Respondent Arlene James filed a premises liability action against Petitioner Brixmor New Chastain Corners SC, LLC arising out of injuries she sustained when she tripped on a parking bumper in a parking lot owned by Brixmor.[1] Brixmor filed a motion for summary judgment on James’s claims, and the trial court denied the motion, pointing to issues of material fact that remained regarding whether the structure on which James tripped constituted a hazard and whether James had previously traversed it, thus giving her, at least, constructive knowledge of the hazard. In the same order, the trial court granted a motion filed by James seeking sanctions for spoliation of evidence based on Brixmor’s decision to paint the parking bumpers in the area of James’s fall after the incident. As a result, the trial court barred Brixmor “from introducing evidence or argument that the parking bumper was not a potential hazard.” Brixmor appealed both of those rulings to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the denial of summary judgment, based on the jury questions identified by the trial court. See Brixmor New Chastain Corners SC, LLC v. James, 367 Ga. App. 235, 236-39 (2) (884 SE2d 393) (2023). However, the Court of Appeals vacated the order imposing spoliation[2] sanctions and remanded the matter to the trial court after determining that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard in granting James’s motion. See id. at 240-41 (3). For the reasons explained below, we grant Brixmor’s petition for writ of certiorari; vacate the Court of Appeals’s opinion, in part; and remand the case to that court.[3] In its petition, Brixmor seeks review of three questions: (1) whether the trial court erred in imposing spoliation sanctions without considering that the alteration in question was remediating a potential hazard; (2) whether the trial court erred in imposing spoliation sanctions4; and (3) whether summary judgment should have been granted based on the prior traversal rule. We grant the petition for writ of certiorari, not to address these issues, but rather to address the Court of Appeals’s determination that Brixmor failed to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court in failing to consider the subsequent remedial measures rule[4] in its analysis of the spoliation issue. See Brixmor, 367 Ga. App. at 240 (3). Once the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court applied the incorrect standard on spoliation and remanded the case to the trial court to apply the correct spoliation standard, consideration of the remedial measure rule was unnecessary to the resolution of the issues on appeal and the court’s determination on the issue was thus dicta. Moreover, the Court of Appeals’s conclusion in this regard resolved, with little analysis, an open and difficult legal question under Georgia law regarding what consideration, if any, must be given to the subsequent remedial measures rule in addressing the issue of spoliation. Therefore, we vacate Division 3 of the opinion to the extent that it purports to make such a legal determination, and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Petition for writ of certiorari granted, judgment vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.
