trial and his Grand Jury testimony was not introduced at trial.20 For all of these reasons, defendant’s motion to vacate the conviction based upon defendant’s claim that Linsalato’s statements constitute newly discovered evidence is denied. See People v. Velasquez, 143 A.D.3d 126, 133 (1st Dept. 2016)(recantation by eyewitness to robbery was unreliable and did not support defendant’s motion to vacate on the ground of newly discovered evidence); People v. Shilitano, 218 N.Y. 161, 170 (1916)(recantation of trial testimony is considered to be the most unreliable form of evidence and does not warrant a new trial unless there is compelling evidence of the reliability of the recantation). Alleged Brady violations Similarly, there is no merit to defendant’s claim with respect to Jones’ history of mental illness that the People committed a Brady violation that gives rise to the requirement of a new trial. To make out a successful Brady claim, a defendant must show that: (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material. See People v. Guica, _N.Y.3d _, 2019WL2424481 (2019). As stated above, there is nothing in the record that establishes that any evidence regarding Jones’s history of mental illness would have been exculpatory or impeaching. Further, there is nothing in the record that suggests at the time of trial ADA Rosenbaum was aware that Jones had a history of mental illness or had any records indicating such in his possession or control.21 Contrariwise, it does appear that defendant was aware that Jones had a history of mental illness based upon counsel’s cross examination of Jones and his summation remarks. (See fn. 18, supra.) Moreover, even if Jones was a schizophrenic with anti-social personalty disorder and was taking medication for these psychological issues as defendant alleges, and the trial prosecutor was aware of this and failed to disclose it and failed to correct Jones’ testimony regarding his diagnosis and treatment, it would still not be material evidence that would warrant vacatur. This is especially so here where Gilchrist’s testimony, Wooden’s testimony, defendant’s statements to the police, and, most significantly, the crime scene diagram that defendant wrote out and gave to Jones all corroborated Jones’ testimony. In light of the extensive corroborative evidence, any undisclosed evidence with respect to Jones’ psychiatric history would have had marginal impeachment value and would have been cumulative to the impeachment of Jones that occurred at trial, where counsel extensively cross examined Jones and argued in his summation that Jones was not worthy of belief due to his prior convictions and the benefits he would receive from testifying in the instant case. Thus, the Court finds that defendant has not established prejudice to warrant vacatur under Brady with respect to any such nondisclosure. See People v. Guica, supra, _N.Y.3d_ (6/11/19)(no Brady violation where People failed to disclose some of the benefits received by a jailhouse informant where no reasonable possibility that the undisclosed impeachment evidence, which was largely cumulative, would have resulted in a different verdict.). Similarly unavailing is defendant’s claim that the trial prosecutor committed a Brady violation by his alleged failure to disclose that Jones had received three letters to the Parole Board in exchange for his testifying in the other three murder prosecutions, and by his failure to correct Jones’ testimony when Jones testified that he was expecting to receive only one such letter from ADA Rosenbaum. Like his Brady claim regarding Jones’ purported history of mental illness, this allegation too is both uncorroborated and contradicted by evidence adduced by the People. Again, defendant seizes upon language in a secondary source, in this instance, the brief the People filed on direct appeal, which indicates that Jones had received three such letters to the Parole Board from the trial prosecutors of the three other murder cases in which Jones testified. Significantly, defendant fails to provide any of the three purported additional letters; whereas, the People have provided evidence from Jones’ parole officer that only one such letter was written and received by the Parole Board and that was the letter from ADA Rosenbaum that Jones testified about at trial. Here, therefore, it has not been shown that there existed any such favorable evidence or that the trial prosecutor suppressed any such evidence. Based on defendant’s failure to adduce sufficient evidence in support of this claim, defendant’s motion is denied. See CPL 440.30 (4)(b), (c), (d).22 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Lastly, defendant received meaningful representation at trial and his claims regarding counsel’s deficiencies fall well short of the threshold necessary to make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under either the Federal or State standard. At the outset, this Court is fully familiar with the work of defendant’s trial counsel, Martin Goldberg, Esq., who has appeared before this Court on numerous occasions both before and after defendant’s trial in 1997. Mr. Goldberg is an extremely able and experienced attorney who has always represented his clients zealously. Indeed, the transcript of the instant trial is replete with instances when the Court had to admonish Mr. Goldberg not to cross the line from zealous advocacy to overzealous conduct. The trial record also reveals that counsel was eminently familiar with the facts of the case and raised what he reasonably perceived could be factual issues in the case, such as the lack of eyewitness testimony, the absence of fingerprint evidence, and the failure to recover the murder weapon. Counsel’s performance also included thorough and effective cross examinations of all the People’s witnesses, a cogent closing argument, and a motion for a mistrial when, after a courtroom outburst by defendant, the prosecutor commented on defendant’s right to testify (thus preserving this issue for direct appeal). As a result of counsel’s efforts, the jury acquitted defendant of intentional murder and first degree manslaughter. Defendant’s claims regarding counsel’s performance are meritless. With respect to counsel’s failure to call William Sadberry as a witness, defendant fails to provide an affidavit from Sadberry indicating that he was available to testify at trial and indicating what he observed. Instead, defendant again relies on inherently unreliable hearsay statements memorialized in police reports. In any event, assuming Sadberry was available to testify, counsel’s failure to call him as a witness can be readily explained as a legitimate strategic choice. Indeed, if called to testify and he testified consistently with his earlier statements to the police (see supra, p. 14), Sadberry’s testimony would have most likely strengthened the People’s case: Sadberry’s statements corroborate both Jones’ testimony that defendant told Jones that he feared that “Willie” and Pepsi would testify against him and Gilchrist’s testimony that defendant came to her apartment after the shooting. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s claim, Sadberry’s statement that he saw two black males running from the building does not exculpate him since defendant has not provided definitive proof that he is in fact a white male.23 Defendant also contends that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to introduce into evidence at trial two newspaper articles about the case published in the Daily News, which, he claims, would have helped him establish that Jones learned about the details of the murder from those articles and not from defendant’s admissions. Initially, this claim fails because defendant did not testify at trial and did not aver that he showed Jones these articles, and Jones explicitly testified on cross examination that defendant never showed him any newspaper articles about the case. Thus, despite counsel’s attempt to lay a proper foundation for the admission of these articles, there was no legal basis for him to do so. See People v. Melendez, 285 A.D.2d 819 (3d Dept. 2001)(court’s refusal to admit newspaper articles proper where defendant failed to lay proper foundation). Even had he been able to lay a proper foundation, these articles would have done little to establish that Jones learned about the details of the case from the articles and not defendant as these articles do not mention many of the details of the murder to which Jones testified. When viewed holistically, the record of Mr. Goldberg’s performance demonstrates that defendant has failed to sustain his burden to establish that he was deprived of meaningful representation. See People v. Lopez-Mendoza, _N.Y.3d_, 2019WL2453628 (2019)(no ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel in his opening statement promised to call a witness to testify and then failed to do so). * * * * The Court has examined all of defendant’s remaining claims and finds that they are unsubstantiated. In conclusion, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was compelling. It includes defendant’s own incriminating words to Detective Hourihan, his own incriminating words to Rachel Gilchrist, his own incriminating words to Glynn Jones, and perhaps most damning of all, his own incriminating words and markings on the crime scene diagram that he gave to Jones. Defendant has been incarcerated based on this case for close to 25 years and the date of his first parole hearing is drawing near. It appears from the instant motion that defendant is a disciplined and intelligent man and not beyond redemption. Such redemption, even for those who have committed murder, comes through self-awareness and self-improvement, which begins by acknowledging responsibility for past misdeeds, expressing sincere remorse to the victim’s family and community for the heartbreak and pain caused them, and participating in programs to prepare to be a productive member of society should parole be granted. However, instead of taking this road, some twenty years after his conviction, defendant has filed the instant motion, which evinces a lack of insight and a lack or remorse. In the future, instead of filing such motions, the Court is hopeful that defendant will gain insight into his past actions, acknowledge his responsibility for them, and expend his energies engaging in programs to prepare himself for eventual reentry into society. Accordingly, defendant’s motion is denied without a hearing.24 This is the decision, order and opinion of the Court. Dated: August 15, 2019 Bronx, New York
